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Abstract 
This thesis is an ethnographic study of Iranian political jokes: a hybridized genre of 
folklore which intersects in both online and oral spheres where it is created and shared. It 
specifically explores the emergence and growth of politicized humorous cellphonelore, which I 
term “electionlore”, during and after the 2016 February elections in Iran. Analysing different 
joke sub-cycles in this electionlore, I argue that these jokes serve as a powerful tool for my 
informants to construct their own “newslore” (Frank 2011) and make manifest what I term and 
define “vernacular politics” through which they were mobilized and unified in their political 
activism. I diverge from the theory of “resistance jokes” (Powell and Paton 1988; Bryant 2006; 
Davies 2011) and propose a new framework for studying political jokes in countries in suspense 
between democracy and dictatorship: jokes as an effective and strategic form of reform and 
unquiet protest.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Jokes in the Margins 
 
In 2015, when it came to the time that I had to choose a topic for my master’s thesis, the first 
thing I consulted with was my journal. For the year since my husband, Hadi, and I moved to 
Canada, I had recorded almost all of my daily experiences of living in this new country in my 
diary. Throughout sixty pages, I had written several sad and happy stories about my challenges 
with the new culture, language, weather, and people. Reviewing all those memories after a year, 
I concluded that if I wanted to write my thesis on a subject which is the least emotionally 
charged and the most compelling, it would be jokes. In between the lines and in the margins of 
my journals, there were multiple jokes which I had written, usually in different colors to separate 
them from main stories. They were either told to me by my Iranian friends in our daily 
conversations or were the ones I remembered as I wrote about my experiences. Perhaps I was 
writing them in the margins, not in the body, because I thought they were secondary and 
distracting. However, after a year, I found them more explanatory than the stories themselves! 
Indeed, I was mostly intrigued by this revelation of how often my friends and I used humor in 
our daily speech without being totally self-aware of our humorous language or of the number of 
times we told jokes to convey our meanings in a single conversation. The more pages I reviewed, 
the more inspired I was to study jokes as my master’s thesis.  
One of my favorite pages in my journal is about an incident that happened in June 2014 
when Hadi and I were in a car with two of our Iranian friends, also graduate students in our 
university, heading to the countryside for picnic. In the body of the journal, I had written in blue: 
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Not surprising, today, all way to the Middle Cove Beach, we were just talking about the 
school and our experiences in the first semester of our graduate studies at MUN. [Then, I 
retold the story of our friend and their issues with their supervisor.]  
 
In the margin in pink ink, I wrote the joke which our friend used when they were explaining their 
problems:1 
Joke One/collected on June 2014: Writing a Thesis on Elephants 
In a university, there were three international students, one German [gender is not 
specified], one British [gender is not specified], and one American man. All three were 
working on elephants as their PhD theses at the same time. After three years, the 
American guy came back with his dissertation, around 250 pages, called ‘Everything you 
need to know about elephants all around the world.’ The next student who submitted their 
thesis was the British one who came back after seven years. Their thesis was an 800-page 
book called Trying to know elephants better. And, finally, the German student came back 
after 15 years with a book as thick as 2000 pages which was called An introduction to 
getting to know elephants, volume one! 
 
Then, the story continues in the body:  
On the way back home, we talked about our experiences of living in Canada. It strikes me 
that even though all of us are living here and now, all our memories tie us back to there 
and then as if we do not belong to either. Comparing Iran and Canada, Hadi said: ‘Our 
story in Canada is like the story of the guy in a joke with two seats on a bus.’  
 
Again, in the margin in pink ink, I had written the joke he told: 
Joke Two/collected on June 2014:  
On a bus heading to Tehran from Shiraz, there was a weirdo guy [ethnicity is not 
mentioned] who every couple of minutes showed up from the back, sat in an empty seat 
in the front, rested for couple of minutes, and then returned to the back. He kept changing 
his seats for many times until the driver got angry and called him out: ‘Hey you, what is 
wrong with you? Just go and put your ass down on your seat for God’s sake! You are 
driving me nuts!’  
Calmly with confidence, the guy answered: ‘Sorry but I’ve booked two seats to be more 
comfortable all the way long!’ 
 
Back in the body, I had written: 
Hadi explains that our lives in Canada are like having two seats, one in the back and the 
other in the front as we are in suspension between two worlds. He said: ‘Neither can we 
totally abandon what we have left in the front in Iran and stay in our seat in Canada nor 
                                                            
1 To protect my friend’s identity, I cannot provide more details on their story and the context in which the 
joke was told. 
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do we want to return to our first place and stay calm there. We are always physically or 
mentally commuting between these two seats without finding comfort in either place.’ 
 
These two jokes are among many in the margins and in between the lines of my journal which 
helped my Iranian friends and me to exemplify, metaphorize, and simplify complicated and 
sometimes untellable concepts in an accessible, humorous language. As a folklorist, curious 
about the ordinary moments of life, I find them not only fascinating but also revealing about 
many aspects of Iranian culture.  
In addition to my journal, my cellphone also played a decisive role in convincing me to 
choose jokes as the subject of my master’s thesis. It also helped me realize what kinds of jokes 
interest me the most, and where the best place is to find them. In late December 2013, before I 
moved to Canada, I installed the messaging application Viber to use its free phone call service to 
keep in touch with my families and friends in Iran. However, after a year, many of my Iranian 
friends and families had transferred a large number of their daily online activities on social 
networks to Viber because, unlike Facebook and Twitter, it had not been blocked or filtered by 
the government.  
Exchanging political jokes was one of the most recurrent activities in Iranian Viber 
groups. First, it was just a hobby for me; first thing in the morning I checked my Viber groups to 
read jokes and have a good laugh. These jokes also updated me with the day’s hot news in Iran. 
Because of the seven-hour time difference between Tehran and St. John’s, I was sure that if 
something newsworthy happened in Iran, jokes about it would be all over my Viber by the time I 
woke up in Canada. Sometimes, I even got the jokes before I learnt about the actual news. Later, 
as I became a more passionate student of folklore, this ritual of checking Viber turned into my 
morning homework; I began to collect jokes and have written them down, each with a small note 
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as a reminder of their contexts for my future reference. In 2015, when I was preparing the first 
draft of my proposal, I already had ten Excel spreadsheets of jokes! 
In 2015, as I reviewed these pages for my preliminary proposal, it became clear to me 
that political jokes not only constituted the majority of my materials but also excited me the 
most. I found politics embedded in Iranian jokes enigmatic, creative, multilayered, and worthy of 
multi-volume theses. By this time, I became determined to narrow my thesis focus on political 
jokes and study their roles in and impact on Iranian society, both virtual and real.  
It did not, therefore, take me long to realize where I should embark on my research even 
from oceans away from Iran. Social media, particularly Viber and, later, Telegram, enabled me 
to bypass the physical distance. They not only kept me updated with the latest political jokes and 
consequently news in Iran, but also made me more aware of the existence and popularity of 
alternative spaces in which Iranians manifest and circulate their often counterhegemonic political 
ideas in various forms, including humor. As I expanded my research, I realized this online 
humor, along with other forms of online media, plays an effective role in shaping and changing 
my informants’ political ideologies and helps them in their political activism. To study these 
alternative spaces and social orders, as a part of my morning ritual of updating my joke archive, I 
began to document my friends’, families’, and later my informants’ online interactions in Viber 
and Telegram groups. Since then, I have collected not only online political humor, but also the 
conversations and the reactions they engendered in online communications.  
Moreover, I was not only interested in the digital performance of political jokes in Iranian 
virtual communities, I also wanted to complement my virtual ethnography with actual fieldwork 
in order to explore political jokes’ significance and functions in off-line Iranian society and see 
how they commute between the digital and oral realms. To this purpose, after submitting my 
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preliminary thesis statement and ethics application were approved, I prepared myself to go to 
Iran and start my ethnographic research.  
As I prepared to leave St. John’s for Tehran, whenever I spoke to Canadian friends about 
my plan to work on Iranian political jokes, and especially to conduct fieldwork in Iran, one of the 
first comments I received was: “Be careful! Iran? Politics? Prison?” Most of their reactions were 
not surprising to me as I was aware that in Western academia, working on a sensitive subject like 
politics, even political jokes, in a Middle Eastern country like Iran raises a red flag. From our 
university travel policy (Memorial University 2010) to even some of my close non-Iranian 
friends, it was thought not safe to conduct fieldwork in Iran, which is somehow related to Iran’s 
regime. However, despite these discouragements and warnings, my 26 years living in Iran 
assured me that nothing could threaten my informants’ and my safety as we have all learnt in our 
lifetimes in Iran how to play around the fire without getting burnt! My supervisor’s constant 
support reinforced my confidence as he reminded me that I, better than anybody else, know how 
to protect myself and my informants. I therefore ended up in Tehran twice, once in 2015 to 
conduct the first round of my ethnography and then later in 2016 to finish up my research. 
  
My Methodology and Positionality 
 
In April 2015, I traveled to Iran and started a preliminary ethnographic study including 
conducting informal interviews and archival research primarily in Tehran. After receiving ethics 
approval in June 2015 (ICEHR 20160071-AR), I completed the first round of my fieldwork 
research and conducted 20 recorded interviews in three cities (Tehran, Bandar Gaz, and 
Kerman). In late February and March 2016, during the parliamentary and the “Assembly of 
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Experts” elections, I did four Skyped interviews, and finally, in August 2016, I traveled one 
more time to Iran and finished my fieldwork study in Tehran. 
In total, I have 25 participants, six of whom I interviewed more than once. All my 
informants are Iranians and Farsi speakers as their first or second language; therefore, I 
conducted all the interviews in Farsi and did not require assistance from an interpreter or a 
translator during or after these interviews. Throughout this thesis, all English translations, 
including interviews and other Farsi materials, are mine. To remain faithful to my informants’ 
word choices, I provide readers with word-by-word translations of their Farsi expressions, 
metaphors, and slang, as well as giving some brief context to those readers who may not be 
familiar with the Farsi language. Additionally, in my transliteration of Farsi words and Arabic 
loanwords, I rely on either my informant’s pronunciations in the interviews or on the most 
commonly used form in Iran.  
It should be noted that my informants used the word “jokes” in a broad sense, as the 
substitute for the word “humor” [Tanz in Farsi] when they discuss different forms of humor such 
as Dubsmash videos and Internet memes. In other words, for them “jokes” mean both humor and 
a particular kind which Elliott Oring defines as “brief communications whose humor is abruptly 
apprehended only at their conclusion” (1992, 81-93). I, too, refer to them as “jokes” in my 
English translations of their words. Additionally, in the title of my thesis and also other parts of 
this research, like my informants, I use “jokes” in a broader sense under which various forms of 
humor fall. While I am aware that words like jokes, memes, and Dubsmash videos are used in 
fairly variable ways, my intention of calling them all “jokes” is to underline their vernacular 
creative nature with dual humorous and serious intent, parallel to traditional jokes. 
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In June 2015, when I conducted the first round of interviews, four informants of mine 
lived in Bandar Gaz, five in Kerman, and eleven in Tehran. All four of my Skype interviewees 
lived in Tehran in late February and March 2016, and, likewise, my interlocutors in my second 
trip to Iran in August 2016 were all residents of Tehran. Tehran is the capital, the largest, and the 
most populous city of Iran (Tehran Municipality 2006). It is located in central Iran and is 
contained, to the north, by the Alborz mountains (see Appendix A-Maps: Map One). According 
to the census issued in 2011, slightly over twelve million people live in Tehran Metropolis, 
known as Greater Tehran (Statistical Center of Iran 2011a). Kerman is a city in south-eastern 
Iran, bordered by Lutt Desert (see Appendix A-Maps: Map One). Around 800 thousand people 
live in Kerman (Statistical Center of Iran 2011b), the majority of whom are Persians and speak 
Farsi with the Kermani accent. Bandar Gaz is a city by the coast of the Caspian Sea in the 
northern Golestan province (see Appendix A-Maps: Map One). Even though Golestan is 
predominately settled by Persian Iranians, Bandar Gazis people belong to a minority group who 
self-identify as Mazani or Mazandarani and speak the Mazani dialect as their first language (see 
Appendix A-Maps: Map Two).  
Even though my informants were then settled in Tehran, Kerman, and Bandar Gaz, they 
come from more diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds including Mazani, Azari, Ghazvini, 
Shirazi, and Lur (see Appendix A-Maps: Map Two: Ethnoreligious Distribution Map of Iran). 
Since the focus of my research is political jokes rather than ethnic and local humor, my 
interviewees’ ethnic background and their city of residence are of the secondary importance. 
Additionally, all my informants are mobile Iranians for most of whom the notion of home as a 
physical place to live is constantly changing. For example, while in 2015, I had ten informants in 
Tehran; on my next visit in 2016, four of them had migrated to other countries. Likewise, two 
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out of my five Kermani informants had moved to Tehran by early 2016. Therefore, throughout 
this thesis, I intentionally avoid giving unnecessary information about my informants’ ethnicity 
and location and introduce them primarily with their age, gender, and political affiliations. 
However, when it is occasionally required, for example in Chapter Three in my discussion of 
local humor and intergenerational identity construction, I draw on their ethnicity and family 
background.  
In this research, my main goal is to reflect the views of a particular age-group of Iranians 
regardless of their ethnicity and location. With five exceptions, all my informants are from the 
“1360 Generation” in Iran. Known as “Dahe Shasti ha” (“the ’80s kids” in English), they were 
all born in the 1360s in the Persian calendar (the 1980s in the Georgian Calendar) and constitute 
the first generation born after the 1979 Revolution. Opening their eyes in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran at the midst of Iran-Iraq war, they were called “the buds of the Revolution” (“Ghonche haye 
Enghelab” in Farsi) by the state. They are the children of those parents whose generation 
overthrew the last monarchy in Iran and carried out a revolution. They are also the younger 
siblings of “Dahe Panjahi ha” (“the ’70s kids” in English) who witnessed this revolution as 
young children.  
The children of the 1970s and 1980s are often known in Iran as “the Burned Generation” 
(“Nasl soukhteh” in Farsi) and “a generation with little to lose” (Khosravi 2008, 139). The ’80s 
children are also called “the Third Generation” (Nasl sevomiha in Farsi) who, as a result of the 
baby boom during the 1980s war with Iraq, “make up more than half of the present population of 
Iran” (Ibid., 5). Unlike their parents, “the First Generation” of the Revolution, and their siblings, 
“the Second Generation”, they have no memories of this political, religious, cultural, and social 
uprising as “they are the product of the Islamic Republic” (Ibid., 5).  
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Despite their lack of participation in the 1979 Revolution, “the ’70s and ’80s kids” were 
the protagonists of what many political scientists and historians call the most important and the 
largest uprising in the history of post-revolutionary Iran (Farhi 2012, 4; Adelkhah 2012, 17; 
Nabavi 2012, xi): “the Green Movement”. In June 2009, when the government announced 
Ahmadinejad as the winner of the tenth presidential elections, hundreds of thousands of Iranians 
spontaneously poured into the streets, first in Tehran and later across the country, and accused 
the state of election fraud. Chanting “Where Is My Vote?” and “Give Back My Vote!”, they 
demanded their uncounted votes and requested the removal of Ahmadinejad from the office.  
Shortly thereafter, this outburst turned into a national movement whose supporters not 
only expressed their dissatisfactions with the regime in street protests, but also sought 
fundamental social changes in different aspects of the society. Despite the subsequent brutal 
crackdown by the government, including the massive imprisonments of protesters, journalists, 
and political/social activists and the house arrests of the movement’s initial leaders, Mir Hossein 
Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi, according to political scientists, the Green 
Movement has brought about long-term consequences in Iranian society (see Nabavi 2012 for a 
collection of essays on religious, political, cultural changes after the Green Movement). As such, 
many of my informants believe that it at least generated a social, cultural, and political awareness 
which is still awake among their generation.    
Except for two who did not deliberately clarify their political affiliations, all my other 
nineteen informants who are “the ’80s kids” (aged between 28 to 37) are pro-Green Movement. 
They either participated in street protests or contributed to this movement with their strong and 
active presence in social media in 2009. Two of them were slightly injured by the state 
authorities during street protests, and one of them was briefly imprisoned. To protect their 
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identities, upon their requests, I use pseudonyms for almost all my informants throughout this 
thesis.  
My pro-Green Movement informants self-identity as “reformist” and support the 
“reformist movement.” Iran’s “reformist discourse” was initially theorized by revolutionary 
elites and religious intellectuals in the early 1990s, ten years after the Revolution. On May 23, 
1997, when Mohammad Khatami, as the pioneer of this discourse, won the presidential elections, 
it officially injected into and gradually restructured the political system. Khatami’s victory day, 
the second of the Khordad month in the Persian calendar (May 23), is annually celebrated by 
reformists and their supporters because it marks the birthday of “reformism,” “liberalism,” and 
“democracy” in Iran’s post-revolutionary politics (see Nabavi 2012, 41-46 for a brief history of 
this movement).  
Even though Iranian reformist politicians never gained enough power to achieve their 
political aims, their discourse of reform paved the way for the emergence and growth of the 
Green Movement in 2009. As my informants explained to me, by using the word “reformism,” 
they basically mean a progressive path moving toward democracy and reform. Likewise, by self-
identifying as “reformist,” they do not only express their commitment to the political ideology of 
a faction, but also their support of the larger discourse of rights and freedom in Iran.  
All of my nineteen reformist informants are university graduates: one with doctorate, 
sixteen with master’s, and two with bachelor degrees in either humanities or engineering 
disciplines. My two informants who did not specify their political affiliations also have 
university degrees; one has a master’s and is currently a PhD student, and the other has a 
bachelor’s. Two of my four remaining informants who do not belong to the ’80s age-group have 
high school diplomas, and the other two are now university students. As a result, it is right to 
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conclude that my research findings have drawn mostly from the views of a particular group of 
young Iranians who are all well-educated and come from middle and upper-middle socio-
economic class. 
My position in this group was very clear: on one hand, I was an ethnographer, and on the 
other hand, I was an insider. Like most of my informants, I am a child of the ’80s with similar 
lived experiences and challenges during my childhood, adolescent, and youth. As a supporter and 
a participant of the Green Movement, I not only share common political interests with my 
reformist informants but, also like many of them, I was affiliated with student political 
associations while attending university in Iran. These common political activities helped me 
build trust among my informants to the extent that they fearlessly and confidently spoke to me 
about politics and their political involvements without self-censoring.  
Additionally, my educational background in both humanities and engineering positioned 
me not only as a curious insider, but also as a researcher familiar with both the daily and 
academic languages of her informants. My engineer participants frequently used esoteric terms 
when they discussed technical matters related to their activities online with the confidence that I 
shared their knowledge. Likewise, my interviewees from humanities disciplines quoted well-
known theorists in their fields as they assumed I might have heard of them or at least be 
interested to learn about them. 
Finally, almost all my informants (except one who is in her seventies) and I are “digital 
native[s]” (Prensky 2001, 1) as we were all born in the digital age and do not need to adapt to the 
technological changes of our time. Like other children of “techno-culture” (Penley and Ross 
1991), my informants not only spend several hours a day with their laptops and smartphones 
surfing social networks, but they have also, as mentioned earlier, benefited from this space to 
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undertake their political activism, especially since the Green Movement. Telegram and Viber are 
the most popular online venues for exchanging news, political debates, jokes, videos, music, and 
different forms of expressive culture among Iranians, from politicians to ordinary people. In 
2015, 22 of 25 of my informants were Viber users, and in 2016, this number changed to 24 
Telegram users. In my last visit to Tehran in 2016, I realized almost all my informants’ online 
activities were centered in Telegram. In less than a year, this application not only replaced Viber 
but also became, by far, the most popular online space which, unlike other social networks and 
messaging apps, is still accessible without VPN and anti-filter software.  
As a digital native and also an active user of Viber and Telegram, it was easy for me to 
observe and sometimes participate in my informants’ online communications in these venues. 
Since 2015, through virtual ethnographic methods (see Hine 2000; Boellstroff 2012), I have 
documented their digital interactions and online conversations which involve any form of humor. 
I was either invited to and joined their groups and channels or, if it was a private group where I 
was not allowed to join, I asked my informants to send me screenshots or sheet-logs of their 
humor-related activities after getting permission from the other members in their groups. Later in 
our interviews, my informants contextualized this material for me. Therefore, my methodology 
in conducting this research was a combination of virtual ethnography and fieldwork research.  
 
Research Objectives and Overview of Chapters 
 
This research is an ethnographic study of a “hybridized” genre of folklore (Blank 2013a, 
20), Iranian political humor, which is created, shared, and converged in both online and oral 
spheres. The Messaging applications Viber and Telegram, as well as semi-public places like 
taxis are the main fields of the emergence, growth, and exchange of political humor in Iran. In 
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this study, I explore how my informants use these spaces to express their political ideas in the 
language of humor, and how this political humor serves them in achieving their political ends. 
To this purpose, I follow four objectives which correspond with four chapters of my thesis:  
The first objective of my research, outlined in Chapter Two, is to study the evolution of 
joke-telling culture in Iran’s recent years. I start my exploration with Irancell, a 
telecommunication company which led to facilitation, mobilization, and digitization of joke-
telling commutations. I argue that with its arrival, cellphones became the main medium of 
creation and dissemination of jokes in Iran. I further explore how these pocket-sized joke-telling 
devices prepared the ground for the formation, expansion, and distribution of what I term 
cellphonelore: folklore that is adapted for, created on, and disseminated through cellphone 
devices. I end my discussion with a brief overview of how smartphones and messaging apps such 
as Telegram and Viber influence cellphonelore and consequently affect joke-telling tradition.   
In Chapter Three, I follow two objectives: first, I explore my informant’s online joke-
telling culture by studying its identifying features and its functions in their online groups. 
Second, I offer a theoretical discussion of the concept of digital joke-telling performance by 
providing a holistic analysis of online humor in the Telegram space. In my exploration of digital 
joke-telling culture, I open my discussion by introducing Viber and Telegram’s platforms and 
their features while naming the factors which led to my informants’ mass migration to Telegram. 
Then I focus on their humorous communications to argue how these interactions make a culture 
which is embedded, interactive, and referential. I finish this discussion by identifying moral and 
social protocols such as Adab va Ehteram be Bozorgan (in English, respect and graciousness for 
elders), an adherence to which makes my informants’ joke-telling culture intergenerational.  
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In my study of digital joke-telling performance in Chapter Three, I first situate my 
research in the body of the folkloristic scholarship on both online and oral humor. Then I identify 
three characteristic features which make Telegram joke-telling performances distinct from oral 
humorous communications: joke forwarding/sharing, digital laughter and unlaughter, and 
reordering public and private spaces. I end this chapter with the argument that Telegram and 
Viber provide my informants with alternative spaces for the manifestation and circulation of 
their counterhegemonic political ideas, those that cannot flourish in the public sphere because of 
the control and fear of the state.  
This conclusion brings us to the fourth and last objective of my thesis outlined in Chapter 
Four and Five, which is an exploration of political humor serving political activism in Iranian 
society. To this aim, I specifically study Iranian election-themed cellphonelore, which I call 
electionlore, in order to show that, contrary to the general assumptions among a large number of 
humor scholars, political humor can be effective, strategic, and an active and unquiet form of 
protest. In Chapter Four, I start my discussion by giving political, historical, and social contexts 
of political jokes that emerged in both virtual and oral Iranian society during and after the 
parliamentary and the Assembly of Experts elections in February 2016. According to my 
informants’ statements, I re-narrate the story of these elections from the perspective of joke 
tellers and distributors and ask and answer when, how, where, and why these jokes were told, 
what consequences they brought, and what goals they achieved. 
In Chapter Five, I analyze three joke sub-cycles of the February electionlore: the pre-
election disqualification jokes, Khatamilore, and post-election vote-counting jokes. In this study 
I diverge from the theory of “resistance jokes” (Powell and Paton 1988, Bryant 2006) and argue 
that, unlike Christie Davies’s argument, political jokes in Iran do not act like an “aspirin” which 
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people take to “suspend their political pain” (2011, 248) without getting long-term real effects. 
Instead, in post-revolutionary and post-Green-Movement Iran, they are an active form of reform 
and effective expressions of support and unification toward a more democratic Iran. 
In this chapter, I introduce the term vernacular politics: the ways in which individuals 
live out politics on a daily basis while interpreting complicated political events that directly or 
indirectly affect their everyday lives. In each joke sub-cycle, I demonstrate that the vernacular 
politics embedded in and articulated through these jokes are not just a simplified vernacularized 
version of so-called official politics but rather are painstakingly selected, carefully modified, and 
intentionally subverted versions of politics whose multiple layers reveal different unspoken 
details about politics in Iran. I finish this chapter with a discussion on how these jokes enabled 
my reformist informants to construct their “newslore” (Frank 2011) through which they 
subverted the hegemony of the elections’ power dynamics in their favor. In this way, these jokes 
mobilized them by evoking their sense of solidarity and empowered them by engendering a 
feeling of superiority. I explain these effects by drawing on three meta-theories about laughter, 
“superiority” (Hobbes 1962; Berlyne 1968; Morreall 1987), “relief” (Freud 1960; Meyer 2000), 
and “incongruity” (Beattie 1776; Oring 2003). I conclude that these jokes served as an 
aggressive weapon as well as a safety-valve, and the laughter they aroused was an explicit 
message of superiority from my reformist informants to the defeated conservatives as the victims 
and targets of these jokes. 
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Chapter 2: Joke-telling Tradition from Taxi to Smartphone: Cellphonelore 
and Transmission of Hybridized Folklore in Iran 
 
“Do you remember the time when there was no joke in Iran?” asked my 31-old male informant, 
Arman. He continued:  
I do! I recall when I was a child till perhaps I turned 12 or 15 years old, there were 
abundance of jokes; Once a Turk guy, once a Lur guy, … There were plenty of jokes of 
this sort, ethnic jokes, and we always laughed at them. I also remember the time when I 
felt there is no joke anymore; all jokes are old. I was 17 or 18 years old [at that time] 
which is 2004 and around 2005 [1382 and 1383 in the Persian calendar]. There were no 
new jokes, or at least, I as a teen, got just repeated jokes. When I got together with my 
friends and family members, as soon as one of us started to tell a joke, after the very first 
word, we all together stopped them, saying: “don’t tell it, we have already heard it!” That 
is the time the Madhouse joke appeared! Iran was really like that madhouse. Have you 
heard the joke? 
 
“No,” I answered with a recorder in my hand. We were drinking tea and talking about my 
research in his apartment in Tehran. He continued: 
Joke Three/collected on June 2015 
Once, in a city, there was a madhouse with plenty of crazy people! Really Majoon [the 
Arabic and Persian word for crazy which is vernacularly used at times when everything 
goes insane without legitimate reasons]! One day, an inspector went there for a visit. He 
found a line of mad people who were laughing out loud and were rolling on the ground 
out of joy for couple of minutes nonstop after one of them shouted out only a number. It 
repeated for several times; each time, one said a number, and all died laughing. He asked 
the head of the madhouse: ‘why was that funny? The interval between their long laughter 
and the time when one of them says a number is very short! Nothing could have been 
said or have happened in between!’ 
 
The head answered: ‘All these people have been here for a long while. They numbered all 
the jokes they knew. Now, it is enough one of them only says a joke number to make all 
laugh. Why do you not try it once? Just pick a number and see what will happen. 
Remember there are only 52 jokes told here, not more.’ 
 
Then the inspector said 22, and all burst out laughing for couple of minutes. Amused by 
this game, he thought it is a good time to test how mad they are. Therefore, he picked a 
number out of the joke range and said 67. To his surprise, this time, the mads laughed 
even harder and longer! When they stopped laughing, the inspector asked one of them: 
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‘Excuse me, can you tell me what you laughed at?’ The mad answered: ‘Not exactly but 
it was a new joke! Haven’t heard it before!’2 
 
We both laughed and then Arman commented: “it was a widespread joke at that time3, and Iran 
was pretty much like that before then. Perhaps, it was not as ridiculous and exaggerated as the 
joke says but symbolically as joke-less and insane as the madhouse was.” I asked: “But this joke 
famine did not last long, right? When did it end? Do you remember?” “Of course, it ended,” 
Arman answered. “Do you know when I got the 67th joke? If I remember right, it was in 2004, 
2005 when Irancell came to Iran.”   
 
Irancell Saves the Madhouse from the Joke Famine  
  
Irancell is one of the biggest mobile phone operators in Iran which provides its customers 
with a number of telecommunicating services such as international calls, SMS, MMS, 3G/4G 
mobile data, and WiMAX4 with an inexpensive price compared to its opponents. What it is most 
popular for, or at least among my informants’ generation who constitutes one of its largest 
market targets, are its pre-paid tariff plans offered for a range of fees. For example, one can go to 
an Irancell official representative store across the country and buy and register a pre-paid SIM 
card by showing their national identity card, Kart Meli (Irancell 2017).  
                                                            
2 To translate this joke from Farsi to English, I tried to remain faithful to Arman’s word choice. For 
example, he used the word divaneh-khaneh in Farsi whose English word-by-word translation is 
mad(divaneh)-house(khaneh). Also, the word “mad” in English is the closest translation to the Farsi word 
divaneh. Divaneh refers to insane people who do crazy acts and harm others either intentionally or 
unconsciously and is different from the word bimare ravani, which is primarily used for patients who 
suffer from mental illnesses. 
3 Multiple variations of Joke Three may be universally known and told all around the world.  
4 WiMAX is an abbreviation for “Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access” which is a digital 
system for wireless communications based on specific standards. 
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Up to the point when I first left Iran, at the time I conducted my fieldwork in 2015 and 
2016, none of the four major mobile phone operators in Iran have provided plans with 
cellphones. A subscriber gets only a SIM card from an operator and separately buys a cellphone 
from electronic shops. Also, to register a SIM card in one’s name, they must have their national 
identity card with them at the time of buying it. Every permanent resident above 15 years old in 
Iran, whether citizen or not, is eligible to get a national identity card. This card has its holder’s 
national identity number, some basic biographical information, and their photo on one side and 
their home postal code on the other side5. 
To use a registered Irancell SIM card, the person increases its credits by dialing a charge 
code. Charge codes are provided through pre-paid charge cards which are available in almost 
every store in Iran, from grocery stores to newspaper street booths. They are also purchasable 
online, and even orderable directly from the operator by dialing a code. Irancell charge cards 
range from 10,000 Iranian Rials (about 0.50 Canadian dollar) to 200,000 Rials (8.43 CAD) and 
provide services accordingly. As it is said on the Irancell website, there is no expiry period for 
these pre-paid credits, and there is no monthly fee to keep the line active (Irancell 2016).  
According to my informants who still use Irancell, the main advantages of Irancell over 
its biggest opponent, Hamrah Aval6 are its affordability and anonymity. While Irancell numbers 
do not include area codes, every number assigned to Hamrah Aval’s postpaid SIM cards has one 
appearing in the first four digits, indicating in which region of Iran the SIM card is registered. 
For example, if a number starts with 0913, people assume the number and consequently its 
                                                            
5 It is compulsory to have Kart Meli to do many things in Iran such as to get a passport, a driver license, 
and to do bank procedures. 
6 Hamrah Aval is one of oldest and largest mobile operators in Iran which is primarily known for its 
postpaid SIM cards.  
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owner might be from a city in either Yazd, or Kerman, or Isfahan provinces whose Hamrah Aval 
area codes are 913. For this reason, my 32-year-old female informant, Rezvan, discarded her 
Hamreh Aval number and bought an Irancell SIM card when she moved to Tehran for work in 
2010, where, in her words, “nosy townie Tehranis look down on shahrestanis,” people from a 
city other than Tehran. With similar motives, Mandana, my 31-year-old female informant, 
bought her first Irancell SIM card in 2009 when she moved to Tehran for study. She told me that 
since she moved to Tehran, whenever she gave her Hamrah Aval number to people at University 
or other institutions, a flood of stereotypical questions and jokes about her ethnic background 
chased her. She says in our interview: “I got sick of these questions and the shahrestani label. It 
didn’t take me long to realize that the easiest solution was to get an Irancell line which does not 
reveal my ethnic background to everyone in first place!” 
Besides its anonymity, Behzad, my thirty-year-old male informant, believes that Irancell 
with its highly affordable and widely available SIM cards enables all Iranians to have, use and 
keep a cellphone line while they are not trapped by monthly bills and subscription fees7. 
Comparing Irancell and Hamrah Aval, one friend of mine once sarcastically made this analogy: 
“rather than giving you a heart attack and killing you at once by a monthly bill as Hamrah Aval 
does, Irancell Sar-e-to ba panbe mibore [literally meaning ‘cuts your head with cotton,’ 
metaphorically used to convey ‘killing someone painlessly and silently without making the 
victim realize their death’] by its pre-paid charge cards.”  
In addition to its reasonable costs, it was its irresistible promotions which drew many 
people to buy an Irancell SIM card during its first years in Iran. Like Arman, I, too, got my first 
                                                            
7 Besides Irancell, there are other phone operators such as Taliya and even Hamrah Aval which also 
provide pre-paid cellphone lines without charging subscription fees. However, according to one of my 
interlocutors, Irancell is the most famous, the most accessible, and the most reliable. 
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Irancell SIM card in 2005 when I was in the second year of my undergraduate studies. Using its 
Red promotional plan for just 30,000 Rials (slightly more than one Canadian dollar) per month, I 
could send unlimited texts to other Irancell users without consuming my credit balance, and even 
more importantly I could make Irancell-family-wide phone and conference calls for free in the 
evenings. To give readers a better sense of Irancell prices, I should note that on average, the total 
amount of Irancell charge cards I used in a month was up to 150,000 Rials (roughly six CAD), 
whereas the bills I received for my Harmahe Aval line was roughly 400,000 Rials 
(approximately seventeen CAD) per month, almost three times more. To become a member of 
this inexpensive network, many people who I knew bought an Irancell SIM card and used it 
alongside their primary lines. My then roommate had four Irancell SIM cards plus one Hamrah 
Aval, each of which she used for contacting different people: her Irancell ones respectively for 
family and close friends, university friends, her two partners, and her Hamrah Aval was her 
official contact number which she gave to our residence manager and university staff. While 
chatting and texting with her friends and families regularly, she also used her Irancell for 
exchanging jokes, funny/informative notes, poems, and even stories. One exam night, she sent a 
whole chapter of a book as multiple pages of texts to her classmates, all for free without 
spending any Rials from her credit balance! 
To compete with Hamrah Aval and to widen its network, Irancell, for a long time, used to 
have a special offer: “buy one SIM card and get one free as a gift!”8 My first Irancell SIM card 
was my sister’s gift SIM card, and my mother’s was my father’s gift one. Similar to my family, 
many other Iranian families became Irancell members and fans and started to use their Harmrah 
                                                            
8 The second SIM card was known as SIMcart hadye, “the gift SIM card” in Iran. Since no other 
operators had given this offer at that time, whenever one said “the gift SIM card”, it was assumed they 
referred to their Irancell line. 
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Aval lines less frequently. Behzad, for instance, told me he used to have an Irancell line, and 
soon his mother and his brother joined this mobile network through the buy-one-get-one-as-a-gift 
offer. Four years later, in 2009, when I bought my second Irancell line, I only paid 50,000 Rials 
(2.11 CAD) and again got two SIM cards, one as a gift. As a result of this affordability and 
popularity, many Iranians without a cellphone line became able to own one. In 2014 when I left 
Iran to come to Canada, almost all of my friends had an Irancell line. In 2015 and 2016 when I 
conducted this research, almost all of my 25 informants had or used to have at least one Irancell 
line at one time. 
Returning to the madhouse joke and Arman’s claim, how did Irancell end Iran’s joke 
famine? Arman explained: 
[When Irancell came to Iran and brought its unlimited free texting services], people 
started sending infinite texts to each other. Anything funny they read on websites was 
turned into a text-message joke and was carried over into this text messaging network 
[Irancell]. Therefore, Irancell and these text jokes grew up bigger and even faster. It was 
then when I got more than thirty or forty new jokes a day! All via SMS! […] Perhaps, it 
was Irancell from which I heard [got] my first political joke […] I remember we [my 
friends and I] made jokes of whatever, literally whatever, we thought it might make us 
and others laugh and texted it to all people in our phone book [contact list]. It didn’t 
matter how many people they were or how many texts we had to send because they were 
all free. And I guess at this point people started to become more hilarious and funny. The 
people whom I thought were getting frowning and serious, now were turning funny and 
humorous again. Therefore, jokes started to get produced more and more. 
 
Arman’s account refreshed my memory. I recall when I was in the third year of my 
undergraduate studies in computer engineering in 2006, a year after I got my first Irancell SIM 
card, every Wednesday after our last class of the week, two students of my cohort got together in 
our undergrad room. One of them searched the Internet for jokes while the other one typed them 
as texts. They sent these texted jokes to all the people in their contact lists, including me, via 
their Irancell lines. As a result, every Wednesday, I received waves of jokes on various topics, 
some of which I forwarded to people in my contact lists with Irancell lines. 
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In its early years in Iran, Irancell enabled many Iranians to have an affordable cellphone 
line. It provided its customers with inexpensive pre-paid plans and guaranteed their anonymity 
through its region-code-free numbers. It also expanded its network through some special deals, 
thereby making families and friends more connected with each other. However, these were only 
some of the impacts it had on my informants’ communications. In fact, Irancell’s most 
significate contribution to their social interactions was the formation and the transmission of a 
pocket-sized digital joke-telling tradition. In the following section, I argue that Irancell played an 
essential role in the construction and dissemination of what I term cellphonelore, a form of 
digital folklore which has mobilized joke telling culture in Iran since then. 
 
Irancell and the Phenomenon of Cellphonelore in Iran 
 
“You should hear my story about Irancell. You would like it. I’m sure it will be some sort 
of use in your thesis. It is kind of embarrassing, but now after five years, I don’t mind telling it. I 
got publicity at school for this story.” My 31-year-old male informant, Ahmad, chuckled and 
waited for my confirmation. “I would love to! Please!” I nodded to him impatiently. Then, I 
quickly opened my notebook. It was not a scheduled interview, and I did not have my recorder 
with me. In fact, I was not prepared at all and was still feeling dizzy and jet-lagged from my 
twenty-hour flight to Iran a few days before. That night, I had come to a party in my old friends’ 
house in Tehran where I met Ahmed. When he heard that I came back to Iran to do my thesis 
research on jokes, he got interested in my topic and had a long chat with me during the party. He 
was a slow talker, and I was optimistic that I would be able to keep up with his pace and jot 
down what he was telling me in that loud, crowded party.  
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Ahmad’s Story9 
Let me start from the very beginning. It goes back to 2007 when for the first time I got a 
cellphone. [I looked up from my notebook without saying a word, and he rushed for his 
next sentence as if answering my unasked question] Yes, I did not have any before. I 
never wanted to have a cellphone line, even when I was living far from my parents. I had 
my own reasons back then which seem absurd to me now. Anyway, guess what operator I 
bought? [without waiting for my answer, he continued]. Of course, Irancell. When 
Irancell came in to Iran, I couldn’t resist any more. It was very cheap, and all my friends 
had one. I remembered ten or more friends of mine made a group and had conference 
calls at least one day in a week in the evenings. It was all free, and they used their 
Irancells just for fun. I badly wanted to join them, so first I bought a very old cheap 
mobile device, Nokia 1100, and then an Irancell SIM card. I got a good plan as well; it 
was the Red or Golden plan, I cannot remember now, but whatever it was, it enabled me 
to join my friends’ conference calls in low cost. 
  
“What did you talk about on your calls?” I asked. Ahmad answered:  
Nothing serious. We were often chatting about ordinary topics, and telling jokes. It was 
just for fun and laughs. Occasionally, we had male-only group talks in which we chatted 
about different topics and told different jokes like dirty jokes. In all these conference 
calls, I was the only one who did not have a Hamrah Aval line.  
 
Even though it all started just for having fun, after a year, I decided to keep my Irancell 
line and use it as my primary number. In winter 2008, I was co-teaching a course with a 
female peer of mine. It was a lab course for which the students were sitting behind 
computers, and we walked around to help them with their projects, live-running on their 
computers. As the instructors of the course, we were only a year or two ahead of our 
students; therefore, it was not easy for us to control the class.  
 
My colleague and I realized we should soon have a meeting to discuss our issue. While 
we were still in class, surrounded by students, she asked for my phone number to arrange 
a meeting date. I said only the first four digits that she suddenly interrupted me and said 
in an angry voice: ‘No, please give me your real number! It is a serious matter, and we do 
not have time for fun!’  
 
Puzzled and a little irritated, I answered: ‘That is my number! My only number! I only 
have an Irancell line!’ I heard students who were sitting at my back giggling. 
  
After this incident, this news got distributed as a joke all over the department that 
‘Ahmad used his Irancell phone for serious stuff!’ 
 
                                                            
9 To reconstruct Ahmad’s story, I relied on the notes I took at the party. While I attempted to be faithful to 
his narrative, some changes were necessary in order give the story more flow and coherence. These 
alterations were made with his permission. 
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I wish it was the end of my story with Irancell, and I had bought a Hamrah Aval line after 
what happened in class. But regrettably, I didn’t learn my lesson.  
 
A year later, I graduated and was looking for a job. My friend’s father who runs a 
successful firm promised to help me out with my job hunting and making networks. One 
day, I was at a meeting with him and his friends who were also successful CEOs. The 
meeting went well, and was hoping one of them would offer me a good position. In the 
end, I was given a form in which I wrote my Irancell number in the indicated space for a 
primary contact number. When I handed it back, my friend’s father took a quick look at 
it. With a frowning face, he asked me in a serious voice: ‘Please give us your main 
number!’ 
 
As Ahmad’s account reveals, Irancell, in its early years, was not considered as a primary number 
by mostly middle- and upper-class cellphone users. Like Ahmad’s friends, students, and 
colleague, many people associated Irancell numbers primarily with entertainment and leisurely 
activities. For most of my informants, myself included, it was the informal and secondary 
cellphone line which was exclusively used for making conference calls with friends and family 
members and texting jokes, poems, love notes, stories, and occasionally political and social 
awareness-raising notes. My informants who had multiple cellphone lines treated each of them 
differently. Like my aforementioned roommate with five mobile lines, they too used Irancells as 
their private number, only for communicating with their intimates, whereas Hamrah Aval was 
their formal number, the one often chosen to fill the blank of a primary number in official forms.  
These two different approaches toward Irancell and Hamrah Aval not only underlined a 
clear distinction between two existing cellphone cultures in Iran but also prepared two separate 
but parallel grounds for the growth of each; on one hand, there was the official mobile culture 
mostly associated with Hamrah Aval numbers which required the use of high variety language in 
formal communications with strangers such as bosses, teachers, and co-workers. On the other 
hand, there was the informal mobile communications among intimates which flourished by 
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Irancell’s arrival and has evolved along with the technological and tele-communicational 
changes in Iran. Cellphonelore has emerged out of and thrived on the latter.  
What I call cellphonelore is folklore that is adapted for, created on, and disseminated 
through cellphone devices. Cellphonelore takes various forms such as jokes, text-based pictures, 
urban legends, and with the advent of new messaging applications such as Telegram and Viber, 
this list expands to short films, digitally altered-photographic jokes, animated pictures, and, more 
recently, Dubsmash10 videos.  
Cellphones, like fax machines and computers, not only serve as a medium for the 
communication of folklore among my informants, but also provide the tools for creation and 
transmission of cellphonelore, which both inhabit and are shaped by this environment. By the 
arrival of affordable and accessible operating mobile network of Irancell, millions of text 
messages, many of which included forms of folkloric expressive culture such as jokes and urban 
legends, were exchanged by Iranians on a daily basis. However, not all Iranian cellphonelore is 
textlore; in other words, not all cellphonelore is generated on and transmitted through texts. The 
prevalence of smartphones with Wi-Fi and 3G/4G data capabilities and the popularity of 
messaging applications such as Viber and Telegram in the recent years in Iranian society have 
unbound cellphonelore from its limitation to text messages, thereby enlarging this genre to 
include other forms such as videos and photos. In the following sections, I draw on my 
                                                            
10 Dubsmash is a video messaging application through which users lip-sync over an audio clip and make a 
new one with their own faces. Audio clips can include a section of a song, a movie, or, more notably in 
Iran, a political speech. A very famous example of this type in Iran is found in the popularity of the 
numerous Dubsmash videos of the former President Mohammad Khatami’s speech, which went viral 
during the Parliament and Assembly of Experts elections in February 2016. In his speech, Khatami, who 
is currently subject to media ban, called on people to vote to the “List of Hope” which included all 
remaining reformist candidates in the election campaign. I further discus this election-themed 
cellphonelore in Chapters Four and Five.  
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ethnographic observations and my informants’ narratives of these cultural and technological 
changes in Iran in order to reveal how they have affected the joke-telling culture. 
  
From Taxi to Telegram: Changes of Joke-telling Tradition 
  
In this section, I draw on my observations documented in my field notebooks to 
demonstrate how the joke telling tradition has changed in Iran since 2013. The following entries 
selected from my fieldnotes are provided in chronological order and are marked by the place and 
time of their occurrence. These fieldnotes provide different joke-telling instances that happened 
in taxis or public places like the metro. They show that technological changes such as the arrival 
of messaging apps like Viber and Telegram affected and mediated this oral phenomenon in Iran. 
In the following section, I further discuss these changes. 
June 2013, Tehran, in a yellow Taxi 
In one of my notebooks, I have kept a joke I heard from a taxi driver in Tehran around 
the 2013 presidential election: 
 
Joke Four/collected on June 2013: 
One day Ahmadinejad [Iranian former president] found lice crawling on his head. He 
took a comb and made a neat middle parting in his hair. Someone asked him why he did 
so. He replied: ‘One side is for male lice and the other for females.’ 
 
I remember it was around the presidential elections in Tehran in 2013, and I was on my 
way to a party when the taxi driver told me this joke. I wrote it down to retell it to my 
friends in the party. 
 
January 2014, Tehran 
In 2014, the messaging application of Viber was new in Iran. Before I left Iran to come to 
Canada, I installed Viber on my mother’s smartphone, so we could have free voice calls 
with each other when we are apart. 
 
April 2015, Tehran, Sadeghiyeh Metro Station 
It was a Spring day in 2015, and I was back in Iran to undertake the first round of my 
fieldwork. Coming back home from an interview with one of my informants, Hana, I was 
on the metro. Next to my bench, there were two girls, in their twenties I suppose, sitting 
on the ground and reading jokes from their cellphones to each other.  
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While giggling and whispering, one of them asked the other one to forward her the joke. 
From my angle of view, one could easily see the screens of their cellphones. Curious, I 
took a look and recognized the purple background of Viber on their cellphones via which 
they were exchanging jokes. 
 
June 2015, Taleghan 
It was the last week of my fieldwork in Iran in June 2015. I was invited to go to a one-
day trip to the countryside around Tehran, Taleghan, by a big group of my friends. To 
organize their plans, manage the budget and share photos, they created a group on 
WhatsApp and requested all the fellow-travelers to join it. For four months after our trip, 
the WhatsApp group was still alive with a change in its name and a twist in its function; it 
became a venue for my friends to exchange jokes and share news.  
 
August 2016, Tehran, Sadeghiyeh Metro Station  
Today was a hot day of summer. I was on my way to visit a friend on the metro. Looking 
around, it seemed to me nothing has changed since last year: In the women-only section 
of metro where I saw the two girls last year, what was smoothly going on was very 
similar to my last year’s observations there: people’s heads were down on their 
cellphones, texting, laughing and talking to people in their next. A woman in her late 
thirties or early forties next to me had a fancy iPhone with a big screen. A light-blue page 
of Telegram was open on her phone. Reading something on it, she was occasionally 
smiling and typing something back. Next couple of days, whenever I used metro, I sat in 
different sections. One day, a young man at my height with earphones was standing next 
to me and was saying something to his phone’s speaker once in a while. Holding his 
cellphone in his hands, the sequential breaks on each station pushed his body forward and 
consequently made his cellphone screen visible to me. From Telegram’s logos and the 
wavy shapes of its voice messages, I realized he was exchanging voice messages on 
Telegram. 
 
Pocket-sized Joke-telling Devices: Mobile phones Have Mobilized Joke-telling Tradition in 
Iran 
 
After asking about my informants’ biographical information, my interviews usually 
started with this question: “How do you typically get a joke?” Before conducting my interviews, 
when I was thinking of my potential questions, I put this in the ice-breaking category with the 
expectation that my participants would answer it with one or two short sentences, something like 
“I get usually jokes from my friends” or “I hear jokes from my funny aunt.” However, as my 
research moved forward, to my surprise, the answers to this seemingly simple and single-layered 
question ended up constituting this chapter of my thesis. This question directed me to see and 
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interrogate the aspects of my research which had become invisible to me because of my 
familiarity with the field as an insider. 
Although it was not my initial intention, through this question I was able to trace back 
joke-telling culture in Iran from the time of Irancell to Telegram, and to study its evolutionary 
patterns. It also changed my approach toward taking fieldnotes. In one of my first interviews in 
Tehran in 2015, I asked the same question of my 33-year-old female informant, Hana. She 
answered: 
I mostly get jokes on cyberspaces. Before I gained access to Viber and Telegram on my 
cellphone, I got jokes via text messages. I used to read jokes on Facebook or emails but 
not any more. Right now, I use only my cellphone. I got numerous jokes from my Viber 
groups [She then named all the groups in which she was a member and explained what 
kinds of jokes are exchanged in them]. As you can see we are more active on our 
cellphones now. Just look around in this coffee shop. How many people do you see who 
are busy with their smartphones?  
 
After this interview, I became more attentive to changes around me. Wherever I went during the 
three months of my fieldwork trip, I took a closer look to see how people were spending their 
time, in public or even in private spaces. As a student living abroad, in Canada, I was attached to 
my cellphone, regularly checking it from morning to evening (the late-night time in Tehran) 
because it was my only way of making connection with my families and friends back in Iran. 
However, it did not occur to me before that the same thing was happening in Iranian society; in 
my visit to Iran in 2015, people there were also becoming more engaged with or, in some cases, 
addicted to online activities on their cellphones, such as Vibering and playing online video 
games. At all the parties and gatherings I attended in different cities in Iran, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that at least one person in each household who had a smartphone via which 
they have been using Viber and WhatsApp. With only three exceptions, 22 interviewees of mine 
were a member of at least one Viber group. When I asked them to tell me political or the latest 
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jokes they heard, in several cases they brought up their cellphones to search for and read jokes 
from their multiple messaging groups online. 
Furthermore, I realized that being a member of Viber, and later WhatsApp, at that time in 
Iran was interpreted as an indicator of improvement in people’s livelihood and financial 
condition. In my interview with Sharon, my thirty-year-old female informant, she explained to 
me that when she or her friends get a notification from WhatsApp saying a friend of theirs from 
their contact lists has just joined WhatsApp, they automatically assume that their “friend [who is 
new on WhatsApp] must have changed their old cellphone and afforded to buy a smartphone” 
because, in her words, “it is impossible to have all these applications with you all the time 
without owning a smartphone.” Comparing her Iranian friends living in Iran with those who live 
abroad, she believes most Iranians inside Iran “care more to have smartphones because they want 
to be a part of these social lives happening on cellphones and do not want to az ghafeleh aghab 
biyoftand [literally meaning “falling behind the convoy,” metaphorically used to imply “not 
moving along with changes including technological, political, and social in the society”].” 
A year later, in 2016, cellphones were still the primary device for exchanging jokes 
among my informants. With the arrival of low-priced Chinese mobile devices such as Huawei in 
Iran, more people from lower middle socio-economic background were able to own a 
smartphone. Therefore, unlike in 2015, being a Viber or Telegram user in 2016 did not 
necessarily suggest being young, coming from a higher class, and even significant improvement 
in one’s economic status in Iran. In fact, affordable smartphones draw more economically and 
generationally diverse groups of Iranians to online mobile activities such as online messaging 
and gaming.  
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To respond to these growing interests and increasing demands for cellular activities, the 
main Iranian mobile phone operators, such as Hamrah Aval and Irancell, competed to offer 
unbeatable 3G/4G data packages. As a result, cellphone versions of applications such as Viber, 
WhatsApp, and particularly Telegram gained more popularity and accessibility in Iran, to the 
extent that they predominately replaced regular text messaging. This change became evident in 
my own research. Two of my three informants who were not members of any online messaging 
groups in 2015 were primarily using Telegram for sending texts in 2016. 
This phenomenon was not specific to Tehran. In Bandar Gaz, a small city in northern Iran 
where last year I studied jokes in the Mazandarani dialect, many of my Mazani participants 
currently use the Telegram app on their smartphones for texting. My 38-year-old male informant, 
Mahdi, told me that last year he had to use his computer to stay in touch with his friends on 
Viber while this year, he has bought a Huawei smartphone and began to use the mobile version 
of Telegram instead of carrying it on Viber. My 29-old female interviewee, Forough, who read 
me Mazani jokes from her Viber groups last year, was now a professional MMO (Massively 
Multiplayer Online) game player. She told me since she always has her cellphone with data with 
her so that she could dedicate more time to play games and send jokes. Even my seventy-year-
old female informant, Khale Moshtari, who still uses a traditional way of writing jokes in her 
notebook, is a Telegram user now. 
Returning to my first question in my interviews, “How do you get jokes?”, I draw on 
Arman’s answer to summarize the evolutionary pattern of the joke-telling tradition in Iran: 
Five or six years ago, [the ways I got jokes] were different. Five years ago, I got all my 
jokes via SMS [abbreviation for Short Message Service. In the vernacular Farsi language, 
SMS is commonly used instead of text messages]. It rarely happened that I went to a web 
site joke or surfed the Internet to read a joke. And even social networks were not like 
today; there were not enough jokes exchanged on them. But now, it is different. In this 
recent year [2015], messaging applications got more power, albeit only their mobile 
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versions [emphasis in his tone]. […] Mobile apps such as Viber, WhatsApp, Line, and 
Telegram are very powerful now. A strong joke wave appears and flows on them. The 
wave becomes popular, and people give it latitude [behesh bal va par midahand in Farsi, 
literally meaning “give it feather and wings”]; it soars and soars till people get tired of it. 
Then, they move on to the next topic. All jokes are coming with these waves. No jokes 
can be found in SMSs any more. Perhaps four years ago, out of five SMSs, two of them 
were jokes. But not now. Luckily if [emphasis in his tone] you could find one joke 
[message] in fifty SMSs. 
 
As Arman remarked above, cellphones are popular communicative tools for transferring the 
joke-telling tradition in Iran. Easily portable and fitting conveniently in pockets, they have 
mobilized and digitized this oral tradition. With 3G/4G capabilities, they provide necessary tools 
to speed up the joke cycles’ growth and circulation. Moreover, as discussed earlier, cellphones 
not only serve as a tool for transmission; they also generate new forms of folklore defined as 
cellphonelore. From the Irancell’s time to the age of smartphones, this genre of digital folklore 
has evolved under cultural, economic, technological, and tele-communicational changes in Iran. 
Humorous expressive forms in cellphonelore are not limited to textlore anymore. Messaging 
applications such as Telegram and Viber prepared the ground for the development of visual, 
animated, and digitally altered-photographic jokes. In the following chapter, I examine in detail 
the role of Viber and Telegram in and their impact on joke-telling tradition in Iran.  
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Chapter 3: Digital Joke-telling Culture and Performance in Viber and 
Telegram 
 
Joke Five/collected on February 
2015: 
Mahmood Ahmadinejad [Iran’s 
former president]: Hey there, how are 
you doing? Why don’t you answer 
me?! I want to have a word with you. 
 
Hassan Rouhani [Iran’s current 
president]: Look! I am busy! What? 
Do you want to add me to a group, or 
you want to tease me again?  I don’t 
have time for that! 
M: nuh-uh! To be honest, I want to 
ask you a favor. I will appreciate it. 
 
Are you in the office right now? 
 
H: Yes, I am in my office. What is 
wrong?? 
M: That closet next to the aquarium, 
there is an Adidas wind jacket in it. It 
is a souvenir from Chávez family. I 
brought it from Venezuela, do you see 
it? 
 
H: Wait a sec…Yes, I see it, there is a 
leather jacket with it too. 
M: OK! let them be there!  
H: eh?![waa in Farsi]  shall I send a 
delivery man to bring it for you? 
M: No, it is not necessary. I will come 
over soon. 
H: You come here? When?  
M: Two years later when I become 
president again! Haha [khh in Farsi]
 
    
Figure 1: Joke Five 
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I received the above joke (Joke Five) from a friend of mine in Viber in February 2015. In 
its format, it is a digital version of a dialogue joke11 between the former and current Iranian 
presidents. This joke was among the first visual jokes I got in Viber. The joke teller, who is a 
famous Iranian humorist, used the Viber platform to make a dialogue between the former 
president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with his successor, Hassan Rouhani. By using digital 
features such as emojis and simulating the Viber interface, he creates a familiar joke-telling 
environment for his audience in Viber. In addition to its form, the political message of this joke 
adds appeal to his artistic creation.  
As one of the most recent controversial and corrupt Iranian politicians, Ahmadinejad has 
a reputation among reformist Iranians that his appetite for power never gets sated because he 
never stops his efforts to come back to the political scenes regardless of his failed administration 
and his cabinets’ big financial and moral scandals. This joke clearly shows his greedy hunger. 
Two years ago, in 2015, when I received this joke, it seemed very funny to me. A year had 
passed since Rouhani, the reformists’ candidate, took the office, and like many Iranians, I felt 
distanced and safe from Ahmadinejad’s stormy and disgraceful presidential era, so I could easily 
laugh at the joke. As I wrote this sentence in early May 2017, it did not sound like a joke to me 
anymore. To everybody’s extreme shock, Ahmadinejad did register as a candidate in the 2017 
presidential election. However, he was disqualified by the Guardian Council, and he did not run 
in the race on May 19, 2017. 
                                                            
11 In his most recent book, Joking Aside, Oring has a thorough discussion on “narrative jokes” where he 
defines them and makes a distinction between them and dialogue jokes (2016, 147-164). According to his 
definition, Joke Four is not a narrative joke because it is constructed from conversational exchanges and 
lacks “a series of consequential actions” as an identifying feature of a narrative joke (ibid., 152).  
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This chapter offers a general overview of the contemporary Iranian joke-telling culture on 
smartphones. Starting with the Viber application, I identify different moral and social protocols 
in the online joke-telling culture of my informants. Then, I explore Telegram’s joke-telling 
culture. I end this chapter with a theoretical discussion of the concept of digital joke-telling 
performance by providing a holistic analysis of online humor in the Telegram space.  
 
What is Viber? 
 
Viber is an instant messaging application with the cross-platform capability which allows 
its software to be simultaneously implemented and run on multiple computing platforms such as 
smartphones and computers with different operating systems including Windows, Mac, and 
Linux. Viber provides its users with instant private and public messaging, as well as offering 
them free voice and video calls available over WiFi or 3G/4G data. This application was 
originally developed and launched in 2010 by the Israeli company, Viber Media, and four years 
later, in 2014, it was bought by Rakuten, a Japanese electronic commerce and Internet company 
(Shu 2014). 
The most convenient way to install Viber on computers and smartphones is to go to the 
website, Viber.com, where visitors are directed to links or app marketplaces through which they 
can download the application suitable for their platforms. To create a Viber account, a user is 
asked to enter their phone number at the installation time. A code is instantly sent to the given 
number through which they can complete the sign-up process. If the user uses the same phone 
number and, consequently, the same account on different platforms of mobile and computers, 
they are able to sync and transfer their ongoing calls and data between the devices. 
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Viber’s mobile app and its macOS (the operating system exclusively designed for 
Apple’s Macintosh computers) version were not effortlessly and efficiently gained for Android 
and Mac users inside Iran for many years. Based on US economic sanctions against Iran, access 
to certain application marketplaces, notably Mac and Samsung app stores, was denied to users 
within Iran for several years, and many Iranians including myself used intermediating apps such 
as Bazaar to get smartphone and MacBook versions of Viber until 2015.  
In July 2015, when Iran signed the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) 
agreement, a number of international financial sanctions, such as the export ban, were lifted from 
Iran (see Joyner 2016 for more information on this agreement and Iran’s nuclear program). 
Accordingly, Apple reassured its Iranian customers that “Apple is no longer banned from selling 
Macs and iOS devices to customers who plan to bring or send those products to Iran” (Sherr 
2013). Since then, the ban on app stores such as Mac and Samsung has been removed, and 
Iranians may download Viber directly from these online stores without using intermediators.  
 
Viber’s Joke-telling Culture: General Overview 
 
A month before starting my fieldwork in Iran, I was still in Canada when I read an article 
with the compelling title “Jokes, Politics, and Medication Prescription: Iranians’ lives in Viber” 
published on the BBC Persian12  website on March 9th, 2015. Underscoring the significance and 
multifunctionality of Viber in Iranian society, the article opens with this sentence: “Mobile 
messaging apps such as Viber, WhatsApp, Line, and Telegram gained enormous popularity 
                                                            
12 BBC Persian is BBC’s Persian language news channel whose web site, Twitter account, Telegram 
channel, and TV and Radio channels are among the most popular and followed news resources among 
Persian speakers, including Iranians inside and outside of the country. To date, the BBC Persian web site 
and its Twitter account are blocked, perhaps permanently, by the Iranian authorities. However, many of 
my informants inside Iran bypass this filtering by using anti-filter apps and proxy servers.  
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among Iranians, but it is the Viber application which has seized Iranians’ hearts” (BBC Persian 
2015). According to a statement made by then Iran’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 
the paper reports that in 2015, “almost ten million Iranian – over 12% of Iran’s entire population 
– used Viber.” Additionally, based on the web analytics service Alexa, it asserts that in 2015, 
Iran was placed on the top of the international list of visitors to the website Viber.com, and 
Iranians constituted 17% of Viber users from all over the world. It is, therefore, especially well 
used in Iran. 
In the next section, the article provides the reader with a thorough documentation of the 
multiple functions of Viber among Iranian users; it demonstrates how the exchange of photo, 
video and music clips and instant private and group messaging are, specifically within Iran, used 
for various reasons including medical purposes, such as providing emergency diagnoses, in 
addition to joke exchanges. Emphasized in a bold font, the article asserts that “due to the Iranian 
users’ insatiable appetite for humor, the free Viber service has turned into a platform for 
exchanging the latest jokes in Iran.”   
Quoting Iran’s then Minister of Information and Communication Technology, the article 
argues that, given Viber’s widespread popularity among Iranian youth, Rouhani’s current 
government, has no intentions of blocking Viber or other messaging apps. As expected, this 
decision was not well received by Iranian hardliners and other political groups opposing Rouhani 
who held a conspiracy theory that Viber was used by its Israeli initiator to spy on Iranians. The 
article ends by noting the growing popularity of Viber among Iranian politicians, including a 
number of ministers in Rouhani’s cabinet and several parliament representatives who used Viber 
for both personal and political purposes. 
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Two months later in Iran, in April 2015, my observations of Iranians’ lives in Viber 
corresponded with what the BBC article describes. From my family members, friends, and 
informants to total strangers in taxis and the metro, everyone seemed to be using Viber to get and 
stay connected with people around them. Viber messaging had almost replaced text messaging, 
and its free phone-call was frequently used along with Irancell and Hamrah Aval 
telecommunication services.   
In 2014 when I had left Iran, using mobile messaging apps was rather a new 
phenomenon, and, in my family, it was only my mother who used Viber exclusively for calling 
me in Canada. Since access to Google Talk and FaceTime was denied from within Iran due to 
sanctions, Skype was the most popular communicating app for making phone calls, and Gmail’s 
chat program was frequently used for messaging.  
My first time back in Iran after being gone for over a year, I noticed two evident changes 
in Iranians’ tele-communications. Firstly, as some sanctions were lifted, Iranians’ access to 
mobile app stores and, consequently, applications were provided, so they did not have to bother 
with proxy servers and intermediating software. This ease in access and use widened the age 
range of mobile application users. It was not only young Iranians as “digital natives” (Prensky 
2001, 1), who under any circumstances found ways to use emergent technology and who were 
Viber users, but also older Iranians who were “digital immigrants” (2001, 2) and accepted and 
adopted digital technology and who became Viber’s fans. In my extended family, along with my 
teenage cousins, my uncles and aunts (who are in their middle sixties) had Viber installed on 
their smartphones and used it primarily for at least reading if not sending texts, as well as 
occasionally calling their children living abroad. Many informants of mine had similar 
experiences with Viber family groups. Sharon, my thirty-year-old female informant, explains:  
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It is not hard to find at least an active family [Viber] group in any Iranian families these 
days. In my families, from my 14/15-year-old cousin to my 60-year-old dad and uncles, 
all have smartphones and use Viber. Whenever I or one of us want to send a general note 
to them or arrange for a family gathering, we create a group [in Viber] including all my 
families instead of sending each of them separate texts. […] Such family groups exist 
forever in Viber and get revived whenever someone shares something there.  
   
In such family groups, jokes were one of the most exchanged folkloric materials, and humor is 
one of the most trusted languages for sharing political ideas. Arman, my 31-year-old male 
informant, explains: 
Jokes are easily spread [in Viber]. In the Viber group with all my family members, my 
forty-year-old cousin sends exclusively jokes and occasionally religious texts. I realized 
whenever she gets serious political notes on the Internet, she usually ignores them; 
whereas, if she gets political jokes with the same content as the notes, she forwards them. 
Likewise, my mom in our group never sends political notes while she frequently sends 
political jokes. 
 
The second noticeable change was the growing popularity of mobile apps among Iranians 
from lower-middle socio-economic backgrounds. As discussed in Chapter Two, low-priced 
Chinese smartphones such as Huawei and affordable mobile operators, namely Hamrah Aval, 
enabled more people to own smartphones and to stay connected in the digital world along with 
their fellow Iranians. While in 2014, Viber and other messaging applications were exclusive to 
the upper middle class, mostly residents of the capital or big cities, in 2015, people in small cities 
were familiar with mobile messaging apps and gradually joined other Viber users. Along with 
my Tehrani informants, almost all my informants in Bandar Gaz, a small city in northern Iran, 
used predominantly Viber for exchanging jokes and text messages by 2015.  
 My informants’ most-used and favorite feature of Viber was its private messaging 
groups. In private groups all members usually know each other, and only the administrator and 
the current members of the group can add a new member. In our interviews, my informants listed 
multiple purposes of and activities with which they were engaged in each of their private virtual 
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gatherings in Viber. Gathering up family members scattered all around the world; 
communicating with coworkers and customers; having virtual reunions with old roommates, high 
school friends, and college cohorts; maintaining relationships with former teachers and bosses; 
and organizing parties, trips, and events within their communities and families were among the 
activities they named. 
Joke-telling was the most recurrent activity of my informants in their private groups. 
Viber’s platform provided them with a specific medium of voice, picture, text, and video to 
create and share jokes in their desired format. The kind of jokes, such as political, ethnic, dirty, 
or other, shared in a group primarily depended on the group’s agenda, members’ gender and age, 
and their type of relationships. In my general observation, my informants felt more relaxed in 
sharing humor of any kind among their peers; whereas, in groups with their family members, 
they exchanged in Narges’s, my thirty-year-old female informant, terms, “more general and 
riskless jokes which [they] guess most members have the capacity [zarfiyat in Farsi] to hear.” 
Likewise, Mandana, my 31-year-old female informant, explains her comfort in sharing 
any jokes in a Viber group with her friends around her age:  
In the groups I have with my close friends, since there is no moral scale based on which I 
am judged, I feel more relaxed to share any, any jokes I like. […] [Also, in one Viber 
group of hers with her college female friends], we even encourage each other to exchange 
more dirty jokes. 
 
In April 2015, I asked Sajad, my 29-year-old male informant, to send me some activity logs of 
his Viber groups. Through the Viber backup option, he generated eight Excel sheets, one for 
each group of his in Viber. Reviewing some parts of his logs, I made an inventory and 
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summarized their main activities during a two-month period, March and April 2015, in the table 
below13.  
 
Group 
Name 
(Names in 
Farsi) 
Numbers 
of 
Members 
Gender/Ethnic/Age of 
Members 
The Initial 
Purpose of 
Creating the 
Group 
Main 
Activities 
Within 
Two 
Months   
The Cool 
Kids 
(Bachehaye 
bahal) 
10 Male only/Multi ethnic/Late 
twenties and early thirties 
Keeping in 
touch with 
old and new 
colleagues at 
his workplace 
Sending 
funny 
pictures and 
jokes 
(mostly 
political and 
dirty)  
Work!!! 
(Kar!!!) 
7 Male and Female/ 
Multiethnic/Two members in 
their late twenties and the rest 
in their forties and older  
Having a 
formal 
relationship 
with a group 
of his current 
and old 
managers and 
seniors (As 
an unspoken 
rule, no jokes 
were 
exchanged in 
this group)
Arranging 
meetings 
and, in one 
case, using 
this group 
as a 
billboard to 
announce 
their new 
regulation  
Number 
One 
(Darajeh 
yek) 
 
12 Female and male/ 
Multiethnic/Late twenties and 
early thirties 
Keeping in 
touch with 
close friends 
from his 
cohort at 
Shiraz 
University 
Sending any 
kind of 
jokes except 
dirty jokes 
and sharing 
photos of 
their old 
times 
together 
                                                            
13 It was impossible for me to get permissions from all Sajad’s groupmates to review and use their chats in 
my research. Therefore, I contented myself with only selections of their Viber activities which were 
limited to general and impersonal information such as jokes. These parts were meticulously chosen by 
Sajad to protect his groupmates’ identities and personal information. In our follow-up interview, he 
revised and completed the aforementioned table. 
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All My 
Families 
(Fak o 
famile 
Man) 
 
More 
than 15 
Female and male (his extended 
families mostly from his 
mother’s side)/Khouzestani 
(from the south of 
Iran)/Multiage from 17 years 
old to late 50s 
Planning for a 
family 
gathering at 
first but the 
members 
decided to 
keep the 
group alive  
Sending 
jokes and 
occasionally 
planning 
parties 
Jokeland 
(Jokestan) 
More 
than 20 
(He does 
not know 
all the 
members. 
It is a 
group of 
friends 
and 
friends of 
friends) 
Female, male, and 
unknown/Multiethnic/Unknown
Exclusively 
for  jokes 
(The only 
rule in this 
group is that 
if someone 
sends 
something 
other than a 
joke or an 
ethnic joke 
they will be 
instantly 
removed 
from the 
group by the 
administrator) 
Sharing 
jokes about 
politics, 
economics, 
social 
topics, 
(mostly in 
the format 
of texts)  
Friendly 
(Doostaneh) 
11 Female and Male/ 
Multiethnic/Late twenties and 
early thirties 
A group of 
close college 
friends 
scattered all 
around the 
world 
Updating 
each other 
with their 
lives, 
sharing 
news, and 
sending 
jokes, 
especially at 
the time of 
specific 
political 
events 
High 
School 
Friends 
(Bachehaye 
dabirestan) 
More 
than 25 
Male only/Multiethnic/Late 
twenties and early thirties 
A group of 
high school 
friends 
Sending all 
kinds of 
jokes 
(including 
ethnic and 
dirty ones)
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Pals at the 
Break at the 
University 
[workshop] 
(Bachehaye 
Zange 
Tafrih) 
15 Female and Male/ 
Multiethnic/Multiage (mostly 
around early thirties) 
A group with 
friends he 
met in a 
workshop for 
which he 
volunteered 
as an assistant 
in 2010
Sending 
jokes, 
notably 
political 
Table 1: Viber Activity Log 
 
As the table shows, Sajad did not share jokes with his superiors and coworkers in group 
Work!!!.The more formal his relationships are, the less jokes are exchanged. Additionally, he 
followed the same policy as Mandana did for sharing jokes in single-sex and mixed-gender 
friend groups. Among his male peers in groups The Cool Kids and High School Friends, he felt 
more freedom to share any kind of jokes, including dirty ones, while in mixed gender groups 
such as Friendly, he was more conservative about the type and extent of swear words in jokes. 
Also, like Narges, he forwards “riskless jokes” with no or a few acceptable swear words in his 
family groups. 
In her studies of “foul language” – particularly in Australia, but to some extent through 
the English-speaking world – linguist Ruth Wajnryb defines “social swearing” as occasions of 
using foul language in social groups. She indicates that “in relaxed settings where people are 
comfortable with other in-group members, their language is characterized by a high degree of 
swearing” (2005, 34) which builds rapport and fosters an atmosphere of acceptance and 
solidarity in groups (ibid., 197). She identifies gender and class as two social variables which 
affect the extent of swear words people use in their social groups and says, “there is less 
swearing in mixed-gender groups than in single-sex groups of either sex” (ibid.). Wajnryb’s 
statements hold up in this examination of Iranians’ Viber groups.  
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In addition to gender and class, age is another determining factor of the extent of the use 
of foul language in my informants’ Viber groups. While in groups with their single-sex peers, 
they extensively shared obscene jokes; however, the existing moral standards in family groups 
imposed some limitations on their joke-telling. Furthermore, the dominant Iranian culture of 
treating seniors, known as Adab va Ehteram be Bozorgan (or just “Adab” refers to respect and 
graciousness for elders) is to a certain extent digitally evident in Viber groups.  
As a long-lasting component of Iranians’ culture in pre-Islamic and Islamic eras, Adab 
includes certain instructions which leads to “gracious and proper demeanours” (Davaran 2010, 
171) toward parents, teachers, seniors, and spiritual and intellectual superiors who are counted as 
Bozorgan or elders. (See Davaran 2010, 170-220 for a historical and literary analysis of Adab in 
Persian culture.) Entering a place after elders, not lying in their presence, and using the plural 
forms of verbs when addressing a single individual in a conversation are some common 
examples of Adab-practice. The digital version of Adab in my informants’ Viber family groups 
involved their thoughtful and conservative word and emoji choices, as well as their avoidance of 
sharing jokes with even the slightest swear words. In this way, Narges’s term, “riskless jokes” 
includes jokes which do not endanger Adab among different generations of families. 
As Sajad’s activity log shows, along with foul language, politics as a theme for humor 
necessitates a specific atmosphere to grow. While sharing political jokes and discussing politics 
in groups with like-minded members in most cases leads to socialization and group cohesion, the 
opposite result is expected in groups whose members have less in common in their political 
affiliations. Sajad explained to me that to minimize confrontations, he did not forward political 
jokes in some of his Viber groups whose members he did not know and trust well. Likewise, in 
her family group, Maral, my 27-year-old informant, told me that even though she enjoyed this 
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close online connection with her family, she avoided sending political jokes because her leftist 
view point is not in accord with their conservative political ideology, and she did not want to 
offend them. Therefore, trust and Adab are two factors which influenced my informant’s online 
political joke-telling. 
Moreover, joke-telling was not only popular in Sajad’s private groups with his family and 
friends, but also in semi-public ones like Jokeland, humor was the only permissible language. As 
he explained, he joined this group via one of his friends; he did not know many of the members 
and was not sure whether they used their actual identities or joined the group with their pseudo-
usernames. All information about a group member accessible to him or other members was 
limited to their names (either real or pseudonym), profile pictures (which could be left blank), 
and their cellphone numbers. Therefore, such big groups in Viber, with known and anonymous 
members, were not totally private but rather semi-public, and usually created for a specific 
purpose such as sharing jokes.   
Mahdi, my 38-year-old male informant who lives in Bandar Gaz, was an administrator of 
one of those semi-public groups in Viber in 2015. His group’s name was Townspeople and has 
more than seventy members who were either Bandar Gaz dwellers or those who were originally 
from this town but currently live somewhere else. As Mahdi describes this group, it is a group 
which, according to its members, “always smells like home to Bandar Gazi people, no matter in 
which part of Iran they live now.” Explaining the initial purpose and the current agenda of the 
group, he stated: 
This group was established [by me] in order to be a space where we [Bandar Gazis] could 
exchange our thoughts and ideas on social, cultural, and political matters relating to our 
town. Then, the city authorities joined the group and said they would like to hear what we 
are discussing about, and then this group gradually and slowing became larger that as of 
today [June 12, 2015] it has seventy, eighty members! […] Townspeople is a group for 
exchanging ideas on town issues, cultural and social concerns, art-related matters, 
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tourism, town beautification and so on. When the mayor, the deputy mayor, some 
members of City Council, along with several well-known Bandar Gazi artists and 
academics joined the group, it became more serious! Since then, all we talk is about the 
town and issues related to it and its people.  
 
Then I asked him if he and other members of the group have used jokes to assist them in 
communicating their critiques. He answered: 
Yes, of course like any other political social matters in Iran we make jokes out of them. 
However, we have a rule in our group. If we are in the middle of a serious discussion, no 
parazit [literally meaning parasitic noise and vernacularly used to convey any annoying 
uninvited noise] like jokes are allowed.  
 
According to what Mahdi and Sajad state, joke-telling communications in semi-public groups in 
Viber act like forwarded emailed jokes (Kibby 2005, 775; Frank 2009) or list jokes (Oring 2016, 
129-146). In private groups, the online joke-telling settings are more like the oral transmissions 
of humor. Similar to the traditional definition of folklore, private-group joke-telling is an “artistic 
communication in small groups” (Ben-Amos 1971, 13) whose audience is limited to known 
members of families or friend groups. However, posting a joke in semi-public groups like 
Jokeland or Townspeople is not like telling a friend a joke in an intimate one-on-one 
conversation. It is indeed like an emailed joke forwarded to a large contact list, known and 
unknown, or like a joke posted in special-forums or joke websites where the audience is 
potentially extended to all net users. In this way, as Oring argues, online jokes “escape the 
confines of local groups and find their way across social boundaries and persist over stretches of 
time” (2016, 146). In the following sections, I argue that these semi-public Viber groups and 
later Telegram channels facilitate my informants’ use of humor in their social and political 
activism by reordering public and private spaces.    
Despite all its advantages, Viber had a short life in Iran, and its initial appeal, which in 
BBC report’s terms once “seized Iranians’ hearts over other applications,” did not last long. In 
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July 2015, almost four months after the publication of this report and a month after my 
fieldwork, in a Skype interview with Sharon, she informed me Viber is no longer in use in Iran. 
She identified Viber’s low speed, the limitations on the size of the exchanged data, and its lack 
of supporting video files14 as the main reasons which made people replace this application with 
its competitors, first WhatsApp and then Telegram.  
My 29-year-old female interlocutor, Sara, in our informal chats mentioned that the other 
biggest problem with Viber was its defective programming. To join a Viber group, a current 
member of the group is able to add a new member without asking their permission. Although 
later, it is the new member’s decision to either stay or leave the group, their consent is not 
initially required. As Sara explained, in Viber space, “[one] can be easily thrown into the groups 
where [they] do not wish to be even for a second.” This careless coding made the Viber 
environment relatively unsafe and unreliable.   
The other main reason Iranian users migrated from Viber to other messaging apps was its 
on-and-off filtering by the government. Social media filtration is not a new story in Iran, and 
there have been abundant visual and verbal jokes addressing this phenomenon as an inseparable 
part of Iranians’ daily lives:   
Joke Six/collected on November 2013:  
On the plane, on his way back from Geneva [after Iran’s Nuclear Program negotiations], 
Zarif [Iran’s minister of Foreign Affairs] tweeted: “I do not know where I am right now.” 
Someone answered his tweet: “Don’t worry Doctor! Just try to open Facebook on your 
cellphone. If it is filtered, be sure you are back home, sweet home!” 
 
Even though since the 2009 Green Movement, many Iranians have become experts at finding 
alternative ways to bypass these filtrations, this time, because of Viber’s numerous errors, they 
                                                            
14 However, as of early May 2017, many of these errors and deficiencies have been solved by the Rakuten 
company.  
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did not see any benefits in remaining loyal to Viber, so they easily and quickly abandoned their 
groups and made new ones in Telegram. On July 5, 2015, I report in my fieldnotes that seven of 
the ten active Viber groups of mine had transferred to Telegram. Two of the remaining groups in 
Viber were those whose members all live in diaspora and keep their groups up-to-date. In August 
2016 when I conducted the second round of my fieldwork, none of my 20 informants who still 
lived in Iran used or even had Viber on their cellphones. Joke Seven, which I received many 
times from multiple groups in Telegram around that time, best demonstrates this phenomenon in 
Iranian cellular communications: 
Joke Seven/collected on July 2015:  
You can say for sure Aryans’15 immigration from Viber to Telegram is the largest and the 
fastest immigration of this nation throughout the whole history of Persia. 
 
 
What Is Telegram? 
 
 Like Viber, Telegram is a cloud-based instant messaging application which enables its 
users to access their messages with seamless sync on multiple devices at the same time. It was 
launched in 2013 by Russian brothers, Nikolai and Pavel Durov, but as it is said in their official 
website, it is “not connected to Russia – legally or physically” and is headquartered in Berlin, 
Germany (Telegram 2017).  
Compared to its two main competitors, Viber and WhatsApp, Telegram’s messenger is 
programmed more accurately and provides its users with more features while giving them fewer 
bugs. Unlike Viber, there is no limitation over the type of a message in the Telegram platform, 
and the size restriction is not comparable with Viber. Telegram users are unlimited in their 
                                                            
15 Aryan, Aryaee in Farsi, is a term frequently used among Iranians when they want to refer to their 
historical and ancestral background. Historically, Aryan tribes were the first settlers of the land later 
known as Persia, in the third and second millennium BC (Barker 1871, Introduction; Katouzian 2009, 28). 
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ability to send any type of message, including audio, video, as well as doc, zip, mp3 files, up to 
1.5 GB each time. Moreover, unlike WhatsApp, Telegram’s data exchanging does not consume 
the memory of a device since messages can be stored in the messenger’s cloud. With regards to 
security, Telegram officials claim that this application “is more secure than mass market 
messengers like WhatsApp and Line” because it is based on a more intelligent protocol 
(MTProto) which is “compatible with high-speed delivery and reliability on weak connections” 
(Telegram 2017). 
Like Viber, the best way to to install a portable version of Telegram that connects with 
the user’s computing systems is to go to its main website, Telegram.org, where the main server 
directs users to a link to the appropriate version of the app. Since Telegram has cross-platform 
capability and uses cloud-based messenger, users get synchronized messages on every device 
upon which they had installed the app.  
Telegram provides its users with different services such as private messaging groups, 
Supergroups, public channels, and, more recently, free voice calls. Accommodating up to 200 
members, a private group functions similarly to a Viber group. It provides families and friends 
with a space for exchanging cellphonelore. If a group grows to 5000 members, it can be 
ungraded to a Supergroup. By default, every member of a group or a Supergroup can add a new 
member, participate in group discussions, and edit the group’s name and picture.  
A public channel is a specific tool for exchanging public ideas. These channels are 
exclusive to the Telegram environment. Defined in Telegram’s website, they are “a tool for 
broadcasting public messages to large audiences” as they can have an “unlimited number of 
members” (Telegram 2017). Unlike Telegram private groups and semi-public groups in Viber, a 
member of a public channel does not have any access to other members’ information except the 
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creator’s, if it is provided and public. More importantly, unlike semi-public Viber groups, a 
current member cannot add a new member. They can only share the channel’s link with their 
friends, and if anyone wants to join, they have to go to the channel page and press “Join”. In a 
channel, only the creator and the administrator can send or delete a message; there is no option 
for other members to make comments or take any action except reading and forwarding its 
messages to other groups. In this way, Telegram channels act like a news agency whose roles are 
communicating news from the perspectives of their creators. When a message is sent in a 
channel, it is signed with the channel’s name and photo, not its creator’s.  
Based on the web analytics service Alexa, as of early May 2017, most visitors of the 
website Telegram.org are Iranians, who constitute 35.8% of the all Telegram users worldwide 
(Alexa 2017). According to the head of National Center for Cyberspace, Firouzabadi, half of 
Iran’s population (forty million) own smartphones (National Center for Cyberspace 2016), and 
according to official statistics, as of September 6, 2016, more than 25 million of them are active 
Telegram users (Fardanews 2016). Firouzabadi also states that there are more than 100,000 
Iranian Telegram channels, some of which have more than one million members. Throughout a 
day, over 1,200,000 items are created and spread in the Telegram space in Iran, and on an 
average, each item is seen 400,000 to 500,000 times (National Center for Cyberspace 2016).  
Not limited to ordinary Iranians alone, Telegram is a popular app among state authorities 
who frequently use it as a billboard to make public announcements. The Leader, the President, 
some of the parliament representatives, all have multilingual channels through which they share 
their thoughts and ideas with people. Ironically, some hardline officials in military and judiciary 
agencies who call for Telegram’s blocking also take advantage of this application to promote 
their ideology. Even though their attempts to totally block this application have failed so far, they 
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have succeeded in making this online venue feel less safe for political activists. Occasional 
arrests of creators and administrators of political channels is one of their strategies in stifling 
freedom of speech in cyberspace (see Center for Human Rights in Iran 2017 for more detail on 
their arrests). Despite this constant fear, the platform served as the most influential companying 
tool used primarily by reformists in the February 2016 elections which I discuss in detail in the 
next two chapters.  
As of early May 2017, all Telegram services are available from within Iran except free-
voice calls. Even though this service was launched by the Telegram officials in Iran on April 14, 
2017, it was quickly blocked by the Attorney-General, which denounced it as “a threat to 
national security” (quoted in BBC Persian Telegram channel on April 2017). 
 
Telegram’s Joke-Telling Culture: General Overview 
 
As discussed earlier, because of Viber’s on-and-off filtering, restrictions, and errors, 
Iranians inside Iran moved their family and friend groups to Telegram, so that new-born 
Telegram groups were identical twins of Viber versions. Therefore, all the dominating joke-
telling culture in Viber was also transferred to the new online environment along with this 
relocation. The moral codes of Adab, the protocols of social swearing, and all other etiquettes 
explored in the Viber sections are equally applicable to the joke-telling performances in 
Telegram. All these protocols and behaviors constitute what Gary Alan Fine terms as an 
“idioculture” or “small group culture” (1979). 
Fine defines idioculture as “a system of knowledge, beliefs, behavior, and customs shared 
by members of an interacting group to which members can refer that serve as the basis of future 
interaction” (1987, 125). In their ethnographic studies of joking idiocultures in workplaces, Fine 
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and Michaela De Soucey identify them as “embedded, interactive, and referential” (2005, 1), 
which serve as “regulation” of “the smoothing of conversation, […] separating group from 
others, and securing the conformity of members” (ibid., 17).  
Although their studies explore face-to-face interactions with a focus on practical jokes 
not joke-telling, their findings are loosely applicable to my informants’ Telegram joke-telling 
idiocultures. Their online humorous communications are also embedded and interactive as they 
happen within the context of a group when its members digitally interact with each other. They 
are also referential because group members use the “cryptic” (Schutz 1995) language of humor 
to express their beliefs and thoughts while making references to cultural, political, and historical 
commonalities shared between them.  
Additionally, this online idioculture is intergenerational. As mentioned earlier, not only 
digital natives but also digital immigrants, regardless of their age, are members of these private 
groups and contribute to their activities such as joke-telling in different ways. The 60-year-old 
mother of an interlocutor of mine is the creator of several family and friend Telegram groups in 
all of which, in my interlocutor’s terms, “she has the responsibilities of coordinating groups’ 
activities, and make sure all members have good time.” Likewise, my 65-year old father is an 
active member of numerous Telegram groups such as our extended family group in which he 
shares jokes, political notes, and pictures.  
The online humorous interactions among different generations of families not only blur 
the digital divide but also help families reconstruct and reinforce their group identities as family 
members. My 33-year-old female informant, Hana, is a resident of Tehran but a member of a 
large family group, some of whose members live in Malayer, a small city in central Iran. 
Malayer is Hana’s parents’ hometown; they moved from there to Tehran when she was four 
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years old. Even though her parents never spoke their local language at home, she became 
familiar with her paternal culture and language through local jokes which her Malayeri relatives 
share in their family group in Telegram. She even learnt about “blasons populaires” (Widdowson 
1978), which are widespread in that region, because they are embedded in these jokes.  
However, not all family groups are like Hana’s, successful in building intergenerational 
identities and filling gaps through humor. In many of my informants’ family groups, young 
generations do not participate in political debates and, subsequently, do not share or digitally 
react to political jokes. Like Maral, many of them prefer to remain silent and hide their 
disagreements by staying in the group because they believe leaving the group will be interpreted 
as a violation of Adab to their elders.  
Fine and De Soucey’s conclusions regarding the effects of joking culture in their 
participants’ groups are applicable to my research. My own informants’ online joke-telling 
functions as “group regulations” in “smoothing interactions […], sharing a collective identity 
through cohesion, separating the group from others by drawing boundaries, and securing 
appropriate action by means of informal social control” (Fine and De Soucey 2005, 8). However, 
my informants’ online humorous communications not only regulate their relationships but also 
act like a double-edged sword: it bonds while at the same time it separates group members. For 
example, in a multi-ethnic group, sharing ethnic jokes reinforces cohesion among non-victim 
members while it generates “unlaughter” (Billig 2005; M. Smith 2009), which is “the display of 
not laughing when laughter might otherwise be expected, hoped for, or demanded” (2005, 192)” 
(Billig 2005, 192), among targets. In my interview with Eli, my thirty-year-old Azari female 
informant, she named different instances that had happened in her Telegram group with her close 
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friends in which she felt “excluded” and “offended” when others shared jokes against/about 
Azari people.  
Likewise, social swearing through dirty jokes is simultaneously intimatizing and divisive. 
Hadis, my thirty-year-old female informant, was a member of a Telegram joke group, Joke 
Ghashang [“the Pretty Joke” in English], with her colleagues. She left the group because of what 
she calls “disgusting dirty jokes which cross the line.” She told me that, in the end, this group did 
not survive because, like Hadis, many of its initial members left the group. Also, sharing jokes 
about politically sensitive matters might elicit online fights while making like-minded members 
form new groups that are in opposition to others. My 32-year-old female informant, Rezvan, left 
a group during the February 2016 elections because she could not tolerate their jokes that were in 
conflict with her political affiliation.   
 
Digital Joke-telling Performance in the Telegram Space 
 
 In line with the then-paradigm of the field, most early folkloristic studies on humor were 
text-based (see Ellis 1991, Dundes 1971a and 1987, Smyth 1986, Banc and Dundes 1986, 
Brunvand 1970). Through a textual analysis of a joke’s “appropriate incongruity” (Oring 2003), 
these folklorists focused exclusively on the joke’s “base meaning” (Oring 1987, 278) and 
speculated on the psychological motivations of joke-tellers. As the field’s paradigm shifted from 
text to context, humor scholars who were influenced by “performance theory” (Ben-Amos 1971) 
turned their attention toward jokes’ “performance meanings” (Oring 1987, 278) and explored 
humor in relation to specific joke-telling settings (see Walle 1976; Thomas 1997; M. Smith 
2009; Oring 2010).  
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With the advent of new technologies and their massive influence over orally transmitted 
folklore, some folklorists, notably Alan Dundes and Carl Pagter, departed from their peers’ 
preoccupations with face-to-face orally communicated humor. They explored photocopied jokes 
shared among office workers (1975, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2000) and, accordingly, coined the terms 
“office copier folklore” (1987) and “photo-copier folklore” (1996). Soon thereafter, folkloric 
scholarship on digital folklore grew in different fields, namely computerlore (see Roush 1997, 
Howard 1997, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995 and 1996, Baym 1993, P. Smith 1991, Dorst 1990, 
Fox 1983, Beatty 1976), mass/popular culture and folklore (Narváez 2003), and more recently 
Internetlore (see Kibby 2005; Mason 2007; Blank 2009, 2012, and 2013a and b; Frank 2011 and 
2015) and Massively Multiplayer Online Games (Staple 2010, Learning 2009). However, with a 
few exceptions (Rezaei 2016, Blank 2013a, Bronner 2012, Oring 2003 and 2016, Frank 2009, 
Laineste 2003) online humor remains understudied in this body of literature.  
Exploring digital performance meanings of humor is not possible in the same way as oral 
performance meanings because, as Russell Frank argues, the virtual ethnography of online-joke 
telling lacks “the texture of an account of actors, scene, and setting” (2009, 100). Therefore, I 
suggest that if we seek for performance meanings of online jokes, we need to read this genre of 
digital folklore as its own language and not seek to translate into that of oral humor or seek out 
possible equivalents in traditional folklore. In the following, I identify three characteristic 
features which make Telegram joke-telling performances distinct from oral humorous 
communications. 
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Joke Forwarding/Sharing 
In Telegram, there is no joke-telling but rather joke-sharing. Unlike oral performances, 
joke-sharing does not serve as a means for a joke-teller’s self-expression and does not display 
what James Leary terms their “jocular communicative style” (1984a, 30). While joke-telling 
performances “are powerful vessels for creating and using symbols of self” (Bronner 1984, 36), 
joke-sharing in Telegram does not demand the self-involvement of those who share a joke. In 
this way, a shared joke lacks the “particularity” of an orally communicated joke which “reveals 
the personalities of individual tellers” (Leary 1984b, 1).  
Furthermore, when it comes to joke-forwarding, there is no variation in most cases. In his 
study of emailed jokes, Frank argues: 
Forwarding an emailed-joke does not even entail retyping it: one hits the forward button, 
and the joke from the incoming e-mail is automatically reproduced in the outgoing e-
mail. In other words, variation, long an identifying feature of oral tradition, has become 
the exception rather than the rule. (2009, 100) 
 
Likewise, my informants in Telegram mostly forward ready-made jokes from other channels and 
groups without even a slight alteration. However, this uniformity and the resulting invariability 
do not necessarily devalue digital joke-telling performances and elevate real-time humor but 
rather necessitate a shift of focus in studying humor online; while performers and their 
performance are in the center of folklorists’ attentions in their studies of oral joke-telling 
communications, in digital humor, the ways in which people interact and converse though humor 
are of greater importance. To put it simply, in the Telegram space, groups and the ways they 
converse through forwarded humor matter more than individuals and their performative styles. 
These conversations generated by humor are worthy of folkloric research because Frank believes 
they include people’s reactions to the folklore (2009, 100). 
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 Additionally, forwarding is not the mere act of copying and pasting. It entails intentional 
selecting and shows the sender/forwarder’s agency in choosing what parts of a tradition they 
think deserve to get transmitted and go viral. Therefore, in a Telegram group, forwarded jokes 
make members’ joke repertoires, and studying them reveals the general mood and interest of the 
group. My informant, Narges, used this strategy when she wanted to join political channels and 
groups in Telegram during the February 2016 elections in Iran; by quickly scrolling down and 
skimming their jokes, she got a sense of members’ average political orientations and ideological 
directions. 
Forwarding can be also interpreted as a digital response to a joke. When a Telegram user 
forwards a joke from other online resources, it means they either agree with its message or they 
want to criticize it with a follow-up conversation. Arman, my 31-old male informant, states: 
“When I get a political joke, if I agree with its message and content, I will forward it, and vice 
versa; if I do not agree, obviously, I do not help its circulation.” Therefore, forwarding is the 
digital repetition of a meaningful tradition. Only those jokes that contain politically and 
individually important messages are forwarded. Consequently, with regards to political jokes, the 
most forwarded jokes are the ones which best represent one political party and their supporters’ 
ideology. I use this rationale in my analysis of election jokes in Chapter Four and Five.  
Even though the lack of self-expression makes forwarded jokes impersonal, it facilitates 
their circulation and expands their audience. It also helps the mass production of jokes. In fact, 
an online joke is like a mass-produced cultural product which makes folklore available to a 
larger number of consumers. These consumers are also producers because, with the ease of 
forwarding, each joke audience has the potential to become a joke-teller without having any 
performative and jocular communicative styles. My informant, Araman, calls this phenomenon 
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“joke waves” (clearly parallel to the folkloristic term “joke cycle”) and believes Iranian political 
joke waves play influential roles in shaping and changing the political climate of Iranian 
cyberspaces in general and Telegram in particular. In this way, online joke waves are more 
effective in social and political activism, at least in Iran, than their oral counterparts because 
there is no hesitation in circulation, no limitation on audience, and no condition on joke-tellers.  
As discussed earlier, even though there is a constant fear among Iranians because of the 
government’s control of and spying upon cyberspaces, political activists still find Telegram and 
other online venues safer than public spaces for their political activities, including political 
humor, which might be interpreted as “a threat to national security” by Iranian officials. The 
potential anonymity in these spaces works as a shield under which they conceal their real 
individuality. Therefore, the absence of real self, let alone self-expression, works as an asset 
rather than a disadvantage in humorous commutations online which serve as means to a political 
end. 
However, not all political humorous activities in Telegram are anonymous, and not all 
forwarded humor lacks self-expression and variation. In the recent Iranian elections in February 
2016, many young reformists made Dubsmash selfie videos of former President Khatami’s 
speech in which they lip-sync over his voice when he called on people to vote for the reformists’ 
list. These videos are not just humorous creations of hundreds of political activists, but are also 
political statements against the prohibition issued by the judiciary branch which bans national 
media from publishing Khatami’s photos and speeches. These achievements seem unattainable 
within the constraints of the oral world. In the next two chapters, I discuss the February 
electionlore and the multiple roles it played in Iranian society and politics.  
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Digital Laughter and Unlaughter 
As Moira Smith indicates, “laughter is a normal and desirable reply to a joke 
performance” with which “the audience signals acceptance of the joker’s invitation to join him or 
her in the humorous mode of discourse for the time being” (2009, 152). On the other hand, 
“unlaughter,” defined by Michael Billig as “the display of not laughing when laughter might 
otherwise be expected, hoped for, or demanded” (2005, 192) when it happens, is socially 
powerful and very significant, highlighting supposed differences and heightening exclusionary 
social boundaries (M. Smith 2009, 150-151).  
However, in online venues, laughter and unlaughter are communicated differently. In his 
studies of Internet joke lists, Oring argues that the emailed joke “does not demand a reaction, and 
a purveyor of e-mail humor usually cannot be sure that the humor is read, let alone appreciated” 
(2016, 132). Unlike emailed jokes, humor in Telegram calls for a response and cannot be easily 
ignored or avoided. While an email can be deleted without being opened, a message in Telegram 
must be read in order to be deleted. Also, any message seen by members in a Telegram group is 
marked with double ticks while unseen delivered messages are differentiated by a single tick. 
Therefore, in the intimate private space of a small family or friend group, ignoring a joke is 
noticeable by the joke-forwarder and other members of the group.  
There are three common ways of digitally reacting to humor in Telegram: stickers, 
emojis, and emoticons. Unlike emoticons, emojis and stickers contain the actual pictures of what 
they represent; however, there is not a significant difference, at least in Telegram, in their 
functions and usages (see Lucas 2016; Danesi 2017 for the genesis, cultural and linguistic 
significances of emojis, and their differences from emoticon), and all three serve as the most 
common modes of emotive and expressive communications in Mobile Instant Messaging (MIM) 
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environments. Since sociolinguistic and semiotic-anthropological literature has largely grown 
around emoticons, I build my analysis of digital laughter upon scholars’ findings on the cultural 
and linguist significance of emoticons and expand them to include stickers and emojis.  
Anthropologist Smiljana Antonijevic defined emoticons as “emotional icons […], visual 
representations of facial expressions used in computer-mediated-communication (CMC) to 
indicate the mood and/or emotion of the user” (2005, 1). Emoticons – a portmanteau word 
composed of emotion and icons – “serve paralinguistic functions in textual communications” 
(Oring 2016, 130). In their studies of emoticons in instant messaging discourse, communication 
scholars Anthony Garrison, Dirk Remley, Patrick Thomas, and Emily Wierszewski point out 
that this paralinguistic nature “does not imply that emoticons must be compensatory. In instances 
where the emoticon appears alone, the nature of the emoticon clearly allows it to function as an 
utterance on its own” [emphasis in original] (2011, 123). Likewise, in their study of the sarcastic 
use of emoticons, psycholinguists Dominic Thompson and Ruth Filik argue that “emoticons may 
actually be more efficient than standard language for marking sarcastic intent. That is, the 
intention can be communicated more quickly via an emoticon than via additional words or 
phrases, in a way somewhat similar to nonverbal cues in speech” [emphasis in original] (2016, 
117).  
In the same vein, in humorous communications by my informants in Telegram, different 
kind of emoticons, along with emojis and stickers, are used in response to jokes. In many cases, 
my informants express their agreement with jokes’ messages only through emoticons. Therefore, 
emoticons digitally represent the audience’s laughter which, as established by the 
aforementioned scholars, is not compensatory but the efficient, sufficient, and quickest way of 
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nonverbally responding to a joke. The table below includes some of the most common Telegram 
emojis and their corresponding emoticons16 used as digital laughter by my informants. 
 
Description Emojis Emoticons 
Grinning Face  :) 
Grinning Face With Smiling Eyes 
 
No 
emoticon 
Face With Tears of Joy 
 
:\') 
Rolling on the Floor Laughing 
 
No 
emoticon 
Smiling Face With Open Mouth 
 
:-) 
Smiling Face With Open Mouth & Smiling Eyes 
 
8D 
Smiling Face With Open Mouth & Cold Sweat 
 
,:) 
Smiling Face With Open Mouth & Closed Eyes 
 
X-) 
Table 2: Unicode Emojis to ASCII-art Emoticons 
 
Unlike emoticons and emojis, stickers are customizable and individually creatable in 
Telegram. Using the Telegram @sticker bot, a creative user can create their own sticker sets and 
get permanent links which they can share with their friends (Telegram 2017). This unique feature 
                                                            
16 There is not a universal mapping table to convert Unicode emojis to ASCII-art emoticons and each 
emoji might have from zero to more than one emoticon equivalent. The emoticons in my table are based 
on what my informants commonly use.   
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not only provides joke tellers with required equipment for making visual jokes, but it also 
enables the audience to give personalized visual responses.  
Customized sticker sets usually emerge as a topical joke cycle goes viral in Telegram. 
Corresponding with a day’s hot political and social events, these sets are used either as visual 
jokes on their own or a response to another joke. In the fall of 2016, during the elections in Iran, 
many of my informants created their own or added already-made election-themed sticker sets 
with which they replied to political jokes spread all over Telegram. In addition to politicized 
stickers, accented stickers are very popular among my informants with non-Tehrani origins. 
Customizing nationally viral stickers, they change the Tehrani-accented Farsi lines in the stickers 
with their mother language, dialect, or accent and make them their own. For example, Forough, 
my 29-year-old female informant, is the user and creator of stickers in the Mazani dialect, the 
language of Mazandaranis who live in northern Iran (see Appendix B-Stickers: Local Stickers). 
While analysing digital laughter is possible through its embodiment in the virtual 
language of stickers, emojis, and emoticons, exploring digital unlaughter is not an easy endeavor. 
The aroused silence after sharing a joke does not necessarily mean disagreement, one-sided 
laughter, or deliberate boundary making through unlaughter. Even in the Telegram space where 
ignoring a joke is noticeable in a private group, some jokes do not receive reactions, either 
acceptance or rejection. As mentioned earlier, several of my informants including Rezvan and 
Eli, have been marginal members and been offended by a joke in their groups; they have reacted 
in one of two ways: they either hid their feelings by remaining silent or they could not tolerate 
the group anymore and left it.  
My informant, Hana, uses the term “threshold of humor tolerance” when she discusses 
ethnic jokes in her multi-ethnic Telegram groups. From the perspective of an ethnically or 
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politically marginalized member, when joke-telling passes this threshold, this targeted or 
offended member – referred to here as X -  leaves the group. Immediately after their exits, the 
sentence “X left the group” appears in the main page and informs all the remaining members. 
This act is interpreted by the other members as a sign of X’s intolerance and their protest to the 
intentional or accidental unlaughter. In this way, the digital unlaughter does its ultimate job 
which is “heighten[ing] the group boundaries by mocking and ostracizing the outsider” (M. 
Smith 2009, 166) and shrinking the group’s size by pushing out those who find group norms 
unbearable.  
In Iranian political jokes, “X left the group” is frequently used as the punchline to target 
the joke-teller’s political opponents and underline their intolerance in staying in and hearing 
voices of groups who have an opposing perspective. In the vocabulary of Iranian political jokes, 
this sentence is usually associated with hardline and ultra conservative politicians who are 
against freedom of speech and political freedom. In Chapter Four, I further discuss these jokes. 
  
Reordering Public and Private Spaces 
When it comes to studying online folklore, folklorists such as Trevor Blank, the pioneer 
of online folklore theorists, usually undertake their investigations under the dominant shadow of 
oral traditions. In other words, in their exploration of the digital world, they constantly make 
unnecessary comparisons with the oral realm seeking parallels in this new language (see Frank 
2011, 9-15; Blank 2013a, xi-xxvi). In this limiting view, online folklore is frequently seen as the 
computer-mediated version of vernacular culture that has limited independence from the oral 
realm (Blank 2012, 5; 2013b, 106) and is primarily admired for its contribution to facilitating 
disseminations of oral folklore (Blank 2013a, xviii; 2012, 5-12). With this preoccupation, 
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folklorists generally neglect the specific roles of online venues as if they are merely transitory 
roads which short-cut folklore’s transmission. In this sub-section, I diverge from this view and 
turn my focus toward Telegram as the space in which online humor is created, lives, and is 
circulated.  
In his well-known theory of “public sphere,” Jürgen Habermas defines public space as 
“the sphere of private people come together as a public” where they openly discuss their political 
views against public authorities (1989, 27). He states that these public places, such as coffee 
houses in 1680 and 1730 in Great Britain and salons in the period between the Regency and the 
Revolution in France, were the centers of criticism, first literary then political, where people 
regardless of economic class and social status engaged in political debates (ibid., 32-39).  
Drawing on and challenging this theory, anthropologists Shahram Khosravi and Mark 
Graham argue that while in a society, public sites ideally provide places for sociability and 
political debates, and Iranian cyberspace “has in some respects provided an outlet for the 
opinions of groups excluded from the public sphere” (2002, 222). They clarify that even though 
the Internet “does not provide any simple choice between a blueprint for justice or injustice, 
freedom or thraldom, democracy or dictatorship, order or disorder”, it “does offer different ways 
of ordering social life” [emphasis in original] (ibid., 223). They conclude that cyberspace is a 
“place of alternative orderings” or, in Foucauldian term, a “heterotopia” because it is the 
“simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space” where cultural, social, and political 
alternatives can exist and flourish (Foucault 1986, 24). In this way, it redraws the boundaries 
between public and private when private and semi-private opinions become more available for a 
much larger public (Khosravi and Graham 2002, 243). Similarly, drawing upon the work of the 
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geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, folklorists have often noted landscapes of “one space, many places” 
(Hufford, 1986). 
In the same vein, the Telegram space is a heterotopian place for alternative orderings that 
cannot flourish in the public sphere. It offers a relatively safe podium to those speakers whose 
voices are not heard or allowed in public. Therefore, Telegram, along with other social networks, 
reorders public and private spaces as it creates alternative sites where censored or fearful voices 
are magnified for a much larger audience.  
As discussed earlier, semi-public Viber groups and Telegram channels are the places 
where an administrator or a creator can share their ideas with their channel members. Even 
though no discussions can be formed, and only administrators and creators can post and control 
materials, some of the Iranian Telegram channels are the most referred to and reliable news and 
information sources in Iran. In an informal conversation, Reza, my 37-year old male interlocutor, 
mentioned that if it were not for Telegram channels, “20:30”, the state-run news program 
broadcast every night at 20:30 from Iranian national TV, could convince people of their lies. He 
believes that the existence of these channels alone worries the authorities because they know if 
they do not tell the truth, they will be caught by people in the channels.  
Furthermore, as noted above, these news channels are the place for unheard stories. For 
example, in January 2017, a vendor woman in Fooman, a city in northern Iran, was accused of 
street blocking and was slapped harshly by a municipal officer. This incident was captured in 
film and photos by people who were present at the scene and soon went viral all over Iran’s 
Telegram channels, arousing public outrage. In response to this scandal, Fooman’s mayor 
officially apologized to the woman and her family and made a public statement in which city 
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authorities provided more details about the incident and explained how they would compensate 
the woman and punish the offender. Like the news, this statement went viral as well.  
However, channels do not only act like news broadcasters. Indeed, in the intervals 
between broadcasts, numerous jokes and humor both related and unrelated to the news are 
distributed. VahidOnline, (ﻦﻳﻼﻧﺁ ﺪﻴﺣو in Farsi), is one of the most famous and followed Iranian 
channels in which not only news but different forms of “newslore” (Frank 2011) are exchanged. 
With over 150 thousand members, Vahid, the administrator’s probable pseudonym, provides his 
channel followers with daily news and people’s afternews responses.  
I was referred to this channel by my thirty-year-old female informant, Bahar, who 
describes it as “the reliable news agency” which “covers literally anything, az shir morgh ta joon 
adamizad” [literally meaning from hen’s milk to human’s life. Like the English idiom, 
“Everything but the kitchen sink,” this Farsi expression is used to emphasize “inclusiveness and 
heterogeneity”]. For many of my other informants, as well as my father and even many Iranian 
friends in Iran, VahidOnline is the first and sometimes the only place to go to for uncensored and 
unfiltered news which otherwise might be inaccessible or unreported, especially from within 
Iran. On his channel, in a description placed below the channel’s picture, which is a sideview of 
his face, Vahid explains the purposes of his channels: 
Vahid Online: a curious netizen17;  
I attempt to provide a picture of the society; 
what is going on and what are people talking about? 
I reflect [news] as much as I can.  
Time is short, and the contents are too many.  
The priority goes to those with less media coverage (his Telegram channel 
[@Vahid_Onlin]).  
 
                                                            
17 Netizen is a portmanteau word composed of “Internet” and “citizen”. It refers to a person who is a 
“citizen of the net” and actively involved in virtual communities and online spheres (see Hauben and 
Hauben 1997 for more information on netizen).  
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As humor is always intertwined with politics in Iran, all forms of jokes, constitute a large portion 
of his channel’s materials. At the time of important national or international political events, he 
covers the most famous online jokes distributed through different forms of social media along 
with actual news. Indeed, channels like VahidOnline update their followers’ cellphonelore by 
providing a large up-to-date archive of news and newslore. In this way, they not only offer a 
space for under-represented opinions such as censored news, unheard stories, and untellable 
jokes, but also bypass the boundaries between public and private as the transition of information 
and folkloric materials happens in two or more ways: first, it is from private (the channel’s 
administrator) to public (its followers); second, this direction is reversed when individual 
members of the channel forward any material from the channel to their private groups. 
Therefore, compared to the public sphere, Telegram provides a much larger audience for private, 
as well as public, opinions.  
This unique feature of Telegram makes this environment an ideal place for political 
activism in Iran. Using public channels and private groups, Iranian political activists get their 
voices to many ears, especially at the climax of significant political events such as elections. 
During such periods in Iran, several political channels appear to promote candidates and their 
political parties. Simultaneously, numerous forms of political humor are exchanged in support of 
or against candidates and their parties in Telegram channels and groups. Iran’s February 2016 
elections were known as “Telegermmic elections” among my informants because of these 
undeniable roles of Telegram.   
However, reordering public and private spaces does not only affect the creation and 
circulation of political jokes. This phenomenon plays an indispensable role in the nationalization 
of local humor in Iranian cyberspace. For example, a non-Mazani Telegram user can easily get 
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access to a large number of jokes in the Mazani dialect by merely joining Mazani joke channels. 
My informant, Forough, introduced me to three channels which only share jokes in different 
variants of the Mazani dialect. Even though an understanding of these jokes for many outsiders 
like me is not acquired easily, the existence of such channels has at least two consequences: 
firstly, it provides linguistically and, in most cases, politically marginalized Iranians with a space 
to express their culture and identity through humor in their mother language, which is different 
from the official language of Iran, Farsi. In this way, these channels contest the hegemonic 
power of dominate social orders as they offer a new ordering which is local humor in the 
language of subordinates. By doing so, they contribute to the creation of multilingual and multi-
vocal spaces in the digital world which used to be univocal, echoing only Persian voices. 
Secondly, these channels widen the audience for local humor and facilitate its circulation by 
giving access to all Iranians regardless of their ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Therefore, 
online Iranian local humor in Telegram never stays local; rather, it becomes national because 
there are no spatial boundaries in cyberspace.  
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Chapter 4: The Iranian February Electionlore: Political Humor in 
Turbulent Times 
 
“Saeedeh, you know, I boycotted the 2012 [parliamentary] election” said Hadis, my thirty-year-
old female informant, “and I have regretted it ever since.” “Me too if it makes you feel better” I 
replied to her in our Skype interview on March 11th, 2016, almost two weeks after the February 
elections. She continued: 
But you know, I made the same mistake in 2013 [the presidential elections]! After the 
2009 elections [the Green Movement], I decided not to participate in any elections in Iran 
until my death! Why I should have bothered to stand in long lines for hours while I was 
sure my vote would not get counted?! But you know, now I feel the people who voted [in 
2013] are proud of what they did. Now when one like Zarif [Iran’s minister of Foreign 
Affairs] has accomplished this achievement [Iran’s Nuclear Deal], is improving our 
relations with the West, is lifting our sanctions, and literally does his best to clean up 
after [former President] Ahmadinejad’s messes, I feel people who voted for Rouhani 
[Iran’s current president] can hold their heads up and say: ‘It was me who voted for him, 
it was me who chose this president who selected Zarif as his minister! It was my vote 
which resulted in this deal!’ I felt how much I cannot say that! How much I cannot be 
part of this happiness! I badly wanted to be like them, to feel like them! But I was too 
embarrassed to feel happy for the thing I did not have a part. I did not vote, and yes, I 
made a huge mistake! 
 
“But you voted this time. Right?” I asked. “Yes, of course! I voted for all the individuals in both 
the lists18!” She laughed while alluding to a famous joke.  
On February 26, 2016, many Iranians who, like Hadis, were once determined to boycott 
all elections in Iran broke their promise and went to polling stations to cast their votes for two 
crucial elections: with blue ballots, they selected their representatives in the Iranian parliament, 
the “Islamic Consultative Assembly”, known as “Khane-ye-Melat” [literally meaning “the 
Nation’s House”]; with brown ballots, they elected the body of the “Assembly of Experts of the 
                                                            
18 She refers to the List of Hope and repeats a line from a video by former President Mohamad Khatami. 
In the following sections, I discuss the list, and, in the next chapter, I explore the video and the jokes it 
generated. 
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Leadership” for an eight-year term. The historical and political significance of these elections 
drew many people with different political affiliations and multiple, and in some cases 
contrasting, intentions to ballot boxes. The high turnout, 62% of all eligible electors (Iran’s 
Ministry of Interior Affairs 2016), surprised those who predicted that like other previous 
elections, the 2016 elections would be neglected by Iranians who have not forgotten the tragic 
aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. Even the results astounded political forces, especially 
conservatives.  
Like any other important political event in Iran, these elections fostered the emergence 
and growth of a great number of political jokes. In this chapter, I re-narrate the story of these 
elections by placing this political humor in the center in order to shed light on its political and 
historical significance from the perspective of joke tellers, listeners, and distributors. Analyzing 
different joke sub-cycles in various forms of video, photo, and text, I ask when, how, where, and 
why these jokes were told, what consequences they brought, and what goals they achieved. 
 
A Brief Overview of Iran’s Electoral System  
 
The 1979 Revolution opened a new chapter in modern Iran’s political history by 
overthrowing the ruling monarchy, Mohamad Reza Shah, and establishing an Islamic republic 
state. Following the Revolution, Iran’s political system was founded on a complex hybridization 
of democracy and theocracy. To put it simply, all 18-year-old and older Iranian citizens have the 
right to vote every four years to directly elect Iran’s president as the head of the Executive 
Power, as well as their representatives in the parliament as the members of the Legislative 
Branch. However, Iranians do not have any direct power in electing the Supreme Leader, who is 
the highest ranking political and religious authority with absolute and unquestionable control 
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over almost all political entities in Iran. The Assembly of Experts of the Leadership is the only 
political entity which, based on the 1979 Constitution, has complete authority in electing, 
supervising, questioning, and even dismissing the Leader. All 88 members in this assembly are 
elected by direct public votes once in every eight years.  
The current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is Iran’s second leader since the Revolution 
and, according to the Constitution, is entitled to “Absolute Guardianship and Leadership of the 
Ummah” [velayat motalaghey amr va emamat omat in Farsi] (see Abrahamian 2008, 146-47 and 
163-64 for more information on this concept). Since Khamenei is in his late seventies, and there 
were some speculations about his health, the 2016 Assembly of Experts election was regarded as 
particularly significant by both sides, conservatives and reformists. Many of my informants who 
voted in the elections supposed that the incoming members of this assembly will be the ones 
responsible for finding him a new successor. Fifi, my thirty-year-old female informant, believed 
that “through [her] vote, [she] would contribute indirectly to the election of the next Supreme 
Leader who plays dominating and unquestionable roles in shaping the country’s future for 
generations.” Khamenei, himself, acknowledged the crucial nature of these elections and urged 
all Iranian citizens to vote. He said in a speech around the election time: 
Everyone should participate in the elections; even those who do not believe in the regime 
should participate for the sake of country’s dignity. There might be some people who do 
not approve of me, but they should also participate in the elections; the elections do not 
belong to the Leader, they are for the Islamic Iran, for the Republic Islamic (quoted in 
Farsi in his Telegram channel [@Khamenei_Ir] in February 2016). 
 
As the head of the regime, Khamenei appoints the heads of many influential posts in the military, 
the civil government, and the judiciary, as well as supervising the parliament and even the 
president. Additionally, he wields control in any national elections through the Guardian Council 
of the Constitution. Six religious experts in this council are the Leader’s appointees. The other 
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six members, who are legal experts, are selected by the parliament. One of their main 
responsibilities is approving the candidacy of election nominees and granting them permission to 
run for an election campaign. Moreover, the results of any election will not be considered final 
unless the Guardian Council certifies them. 
In the 2016 February elections, the Guardian Council, which was dominated by 
conservatives, disqualified thousands of reformist and moderate candidates who registered to run 
in the race. To the surprise of many people and some politicians, they even disqualified Hassan 
Khomeini, the 43-year-old grandson of revolutionary leader and Iran’s first Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Khomeini. His disqualification awakened many criticisms from reformists, especially 
President Rouhani, and some influential politicians like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was one 
of the founding fathers of the Revolution, Iran’s fourth president, and the former chair of the 
Assembly of Experts. Despite these mass disqualifications, all those remaining reformist and 
moderate candidates came together and formed a historic coalition in order to prevent 
conservatives from winning the seats. They announced the names of their candidates in unified 
lists, known as the “List of Hope,” for each city in Iran. For Tehran, the List of Hope consisted 
of thirty candidates for the parliament and sixteen for the Assembly of Experts. 
In response to this coalition, Khamenei, who swings toward conservatives, criticized the 
British media broadcast, implicitly BBC Persian, accusing them of interfering in Iran’s elections. 
He asserted in a speech before the elections: “The British radio is giving guidelines to the people 
saying vote for so-and-so and do not vote for so-and-so! What is this? Are the British missing 
their interferences in Iran’s affairs?” (quoted in Farsi in his Telegram channel in February 2016). 
A group of his hard-core supporters are called “the Worried Ones” [Delvapasan in Farsi] due to 
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showing extra concern over Iran’s nuclear agreement19 in 2015. Drawing on his quote, the 
Worried Ones labeled the List of Hope as “the Queen’s List” and promoted this idea that anyone 
who votes for this list is doubtlessly a traitor and a “Westoxificated” [Gharbzade in Farsi]. 
Variously translated as Westoxification, Westoxication, or occidentosis, Gharbzadegi is a term 
first coined by Iranian philosopher Ahmad Fardid and widely used by the lay intellectual and 
writer Jalal Al Ahmad. It means the loss of Iranian identity through the blind adaptation and 
imitation of Western culture (Keddie and Richard 2006, 189) which Al Ahmad analogizes to “a 
plague coming from the West” and intoxicating the society (1984, 135-6).   
With two exceptions, all my informants who participated in the elections were pro-
reformists and voted for the List of Hope. Like Hadis, they did not boycott the elections this time 
because they saw it as a rare moment to, on one hand, show their support for the reformist 
president and his cabinet and, on the other hand, give hardliners what they described to me as “a 
revenge-slap”. Fifi explains: 
To answer to your question that why this time unlike the other time [the 2012 
[parliamentary election], I voted, I would say because it was an unfair election. [it was 
unfair because of] all these unprecedented disqualifications which we never had in any 
era before. It was to the extent that even the grandson of the founder of the Revolution 
got disqualified! And then, an influential person like Mr. Hashemi [Rafsanjani], who 
always behaved carefully and took minimum possible risks in all these 37 years [since the 
Revolutions], broke his silence and gave a controversial speech against the Guardian 
Council. […] It was when I realized the situations is getting very dangerous from within. 
In fact, hardliners were about to take the front line. Then I thought if I boycott the 
election this time, how I could answer back these disqualifications? […] And you know 
how I convinced myself to vote? I realized this is how they [hardliners] are eliminating 
reformists; first they silenced their leaders [she implied the Green Movement’s leaders: 
Mousavi, Rahnavard, and Karroubi] by putting them in house arrest, and then they 
disappointed their supporters from participating in any elections. Gradually and silently, 
they are disappearing reformists and making the society more radical. This thought 
passed through my mind and frightened me very much, so I decided to vote. This fear 
                                                            
19 This agreement is JCPOA (The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and is known as BARJAM 
(Barnameye Jame Eghdam Moshtarak in Farsi) in Iran.  
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still exits, but I am sure if we [reformists] had lost the elections, we would have lost 
many more things.  
 
Moreover, Iran around the February elections was the Iran after the nuclear agreement. 
BARJAM is a historical agreement with world powers regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which 
limited its nuclear ability in return for lifting international oil and financial sanctions (see 
Joyner2016 for more information on BARJAM and Iran’s nuclear program). In 2015, the night 
the deal got signed, thousands of Iranians, including my reformist informants, celebrated this 
victory by pouring into streets in multiple major cities of Iran, screaming, and dancing. 
Additionally, many were active on social media posting jokes20 and celebratory notes which 
mostly thanked Rouhani’s government, in particular Zarif, and blamed the incapability of former 
President Ahmadinejad.  
Despite this national celebration, the then-parliament, dominated by hardliners, 
denounced the deal and began to apply pressures on Rouhani and his cabinet in different ways. 
Therefore, the 2016 elections provided pro-president voters with a chance to reclaim the 
parliament from hardliners. For my liberal and left-wing informants, their participation in the 
first election since the agreement was, in Fifi’s words, “the announcement of [their] alliance with 
Rouhani and Zarif who achieved this great deal.” They believed the more reformist 
representatives they voted for, the more politically uniformed parliament they would get. This 
                                                            
20 The Iran-US Nuclear Deal jokes which emerged in 2015 make up the latest joke cycle on Iran’s nuclear 
program so far. It includes jokes which mostly target negotiators; the deal; and its potential impact on the 
economy, international relations, and the daily lives of Iranians. In fact, it is a joke sub-cycle which 
belongs to the larger family of Iran’s nuclear program jokes created and disseminated periodically at 
different times during these negotiations. The first appearance of these jokes coincides with the first phase 
of these negotiations during Ahmadinejad’s presidency where Iran’s negotiator, Saeed Jalili, had a series 
of meetings with Catherine Ashton, the European Union foreign policy chief in 2007. 
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would ultimately lead to a more harmonious state whose executive and legislative branches are 
in harmony.  
Furthermore, given that Khamenei is more right-wing leaning, the outcomes of these 
elections had the capacity to integrally change Iranian systems of power. The president, the head 
of the executive body is a reformist; therefore, voters were left to wonder: what if two other 
bodies of power, the legislative branch and the Assembly of Experts which is the entity 
supervising and electing the Supreme Leader become reformist too? If all bodies of power 
become reformist, the chance that the next Leader is chosen from reformists will increase. These 
were some of my informants’ motivations for participating in these elections.  
 Indeed, the results of these elections, as Fifi puts it, were “game-changing and historical.” 
In Tehran, the entire List of Hope won all thirty seats in the parliament, and, with one exception, 
they took fifteen of the sixteen total seats in the Assembly of Experts. This landslide victory 
shocked conservatives and outraged the Leader. In a speech after the official announcement of 
the results, he asserted: “I said those who do not believe in the regime shall vote, [I did not say] 
send those who do not believe in the regime to the parliament!” (quoted in Farsi in his Telegram 
channel on March 2016) 
Nevertheless, this achievement for my reformist informants meant another forward step 
on their slow but steady path towards democracy. The movement started with the election of 
President Khatami in 1997, was reborn in the 2009 Green Movement, re-emerged in the 2013 
presidential election, and continued in the 2016 February elections. Combining three elemental 
icons, reformist voters as the wayfarers of this path borrowed the symbol of the Green 
Movement, (see Figure 2 for the victory green fingers,) and mixed it with a bandage (as the 
marker of wounds which have remained from the 2009 Green Movement) and ink-stained 
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fingers as the symbol of participation in these elections (see Figure 3). As my informants stated, 
a week before the election day, this picture went viral mostly in different channels in Telegram 
and soon thereafter became the main symbol of the 2016 elections for reformist voters.  
In most channels from which I received this picture, it came with these phrases: “Neither 
our scars are healed, nor our pains are lessened, but…but I vote with confidence because it is not 
only a vote but a path…” (posted in different pro-reformist channels such as VahidOnline 
[@Vahid_Onlin] on February 2016). Bahar, my thirty-year-old female informant, was the one 
who sent me this picture on February 18, 2016, almost a week before the elections, and told me 
that “this picture with its powerful phrases reminded [her and her like-minded friends] of how far 
[they] have come in this path, and how much longer they should go to arrive at [their] goals.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Green Movement’s Symbol                                             Figure 3: We Stay: February 26th, 27th, and 28th 
 
Likewise, Hadis believed that it was a powerful symbol which, along with other pictures 
and political statements, motivated her to participate in these elections. She summarizes the 
stories of these elections as follows: 
During Ahmadinejad’s period, it was all miseries and adversities. Our votes were stolen, 
we were under sanctions, prices got tripled, [and] we had literally nothing! It was like a 
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situation which one who sees from the outside might have said: ‘they have nothing to live 
on, they should be totally hopeless!’ But the same miserable people made a campaign, 
calling on people to join them and vote again! Then, they formed a united group, voted, 
and changed the president. A step forward! Then again, the same group kept the same 
campaign alive for the parliament election, again called on people to vote. They made a 
list and said to all ‘it is the best of all has remained, come and vote again!’ It happened at 
the time of suffocation when one [an outsider] might still assume Iranians are a handful 
of depressed, exhausted, and miserable people who lost their path. But in the glimmer of 
hope, they found their path. And their hope was much as the entire List of Hope got in to 
the parliament, almost the entire List of Hope got in to the Assembly of the Experts.   
 
As both Hadis and Bahar mentioned, the February elections provided pro-Green Movement 
Iranians with an opportunity to display their unity and support for the ideas they believe in and 
the goal they fought for. 
The February Elections’ Joke Cycle: Their Context, Emergence, and Growth 
 
Once the election results were officially announced, on February 28, 2016, on his official 
Twitter account21, the prominent conservative and the former speaker of the parliament, Haddad-
Adel, who lost to the List of Hope by placing the 31st, tweeted:  
During the past few days, on cyberspace, I have read many interesting and remarkable 
jokes about myself. I am happy for the excitement and happiness of my fellow 
Tehranians who support the opposing group. I am thankful because the most significant 
portions of your jokes do not target my personality and my family! 
 
As a matter of fact, he must have come across the jokes people made about him on the Internet. I 
personally received many digitally-altered photographic jokes and Internet memes  
specifically targeting him in the last days of the elections as he was only one place behind to win 
a seat in the Tehran parliament. Even before knowing the official news, I became aware of his 
defeat through the following meme which a friend of mine shared in our Telegram group. 
 
                                                            
21 Ironically, even though Twitter is blocked in Iran, many politicians and state authorities including the 
Leader and the president have official, active accounts in English and Farsi.  
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Joke Eight/collected on March 2016: 
 
Peter from the movie Finding Neverland: 
What were the results of the parliamentary 
election? 
 
 
 
 
Haddad-Adel: We lost just with a slight 
difference… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haddad-Adel: Don’t worry! Soon, I will 
divulge documents which prove the state 
cheated in the elections. 
***It alludes to the 2009 presidential 
election in which many reformists and the 
Green Movement protestors believe the 
then-state cheated. 
 
        Figure 4: Joke Eight 
 
Joke Eight was among the hundreds I received within the whole election period. From the 
Guardian Council’s announcement of candidates’ disqualifications to the time all votes were 
counted and the results were proclaimed, I collected more than thirty pages of jokes; verbal and 
visual; numerous caricatures; and several humorous videos which my friends and informants 
forwarded to me in Telegram, Twitter, or other online venues. The other source from which I 
took many jokes was the Iranian satirist and writer Ebrahim Nabavi’s Facebook page. On March 
2, 2016, he asked his page followers to send him “the best joke or jokes they heard about the 
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elections.” Only a day after his request, 423 people commented under his post, many of whom 
sent original jokes, mostly verbal. 
The first question I asked my interviewees is: why did Iranians make thousands of jokes 
about the elections? Mandana, my 31-year-old female informant, believes that “political jokes 
have become a part of [Iranians’] daily culture [which] play an important role in shaping their 
understandings of the society.” Likewise, Arman, my 31-year-old male informant, believes:  
Iranians are highly politicized people; not because they adore politics, rather because it 
has direct impact on their lives, on their bread [Bread is a metaphor for daily income in 
Farsi] […] Any event which directly affects people’s bread makes them conscious and 
curious. That is why people follow politics and spread the word in Iran. And I believe it 
[politics] is best spread in the humorous language of jokes.  
 
Therefore, any political events with direct and indirect impact on daily lives nourish Iranian 
appetites for jokes and provide them with substantial targets. In my joke archive, which I have 
established and updated since 2015, whenever there was a political occasion in Iran, for example 
the ten-day annual celebration of the victory of the Revolution [Daheye Fajr in Farsi], or a 
political event in progress, like Iran’s nuclear negotiations, I could find a corresponding joke 
cycle which had instantly emerged in response to those political matters. However, it should be 
noted that not all political events stimulate laughter in Iran. A very recent example of such is the 
sudden death of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani in January 2017 which deeply saddened many 
reformists and moderates in Iran. Given his recent popularity among people and his influential 
contributions to the reformist movement, it was not surprising that I did not get a single joke 
targeting him or his death from my pro-reformist informants or online groups.   
As political events with considerable tangible impact on people’s daily lives, elections in 
Iran normally trigger people’s humorous responses. Perhaps the only exceptions were the tragic 
elections of 2009 and the boycotted parliamentary elections of 2012 in which people, particularly 
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protesters and boycotters, did not have the appropriate mood, motivations, or, probably, time to 
be humorous. Bahar, my thirty-year-old female informant, calls these periods “the jokeless times 
as if the dead’s ashes were thrown all over the country which stole away any moods for jokes.” 
On the contrary, the 2013 presidential elections and the more recent ones, the 2016 elections, 
brought thousands of waves of jokes with them because, firstly, Iran around this time was 
distanced enough from the traumatic post-election years of 2009. Secondly, the results of both 
elections, 2013 and 2016, were in favor of the Green Movement protesters. Thus, some joke 
cycles that emerged during these times were celebratory jokes. For instance, several jokes in the 
“Thank You Rouhani!” joke cycle in 201322 and the post-election joke cycle in 2016, were the 
pro-Green Movement and reformist people’s commemorations of their hard-gained 
achievements after all those tragic years.  
More importantly, as mentioned earlier, when the 2016 election jokes appeared, Iranians 
were a happy and hopeful people after BARJAM. In fact, their victory in the 2016 elections 
doubled and reassured this happiness and hope. Accordingly, post-election jokes provided them 
with the language to express and embody their feelings. In other words, from a reformist’s point 
of view, all major joke cycles that emerged since Rouhani’s presidential victory in 2013 are 
comprehensible as different segments of an extended line which starts from the “Thank You 
Rouhani” cycle, stretches out to “Iran-US Deal”, and, thus far, ends with “the February 
elections” jokes.  
Finally, social media had a stronger presence in the 2013 and 2016 elections than the 
previous ones. Facebook, in 2013, and Telegram, in 2016, dominated other social networks; they 
did not only facilitate the mass-circulations of jokes, but also extended this genre of humorous 
                                                            
22 See Rezaei 2016 for more information on the “Thank You Rouhani!” joke cycle. 
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folklore in Iran. In 2016, with the growing popularity of Telegram paired with the affordability 
of smartphones, more hands were involved in creations, circulations, and developments of the 
February jokes to the extent that not a single story in these times was left unnoticed, 
uncommented, and “unjoked”. This provides a foundation to more fully answer the central 
question of this chapter: why were there thousands of jokes about these elections? To expand 
further, I will now explore when and where these jokes appeared and, more importantly, who 
were their main tellers and distributors. 
When did these jokes emerge? Using a thematic analysis, I have created three sub-cycle 
categories into which all these election-themed jokes, whether video, picture, or verbal, fit. 
Firstly, there are “pre-election jokes” which originally appeared as a response to the mass 
disqualifications by the Guardian Council. This sub-cycle expanded mainly when jokes, along 
with other communicative tools, were used as a means of campaigning by candidates and their 
supporters. Secondly “the Elections’ day” jokes were told on the polling day. And, thirdly, there 
are “post-election jokes” which went viral when the majority of votes were counted, and the List 
of Hope’s victory became certain. The last constitutes the largest sub-cycle within the February 
elections joke cycle. Describing her feelings about different cycles of jokes concerning the 
elections, Maral, my 27-year-old informant says: “while the jokes along with other political 
notes I got before the election day made me indecisive to join voters and vote for the List of 
Hope, the jokes I got after the election made me feel proud of my decision.”  
Who made/told/sent these jokes? As Maral stated above, the February election joke cycle 
I come across on the Internet and through my leftist informants largely reflects reformists, 
moderates, and their supporters’ political views. In other words, they were in favor of reformists 
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and moderates’ coalition, the List of Hope, and consequently against conservatives and the 
Worried Ones!  
My thirty-year-old female informant, Narges, self-identifies as neither conservative nor 
reformist. She was one of my two informants who did not vote for the entire List of Hope. As 
she explained to me, she compiled her own list including both conservative and moderate 
candidates. To gain insights into both sides, she joined two contrasting Telegram groups during 
the elections period: she became a member of her hard-core reformist friends’ group who were 
between the age of twenty and thirty years old and were residents of Tehran. As Narges defines 
their political affiliations, “they think much closer to the dominating political views of the 
country’s political capital, pro-reformists and pro-Green Movement.” She also joined her senior 
family group, whose members lived in counties or small cities far from Tehran with the average 
age of forty or above. She calls them “conservatives and ultraconservatives”. Comparing these 
two groups and their activities during the elections, she concludes jokes were not the common 
language among her conservative family. She explains: 
It was only in my friend group where many political jokes about the elections were 
exchanged while in the conservative group, [everything] was just serious, you would find 
no jokes at all. Perhaps it means the people who make jokes comprises the youth 
population of the country who are more creative and are more engaged in social 
networks. And because they are predominantly reformist, they apparently make jokes 
against conservatives. 
 
Likewise, Fifi describes her groupmates who send her jokes in favor of reformists as “political 
activists who are mostly in [their thirties or younger], feminist, reformist, clearheaded, and 
freethinkers [Azadandish in Farsi] in terms of many issues, especially social and political ones.” 
Similarly, Hadis characterized those who encouraged her to vote for the List of Hope by sending 
pro-reformist political statements including jokes as “reliable, responsible, and intellectual who 
share their political awareness with others.”  
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However, it is not to say the conservative camp did not benefit from humor as a political 
weapon in these elections. The two closest and the most loyal groups to the Leader, Velaees 
[pro-leaders] and Basijis [individual members of the Basij militia], used social media to mobilize 
their fellow conservatives against the List of Hope. As a paramilitary force, Basij is a 
subordinate of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard [Sepah in Farsi], which takes its orders directly 
or indirectly from the Leader to get involved in political, religious, and cultural activities (For 
more information on Basij’s various roles in Iranian society, see Golklar 2011, Ostovar 2013). 
Since the 2009 Green Movement, their image among the public has been associated with 
ultraconservatives who are not afraid of using violence to suppress the protesters. During these 
elections, young Basijis had a Twitter campaign, #No2UK (# ﻪﻧ-ﻪﺑ-ﺲﻴﻠﮕﻧا  in Farsi). In this 
campaign, they used verbal and visual jokes to promote their conspiracy theory that the List of 
Hope is the Queen’s List. In Telegram, they also created and spread countless stickers with the 
pictures of Queen and Winston Churchill as if they were deceiving people to vote for their list 
(see Appendix B-Stickers: No2UK Stickers). 
Moreover, like Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook, Khamenei has official channels in 
different languages in Telegram: five in Farsi, one in English (@Khamenei_English), and one in 
Arabic (@Khamenei_Arabic). During the time of the elections, all these channels, especially the 
Farsi ones, were active, posting his videos, audio files, and photos and sharing his speeches and 
sermons about the elections. Even though I did not find any form of humor in his main news 
channel (@Khamenei_Ir), there were numerous uses of customized stickers with his pictures in 
different poses while repeating selections of his speeches (see Appendix B-Stickers: Khamenei 
Stickers).  
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Where were these jokes mostly told/shared? In answering this question, several of my 
informants mentioned the Telegram messaging application as the main platform which they used 
specifically for receiving, sharing, and even creating the February election jokes. In addition, 
they told me of their accounts of political debates, as well as joke-telling performances in public 
and semi-public places like taxis during the elections. In the following sections, I explore the key 
roles of Telegram and taxis separately in relation to the creation and circulation of what I term 
electionlore. 
 
Digital Electionlore in the “Telegramic Elections”: The Intersection of Politics and 
Cellphonelore 
 
Dear people of Iran, the country needs your vote. Let’s decide on a hopeful future for Iran 
on Friday. 
Hassan Rouhani 
 
Maral read this message to me from her cellphone. She told me that on Wednesday, February 
24th, two days before the elections and the last day of campaigning, she received this text from 
the president. She said: “I was checking my Telegram groups when I got this [message] as a 
regular text. It is not surprising of Rouhani; once in a while, on different occasions like Women’s 
day or Nowruz [Iranian New Year], he sends text messages to random numbers. I guess he 
realized where he can find us! In our mobile [phones]!”  
As Maral’s quote shows, given Iranians’ growing obsession with smartphones, 
communication devices, notably cellphones, entered the February political battlefield and served 
political purposes. Alongside regular text messaging, social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, 
and Telegram were used as digital campaigning tools to push both side’s points of views. 
However, on top of this list, Telegram doubtlessly stands as one of the key players and game-
changers in the February Elections. This instant messaging application, with over twenty million 
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Iranian users, provided both candidates and individuals, especially moderates and reformists, 
with a safe and open platform to express their political views and agendas. Through its private 
messaging groups, like-minded voters virtually got together to share, forward, and discuss the list 
of candidates and to question their decision to either participate in or boycott the elections. 
Additionally, through its public channels, many candidates and their supporters formed digital 
headquarters through which they distributed their election promises and political agendas.  
Of particular note was the massive circulations of the List of Hope in various forms of 
pictures, videos, and even “bots” in Telegram. “Bot” is a generic name in computer science for a 
program which is specifically designed to run concurrently and to perform iterative operations. 
In Telegram, bots are accounts run by a software, not an actual individual, and are used primarily 
for creating polls, inventories, and surveys. The List of Hope bot enabled pro-reformists voters to 
access the list of candidates specific to their cities. By simply clicking on the name of a district, 
the bot generated the corresponding List (see Figure 5). 
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              What can this bot do?  
This robot provides information about the 
official lists of the coalition of reformists and 
moderates (Rouhani and Khatami’s 
supporters) in the parliamentary and 
Assembly of Experts elections. To get 
different lists, press start or message the bot 
‘List’. 
 
[I pressed start] /start 
 
Select your polling district from the below 
keyboard. If your district is not there, find 
smaller districts provincially divided in the 
end of the keyboard. 
 
Tabriz, Azarshahr, 
and Oskoo 
Tehran, Rey, 
Shemiranat, and 
Islamshahr
Mashhad and Kallat Esfahan 
Qom Shiraz 
Kermanshah Rasht 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The List of Hope’s Telegram Bot 
  
Highlighting the essential role of Telegram, Narges calls the February elections 
“Telegramic elections”23 and explains: 
As a matter of fact, this time, the city [Tehran] was not covered much with papers. Unlike 
the previous elections, no walls were covered with candidates’ posters, or at least the 
places I was [central and western Tehran] I did not find any. Probably, on the 
intersections of main streets like Valiasr Street or Azadi Square, you would find big 
billboards with the pictures of candidates. But that was all physical, tangible thing you 
could get in these elections. For the most part, candidates and their supporters spent all 
their time and perhaps money in campaigning in Telegram. It had two benefits for them: 
first, they saved a huge amount of money in this way. Also, it was all regular people who 
spread the words which is way faster, cheaper, and easier than hiring individuals or 
finding volunteers to hand over their fliers. The only paper thing I got was the List of 
Hope [which many people circulated hand to hand]. All other pictures and information I 
got was digital from Telegram. I easily joined candidates’ telegram channels to get to 
know them better. […] Even on Friday [the election day], at the polling station, many 
people had their cellphones in their hands when they were filling out the ballots. 
                                                            
23 This name was frequently employed among Iranians around that time. BBC Persian also used this name 
in the title of a report: “Iran and the Telegramic Elections?” (BBC Persian 2016). 
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If you remember, normally in previous elections, we took out paper lists from our pockets 
to write the names of candidates at polling places. This time, it was just cellphones! 
  
Likewise, explaining the general mood of Telegram during this period, Maral asserts: 
I am not personally much into politics. I mean I do not normally check news websites as 
the first thing in the morning. But during the elections, thanks to Telegram, I could not 
escape the news for a second! It was everywhere in my Telegram! In my channels, my 
private groups […] The elections were the heated discussions in all my Telegram groups 
[then she names some of them]. There were only a few groups whose members seemed 
had nothing to do with the elections; […] even in those groups, occasionally at some 
points, jokes [related to the elections] were exchanged. 
 
The main reason that Telegram became the most important campaigning tool in these recent 
elections was its constant accessibility during this time. Since the 2009 Green Movement when 
protestors used Facebook and Twitter to internationally spread the footage of the fatal shooting 
of a young woman, Neda AghaSoltan, in a protest, these social media were labelled as 
“seditious” and were blocked by the Iranian authorities. During this period in Iran, extreme 
monitoring and surveillance were applied on people’s telecommunications and their online 
activities.  
My own personal experience dates back to the climax of these tensions when a text 
message of mine did not ever get delivered, no matter how many times I tried to send it. In my 
text, I simply invited a couple of my friends to join me in having Ghormeh Sabzi, the Green Stew 
[a famous stew in Iran made of vegetables and meat], at my place. Ridiculously enough, this 
message never made its way to them merely because it included the word “green”! Soon 
thereafter, my account became known among my friends and inspired us to create a game: 
Players should come up with meaningful texts with the words composed of green just to drive 
the supposed surveillance agent crazy! The winner was the one with the highest number of 
undelivered texts!  
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In 2012, upon the Leader’s command, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace was formed of 
top-ranking officials to regulate policies on Iranians’ activities on the Internet and, along with the 
Iranian Cyber Police, to protect the country’s cyber security. Regardless of all these restrictions 
and censorship, Iranians overcame this blocking and spying by using anti-filter apps, proxy 
servers, VPN (virtual private networks), and filter-busters. They also periodically switched to a 
new social network which had not been discovered and, therefore, filtered by the Iranian 
authorities. Telegram is among a few social networks which, unlike its rivals WhatsApp and 
Viber has not yet been the target of filtration or blocking in Iran. Fifi explains: 
In these election, there were countless jokes because Telegram did not get blocked, the 
Internet did not go on and off […]. After many years, it was the first election that neither 
Telegram nor WhatsApp got blocked! The whole time during the elections, days before, 
even days after, social networks [except Twitter and Facebook] were totally accessible; 
no crippling decrease in the Internet speed, no nerve-racking disconnections! Not at all! 
You cannot believe if I say it was the [emphasis in her tone] election in Iran without 
blocking and the internet disconnections!! 
 
Several informants of mine believed that it was their reformist president whose resistance 
prevented the blocking of Telegram during the elections. Since 2013, when he took the office, 
there has been a constant quarrel between two powers, the ultraconservative judiciary and the 
reformist executive branch over the blocking of social networks, especially Telegram, in Iran. 
While reformists believe blocking and censorship violate freedom of speech, the opposing group 
sees these social networks as a threat from foreigners who seek to intervene in Iran’s affairs. In 
the February elections, even though conservatives aimed hard to block Telegram, President 
Rouhani’s administration promised all Iranians that his government would stand against these 
efforts, and as Fifi and my other informants attested, he kept his promises. Thus, for the very first 
time since the 2009 disputed elections, elections were held in Iran without filtrations and 
blocking, at least in Telegram’s territories.  
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After the shocking victory of the List of Hope which many believe is owed to Telegram, 
hardliners have begun to apply more pressures on Rouhani’s cabinet to control and restrict access 
to this social network. To this purpose, in January 2017, Tehran’s Attorney-General officially 
persisted in its opposition to Telegram’s unblocked access within the country and demanded that 
Rouhani’s government make security measures regarding the full blocking of Telegram in the 
upcoming presidential election in May 2017 (reported in Eslahat News Telegram channel 
[@eslahatnews]). Moreover, as the first step toward controlling this app in the election, in mid-
March 2017, around the Iranian New Year (Nowruz), twelve Telegram channel administrators 
who are pro-reformists and supported the List of Hope during the 2016 elections, along with a 
number of reformist journalists, were arrested by an unknown military intelligence agency, 
supposedly the intelligence agency of Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Sepah.  
Given the Nowruz holidays and the five-to-thirteen-day closure of government offices, 
these unexpected arrests shocked the president and his cabinet and aroused straight objections 
from parliamentary representatives who condemned this action. They argued that it was 
strategically done during Nowruz with the purpose of delaying any legal response from the 
parliament and Rouhani. Ali Motahhari, the second deputy of the parliament, also expressed 
concerns over the fairness of the 2017 election if the other side insists on taking such 
spontaneous and damaging actions (posted in VahidOnline Telegram channel on March 2017 
[@Vahid_Onlin]). In response to these arrests, and based on their customers’ rights of 
confidentiality and security, the Telegram officials managed to put these channels whose 
administrators were arrested on hold and temporarily gain their ownerships in order to prevent 
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potential abuses.24 This news comforted these channels’ worried followers and assured them that 
hardliners would not be able to hack into and easily exploit them. 
During the 2016 elections, many jokes exchanged in private groups were forwarded from 
these channels. “Joking with politics” was my father’s favorite from which he shared jokes in our 
family group. Likewise, many of my informants told me that they relied on the materials 
provided on these public channels for their election-related conversations with their families and 
friends in private groups. Maral especially followed @Vahid_Onlin and Reforms’ News 
channels to stay updated with and share election news. 
In her long list of pro-reformists channels, Fifi particularly emphasized the role of 
“Political Humor” [@tanzesiasi] and “The Political Bitter Smile” [@talkhandesiasi] (the 
administrator of the former is among the May arrestees), as the channels whose jokes had the 
strongest presence in her private groups during the elections. Listing her channels and going 
through them group by group, she explained to me that, depending on members’ interests in 
politics, how and to what extent their daily activities were channeled into sharing the already-
made election-related materials from channels or, in some cases, creating such jokes, notes, 
videos, posters, and pictures. She named her family group as her most politically active 
Telegram private group during the elections period. This large group had more than one hundred 
male and female members within the wide age range of seven to seventy-four years old, most of 
whom were reformist and, in Fifi’s words, “highly politicized and politically aware”. The 
                                                            
24 These currently on-hold channels include: “Reformists’ Forum” [@majmae_eslahtalaban], “Reform 
News” [@eslahatnews], “Rouhani’s supporters96” [Havadaranhasanrohani96], “Reformists’ News” 
[@eslahtalabannews], and “Joking with Politics” [@shoki_ba_siasat] in Farsi. All these channels, 
especially “Reformists’ News”, were active as the main source of any political information, including 
humor, from the 2016 elections to their administrators’ arrest. 
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following screenshots taken by Fifi show a selection of their activities during the last week of the 
elections: 
 
 
Figure 6: Debates-Electionlore 
 
Figure 7:  List-Electionlore 
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Figure 8: Photos1-Electionlore 
 
Figure 9: Videos-Electionlore 
 
Figure 10: Ink-stained fingers-Electionlore  Figure 11: Photos2-Electionlore 
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As the pictures show, during the last seven days of the elections, they debated over 
candidates (Figure 6), shared the List of Hope (Figure 7), posted photos capturing the city’s 
atmosphere on the last campaigning days (Figure 8), exchanged news videos (Figure 9), and 
encouraged each other to vote by sending the pictures of their ink-stained fingers (Figure 10) 
after casting ballots and photos of political activists present in polling stations (Figure 11). More 
notably, they exchanged a great number of jokes: verbal (Figure 12), visual (Figure13), stickers 
(Figure 14) and digitally-altered photos (Figures 15 and 16). 
 
 
Figure 12: Verbal Jokes-Electionlore 
 
Figure 13: Visual Jokes-Electionlore 
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Figure 14: Stickers-Electionlore 
 
Figure 15: Digitally-altered photo1-Electionlore 
 
Figure 16: Digitally-altered photo2-Electionlore 
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Indeed, what Fifi and her groupmates exchanged in their online communications in 
Telegram is election-themed cellphonelore. As defined in Chapter Two, cellphonelore is folklore 
that is adapted for, created on, and disseminated through cellphone devices. This digital folklore, 
which both inhabits and is shaped by this environment, takes various forms such as jokes, text-
based pictures, urban legends, digitally altered-photographic jokes, animated pictures, and 
videos. As Fifi’s group activities show, these elections politicized cellphonelore preparing the 
ground for the emergence and growth of a great number of what I term electionlore. Electionlore 
encompasses any humorous expressive forms of folklore concerning the February elections 
which were primarily, but not necessarily, generated and circulated on the online venues of 
Telegram. Different media and apps such as Dubsmash videos and Photoshop were involved in 
creating such humor in various forms of texts, videos, and pictures. In the following chapter, I 
explore the various humorous forms that emerged in the three aforementioned joke sub-cycles 
and argue how this mass-mediated electionlore enabled my reformist informants to make 
manifest vernacular politics and construct their newslore in the digital world.  
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Chapter 5: From Disqualifications to a Revenge Laughter: Analysing 
Electionlore in Three Joke Sub-cycles 
 
The story that the February election jokes tell is like a folktale whose figures play different roles. 
In this chapter, I use the roles in folk narratives and retell the story of the February elections 
through jokes. I start by introducing the villains and the heroes who appeared in the pre-election 
disqualification jokes. Then, I continue by finding the donor’s role as the helper of heroes in 
Khatamilore when former President Khatami and his supporters entered this battlefield to help 
the reformist heroes. My story reaches its climax when, in the post-election jokes, the villains 
were punished and the people celebrated their victory. Finally, in the last section, I argue that 
these jokes and their messages were orally shared among Iranians in taxis in Tehran. 
 
“The Disqualification Office, how can I help you?”: Vernacularized Political Line-ups in 
the Pre-election Disqualification Jokes  
 
 “[The election joke wave in Telegram] started since they [the Guardian Council] began 
to put out the disqualifications” said Maral, my 27-year-old informant. She continued: 
In Seniors of Zange Tafrih [her group in Telegram with her 35 university friends 
between 25 and 31 years old] I did not expect other than that. Since 2009 [the Green 
Movement], all [the members] became highly political and remained politically active 
afterwards, [so] not surprisingly our group’s vibe was very electionary then. Perhaps the 
first but week-in-presence round of jokes appeared when candidates registered. These 
jokes were very personal, sometime sexist, just about the candidates [themselves] who 
wanted to run. […] But you know, this wave got heated [tab va tab in Farsi] and shifted 
when many reformists got disqualified. You know one of our professors [Maral said her 
name] also registered but got disqualified! These disqualifications provoked many 
disputes and so many jokes. The poet Haloo [a pen name], who is currently in [the] 
Evin25 [prison], wrote a long poem addressing Hasan Khomeini [the grandson of 
Khomeini, the founder of the Revolution] and teasing him that ‘you thought you would 
                                                            
25 A prison located in northern Tehran and known for housing political prisoners since before the 
Revolution. Since Ahmadinejad’s presidency, it is sarcastically called “Evin University” due to the high 
numbers of intellectuals imprisoned there. 
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get easily qualified because of your grandfather, ha ha, you were badly mistaken [Koor 
khoondi in Farsi]’. Then, it was numerous jokes about candidates who at that time were 
in the parliament but got disqualified to run again!! Ridiculous! Millions of pictures with 
funny captions got distributed in our group. […] these disqualifications made many 
people vocal, at least in Telegram. 
 
As Maral pointed out, before the mass disqualifications, election jokes evolved around the 
candidates, their personalities, and their gender regardless of their political orientations. Whether 
a reformist or a hardliner, if their names, pictures, age, or anything related to their campaign 
offered any sort of excuse for mockery, they would get attacked as joke targets. However, these 
jokes were very few in number with a relatively short life firstly, because they were primarily 
told in face-to-face communications without receiving large mass-mediations and distributions in 
Telegram. In my joke archive, I have few examples of this sort and, except for Maral, none of 
my informants remembered hearing or receiving them.  
Secondly, they targeted customary and recurrent subjects such age and gender which can 
be joked about out of the election contexts. In other words, despite their targets who were 
potential candidates, not many of them were political, at least in message or function, as they did 
not serve to promote or criticize candidates’ political ideologies and affiliations. Furthermore, the 
mass disqualifications by the Guardian Council not only prominently changed the story of these 
elections, but also shook up the election joke cycle and made their tellers shift gears toward the 
center of this political battle field: the old war between reformists and conservatives, and, in 
more precise words, the new political groupings of pro-Rouhani voters versus pro-Leader ones.  
The old common terminologies used to specify one’s political affiliation are right and left 
wings in Iran. Vernacularly used by my parents’ generation, the 1950s, right wings [Rasti in 
Farsi], are conservatives versus leftist [Chapi in Farsi], who are non-conservatives which is in 
line with its universal use. Even though a few of my informants who were in their early thirties 
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used such words, most of them preferred other words such as “reformist,” “moderate,” 
“hardliner,” and “conservative” when they wanted to self-identify or name the other side’s 
political views.  
“Conservatives versus reformists”, however, was not the most frequently used vocabulary 
in the elections joke cycle. Pre-election jokes humorously played with the old quarrel between 
these two groups; however, the disqualifications complicated this approach. Jokes, while 
underscoring party divides, directly address prominent figures from both sides without 
mentioning their parties. In other words, they were representative-based rather than party-based.  
Corresponding to the political battle, two groups were portrayed in these jokes: reformists 
in the role of heroes and conservatives as villains. Painstakingly selected, villains as the target of 
jokes were usually conservatives from the Leader’s inner circle in opposition to Rouhani’s 
supporters, cast in the role of hero. While highlighting their contrasting political ideologies, these 
juxtapositions also reflected how ordinary Iranians make sense of political divisions in post-
BARJAM Iran. Through the humorous language of these jokes, this political grouping was 
translated into the political battle between pro-Rouhani’s voters versus pro-Leaders or pro-the 
List of Hope versus the Worried Ones or anti-BARJAMs. 
Perhaps the most familiar villain that reappeared in the pre-election joke sub-cycle is 
Ahmad Jannati, who has a long history of representing hardliners in Iranian political jokes. In his 
nineties, with a bony face and a frail figure, he is a well-known ultraconservative who was the 
Guardian Council’s Leader-appointed chairman and a member of the Assembly of Experts 
during the elections. His dogmatic take on Islam, social freedoms, and gender equality paired 
with his active and crucial role in politics since the Revolution despite his old age resulted in his 
personage in jokes in which he is portrayed as an “immortal radical politician” who, since “the 
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dinosaur age,” has been “reformists’ sworn enemy.”26 His son, Ali Jannati, a reformist and 
Rouhani’s former minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Culture, stated that he, himself, 
received jokes about his father on his cellphone (Mashregh News 2015). His other son also 
commented on jokes about his father’s age and said: “We genetically live long!” (Fars News 
Agency 2015)  
My 31-year-old male informant, Arman, believes Jannati is a hardliner who is granted 
“the honorary title of permanent political joke target” by Iranians. He explains: 
Because of his position, Jannati honorably achieved permanency as a political joke 
target! [Arman laughed] He stands in a position through which he just defends the Leader 
and endlessly speaks against reformists. He is a member of the Assembly of Experts who 
is supposed to be a supervisor of the Leader while he is definitely his submissive. When 
people want to criticize the Leadership, or when reformists want to show there is 
negligence in the Guardian Council, Jannati becomes a symbol who receives attacks. The 
other reason of having this honorary title [permanent joke target] is because he is seen 
and heard from a tribune which is the most famous one in Iran, the tribune of Tehran’s 
Friday prayer.  
 
Similarly, my 31-year-old female informant, Mandana, named Jannati as a “non-forbidden” 
target who can be joked unlike the Leader. Reviewing recent political joke cycles, she argued 
that “it has always been legal to laugh at and joke about Jannati” because he is not the regime’s 
“sanctities”.  
In the February elections joke cycle, neither my informants nor I came across any direct 
verbal criticism of the Leader. While there were numerous Internet memes which include 
Khamenei’s pictures alone or alongside other politicians, no verbal attack specifically targeted 
him. Instead, Jannati, as one of the Leader’s confidantes, once again stole the floor from other 
conservatives as the main villain targeted in the election jokes.  
                                                            
26 Words in quotations were chosen from jokes. 
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Appointed by the Leader, Jannati was repeatedly granted the tribune of Tehran’s Friday 
prayer, one of the most powerful tools for making political speeches in Iran, during the elections. 
Using this power, he openly announced his opposition against BARJAM and directly criticized 
Rouhani and his cabinet. This hostility was enough for pro-reformist joke tellers to return him, 
once more, to the role of villain in their pre-election jokes.  
From my research, his first appearance in these jokes was when, in a speech, he 
complained about the large number of registered candidates in this race and said: “Unfortunately, 
the number of people who registered in the parliament and the Assembly of Experts elections has 
increased. I wonder if some of them can even read just one Arabic phrase correctly” (quoted in 
BBC Persian Telegram channel on January 2016). In the resulting jokes, Jannati was depicted as 
a grumpy old chairman of the entity whose responsibility is reviewing candidates’ profiles, but 
he is too old and exhausted to admire people’s increasing willingness to contribute to their 
country’s politics. In other jokes of this sort, the “appropriation of their incongruities” (Oring 
2003, 13-26) was built on his comment about some candidates’ poor Arabic. Given his record of 
mispronouncing hard Farsi words, as the Guardian Council’s chairman, he is now the one who 
decides which candidates speak Arabic better while he, himself, is not fluent enough in his 
mother language, let alone Arabic, to undertake such a task.  
Besides his responsibility as the Leader-appointed chairman of the Guardian Council, he 
also registered as a candidate for the Assembly of Experts. This ironic fact was, itself, a simple 
joke that “he is the only candidate in this race who by Leader’s command can qualify himself 
and disqualify others!” (see Joke Nine). Such jokes got heated when he did qualify himself (see 
Joke Ten), but disqualified most of reformists, notably Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the 
founding father of the Revolution, Imam Khomeini.  
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Joke Nine/collected on January 2016: Today’s Jannati’s dialogue with himself: Hey me, 
do you think I get qualified? That is the question!  
 
Joke Ten/collected on January 2016: Jannati registered in the elections whose candidacy 
was granted by himself, so he can supervise the Leader who chose him to qualify himself 
[Jannati]!  
 
These mass disqualifications soon became the center of these jokes. Directly criticizing the 
Guardian Council (see Joke Eleven) or Jannati (see Joke Twelve), they sent a message about the 
absurdity of the qualification process, the incompetency and biased performance of the entity in 
charge, and, thusly, the unfairness of these elections. This message was echoed through the usage 
of popular personages from another recent joke cycle, the Iran-US Deal (see Joke Thirteen). 
Zarif, a hero borrowed from this joke cycle, and his American counterpart in Iran’s nuclear 
negotiations, John Kerry, reemerged in the pre-election disqualification jokes. They not only 
resonated in the post-BARJAM political climate of Iran, but also remind voters that these 
elections are the battles between pro-Rouhanis and anti-BARJAMs. 
Joke Eleven/collected on January 2016:  
I just made a phone call to the Guardian Council. A guy answered: The Disqualification 
office, how can I help you? 
 
Joke Twelve/collected on January 2016:  
Now, our special thanks are reserved for Jannati, a decent, innocent old man who made 
his great sacrifices and big efforts in making these elections even more greater and more 
passionate! Thanks to his disqualifications, the number of qualified candidates is now 
equal to potential seats! 
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The other heroic face introduced by these jokes was Hassan Khomeini, a middle-aged, 
well-respected reformist with close relationships with the reform movement’s pioneer, former 
President Mohamad Khatami, and influential politicians, notably Hashemi Rafsanjani. As the 
grandson of Khomeini, his name is tied with the Revolution and its ideals. Therefore, it was not 
surprising that his disqualification was not only strongly condemned by prominent politicians, 
but also outraged and deeply worried the 1950s and younger Iranians as the generations who, 
like my parents, made this Revolution happen and still have high respect for Imam Khomeini and 
his families.  
Hana describes how her mother’s generation feels about Imam Khomeini as the 
Revolution’s founder: 
And not only Khomeini but also his families are highly respected in Iran, and Iranians, 
my mum’s generation baraye harfeshoon tare khord mikonan [literally meaning ‘they cut 
chives for their words’; here used to imply ‘they admire them and listen to their advice’]. 
Actually, his place in my parents’ generation’s minds is as holy as a saint. I somewhat 
agree he was a charismatic figure. […] Khomeini is a person whose face was seen in the 
Joke Thirteen/collected on January 2016:  
John Kerry [U.S Secretary of State]: You got 
disqualified? 
Zarif: I am a minister for gods’ sakes [Baba in 
Farsi]! 
*** The word Baba [literally ‘father’] is used 
here at the end of Zarif’s statement to express 
his desperation of proving and establishing his 
position as a minister. 
Figure 17: Joke Thirteen – Pre-
electionlore 
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full moon! [In early years of the Revolution, this belief was common among a big group 
of Iranians that Khamenei’s face is carved in the full moon, and this was a proof of his 
high spiritual and supernatural level] Did you forget that? [She laughed] I am not saying 
us [our generation], but look at other people from older generations who regard him as a 
super human. For example, in 2001, I was on a trip in Shiraz where I encountered a 
woman at my mum’s age who said – I remembered what she said word-by-word because 
I was shocked! – She said: ‘I cannot go to Mashhad to pay my tribute to Agha [Imam 
Reza, the 8th Imam of Shias whose shrine is in city Mashhad], but I will go to Tehran on 
ertehal days [the anniversary of Khomeini’s demise] in order to pa boosiye Agha beram 
[literally meaning ‘to go and kiss Agha’s feet’; metaphorically used to imply ‘to visit his 
shrine humbly as a pilgrim’]. Can you believe some people are [still] so fond of him?  
 
The February elections were about to happen two weeks after Daheye Fajr, the ten-day annual 
celebration of the victory of the Revolution. Starting from the 12th of the Bahman month in the 
Persian calendar and ending on the 22nd, Daheye Fajr is annually held in early February across 
Iran and is supposed to be celebrated by all Iranians who presumably still feel faithful to the 
Revolution. This coincidence, paired with Hassan Khomeini’s disqualification, drew the 
attention of joke tellers to another fundamental matter in the election battle and made old ashes 
flame: the old story of the Revolution, and how it ate its children.  
One of the first jokes about Hassan Khomeini’s disqualification, which I received in 
Telegram, mimicked a news format:  
Joke Fourteen/collected on February 2016:  
The Guardian Council disqualified Khomeini’s Revolution. 
  
When I told my father this joke, he remained silent for couple of seconds and then, with a short 
smile, he shook his head and said: “regrettably”. The bitter laughter this joke aroused in him 
made me realize how serious such jokes might sound to the ears of a group of Iranians who, like 
my father, gradually lost faith in their Revolution or, like Hana’s mother, must have felt 
heartbroken to witness Khomeini’s family treated disrespectfully by the Revolution. 
The post-Hassan-Khomeini-disqualification jokes magnify the existing and deepening 
divisions in Iranian politics from another angle: the reformist children of distinguished 
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revolutionaries and well-esteemed Revolution ideologists versus hardliners (see Jokes Fifteen 
and Sixteen). These jokes overlapped with the Daheye Fajr joke cycle in their use of Khomeini’s 
pictures and quotes when they underlined his expected discontent, if he were still alive, at his 
grandson’s disqualification (see Joke Seventeen and Eighteen).  
Joke Fifteen/collected on February 2016: 
 The daughter of Taleghani, 
The son of Martyr [Shahid in Farsi] Motahhari, 
The son of Martyr Ashrafi Isfehani, 
The grandson of Imam Khomeini, 
Another grandson of Khomeini, 
Hashemi’s children, 
Dr. Aref’s son, 
All are disqualified! Do your best in raising children! 
*** All people whose names are listed in this joke are the children of highly recognized 
revolutionaries. As the instrumental ideologists, Taleghani and Motahhari nurtured the 
sapling Revolution by their thoughts in its early years, and it is believed that Ashrafi 
Isfehani and other Martyrs secured its stability by their blood in the unsettling time of 
war during the 1980s.  
 
Joke Sixteen/collected on February 2016:  
The guy grew up in Khomeini’s house, was trained in Hozeh 
[a seminary where Shi’a Muslim clerics are trained], and now as it turned out, he is not 
righteous enough to be a politician! Nothing is expected from us, guys! Relax! Take it 
easy! 
   
Joke Seventeen/collected on February 2016:  
The rumor says: “Khomeini is sulking [Ghahr karde in Farsi] and does not intend to 
return tomorrow!” 
*** I received this joke on the 11th of Bahman, a day before the beginning of Daheye 
Fajr. The beginning of this period, the 12th of Bahman [February the first] marks 
Khomeini’s arrival day in Iran in 1979 after spending more than 14 years in exile. On this 
day, millions of Iranians went to the airport to welcome him.  
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Joke Eighteen/collected on February 
2016:  
[Ayatollah Khomeini in the photo]: Let 
me pour a cup of tea for my beloved 
grandson, so it washes away the grief of 
his disqualification. 
 
*** This photo is very famous among the 
“1980s and 1970s kids”, the Third and 
Second Generations of the Revolution. 
My informants, the Third Generation, 
recall it as the first pictures in their 
school textbooks accompanied with a 
quote from Khomeini to exemplify and 
promote his modest life style. Figure 18: Joke Eighteen: Pre-electionlore 
 
 
Even though these mass disqualifications at first disappointed reformists, as discussed 
earlier, in the end it led to revenge votes from pro-Green Movement Iranians who supported the 
coalition of remaining moderate and reformist candidates in the List of Hope. In the next section, 
I explore those parts of electionlore which mobilized and unified my informants to take this 
revenge. 
 
“I repeat, vote for all the individuals in both the lists”: Making Popular Alliance Through 
Khatamilore  
 
“What is your favorite joke in these elections?” I asked Fifi. “Let me think” she hesitated 
for a second and then said:  
Maybe not only my favorite but also, I can say the most powerful jokes I got were the 
ones about Khatami’s [Iran’s former president who is best known as the pioneer and 
leader of the reform movement] video. You know I believe we won the elections indeed 
just because of the massive circulations of that video message in Telegram, and not 
because of posters or fliers! You must have seen the video and heard the jokes, Right? 
 
I nodded. She continued:  
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His message was so very persuasive. It generated many jokes and many videos, and I 
think it is because he is beloved and has an influential personality among us. He is 
subject to a media ban, and his ban aroused many objections. Who could believe that a 
popular president, [who] I can say is definitely the most popular politician ever this 
Revolution sees in its 37-year-old lifetime and who is the mastermind [Maghze motefaker 
in Farsi, meaning behind the idea] of the ‘Dialogue between Civilizations’ [On his 
suggestion, the year 2001 was named so by the United Nations], is on a media ban in his 
own country!?![…] It was in his video where he introduced the List of Hope and called 
on people to vote for it. […] and as it turned out, many people listened to him because 
they still deeply love and trust him. 
 
As the fifth president of Iran, Mohamad Khatami was in office from 1997 to 2005, proceeded by 
Hashemi Rafsanjani and succeeded by Ahmadinejad. Among my generation, the “1980s kids”, 
and older, “the 1970s kids”, he is known as the icon of enlightenment, democracy, intellectuality, 
and reform in the post-revolutionary Iran. Before he became president, he served as the minister 
of Culture and Islamic Guidance in Hashemi’s cabinet through which he was recognized as the 
advocate of freedom of speech, tolerance, and liberalization. His brilliant career in culture, his 
training as a political philosopher, accompanied with his powerful and poetic language resulted 
in a charismatic cultural image among young pro-reformist Iranians (see Wastnidge 2016 for 
more information on Khatami and Iran’s cultural and political climate under his administration). 
Like Fifi, many other informants of mine named him as their favorite and “the most popular 
politician” in their life time. Some of them even expressed regrets that they had not been born 
earlier, so they could have gone to universities and spent their youth when it was “Khatami’s 
Iran”.  
In a recent Iranian joke cycle that emerged after Trump’s victory in the US election, 
Obama’s America is compared to Khatami’s Iran, which was succeeded by Ahmadinejad. In 
these jokes, Trump seeks help from Ahmadinejad as his mentor on how to make America great 
after Obama, like what Ahmadinejad did with Iran after Khatami! To emphasize these 
similarities, these jokes made a double comparison and contrast: On one end, there are Trump 
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and Ahmadinejad, side by side, as the symbols of chaos, populism, low language, not-
statesmanlike-looking politicians [chehreye gheir siyasatmadarane in Farsi] while on the other 
end, Khatami and Obama are portrayed as good-looking, charismatic leaders of democracy and 
tolerance.  
 In 2013, on the eve of Rouhani’s victory in the presidential election, I was in a taxi in 
Tehran heading home when we got stuck in a traffic jam caused by a big crowd dancing and 
screaming in the streets. Many of them held up Rouhani’s photos besides Khatami’s. As a very 
common topic in taxis in Iran, the driver, a man in his forties, began to kill time by talking about 
politics. I clearly remember what he said about Rouhani’s victory. Pointing at Khatami’s photo 
in the hands of people in the street, he said, “You see, even after these many years [it was seven 
years after Khatami’s presidency], people still voted only for whomever he [Khatami] said. I 
voted for Rouhani because he said Rouhani is trustworthy.” In the February elections, history 
was repeated one more time when many Iranians trusted their beloved reformist leader and voted 
for the List he asked them to. 
Khatami’s video, which Fifi mentioned in our interview, was originally released on social 
media on February 22, 2016, four days before the election day, and soon went viral, especially in 
Telegram. In this video, Khatami first criticized the Guardian Council for disqualifying 
“competent, well-respected, well-trusted, and well-known figures among Iranians.” Then, he 
asked all Iranian voters to come and support the reformist movement one more time, as they did 
in the 2013 presidential elections. He indicated that by supporting the coalition between 
reformists and moderates, they would take a step toward a “parliament aligned and along with 
the present and his ideals,” especially BARJAM. Finally, he urged them to participate in both the 
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parliamentary and the Assembly of Experts elections and vote for the List of Hope. He 
emphasized:  
Those who care for reforms, improvement, progress in the country as well as removal of 
threats and limitations, need to try to vote for both the lists, all the individuals in both the 
lists, I repeat, vote for all the individuals in both the lists, to take steps on the path of the 
country’s dignity and to boost stability and security in the country as well as to optimize 
and improve the affairs.  
 
Since 2015, when the judiciary branch of government issued a prohibition on Iran’s national 
media from publishing Khatami’s images or even mentioning his name, millions of Iranians have 
formed a digital campaign and launched the hashtag “we will be Khatami’s media” (in Farsi 
# ﻪﻧﺎﺳر-ﯽﻤﺗﺎﺧ-ﻢﻳﻮﺸﻴﻣ ) to spread his words, videos, and pictures in the alternative space of social 
media. Through this campaign and during the elections, his supporters circulated his video 
primarily in Telegram and Instagram, as well as Twitter and Facebook, with the same hashtag, 
(# ﻪﻧﺎﺳر-ﯽﻤﺗﺎﺧ-ﻢﻳﻮﺸﻴﻣ ), and new ones, including “I repeat” (# راﺮﮑﺗ-ﻢﻨﮑﻴﻣ ) and “the List of Hope” 
(# ﺖﻴﺴﻟ-ﺪﻴﻣا ).  
Given his popularity and charisma among young political activists, most of whom were 
familiar with the language of humor and technology, Khatami’s video soon became a rich source 
of inspiration for humorous political activism in social media. Along with his original video, 
thousands of mass-altered and self-customized replicas of it were widely spread through 
Telegram. In a digital movement initiated by movie stars and followed by Internet celebrities, 
such as VahidOnline, Iranians called on each other to become Khatami’s voice by making selfie 
videos miming to the last part of his speech; using the Dubsmash video application, they filmed 
themselves while lip-syncing over the last sentences: “Vote for both the lists, all the individuals 
in both the lists. I repeat, vote for all the individuals in both the lists.” They shared these 
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Dubsmash videos with the hashtags: “I am Khatami’s Media”, “List of Hope,” and “I repeat” in 
Farsi.  
Narges told me that she first received the Dubsmash video of the prominent young 
actress, Baran Kosari, in Telegram before seeing or even being aware of the existence of 
Khatami’s original footage. In her video, Kosari, whose images are also banned on Iranian 
National TV due to her political activities in the Green Movement, holds a photo of Khatami in 
her left hand while holding up her right victory bandaged ink-stained fingers (like Figure 3). 
Miming to Khatami’s famous lines, she opens her right-hand fist in front of the camera to display 
“30+16” written on her palm when Khatami’s voice was saying “vote for all the individuals in 
both the lists” (see Kosari 2016 and Figure 19). Inspired by her, many of her followers in 
Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram made and released their Dubsmash videos while emphasizing 
the phrase “30+16” (thirty stands for the number of representative in the parliament and sixteen 
for the Assembly of Experts) in creative and humorous ways. Not only limited to voters inside 
the country, Iranians in diaspora contributed to this digital movement. Some of my friends in 
Canada, the U.S, and France joined this campaign by mouthing along to Khatami’s words in 
their Dubsmash videos.  
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Figure 19: Baran Kosari’s Dubsmash Video: Khatamilore 
 
Soon thereafter, Khatami’s phrase, “I repeat,” became the golden slogan of this humorous 
political movement. As a first response, a large series of stickers emerged in Telegram in which 
Khatami plays with his sentences while in different poses (see Figure 20). Subsequently, a large 
number of verbal jokes were dedicated to Khatami, his influential speech, and his golden words. 
Like the disqualification jokes, these ones resonated in post-BARJAM Iran by borrowing the 
heroes of the Iran-US joke cycle, notably Zarif (see Joke Nineteen). Up-to-date with 
international cultural and political events, they benefited from the U.S. 2017 presidential election 
(see Joke Nineteen and Twenty) and Oscars ceremony (see Joke 21) in forming their appropriate 
incongruities. Moreover, they not only expressed joke-tellers’ and distributors’ support for and 
trust in their beloved politician and his list, but they also made a political statement against his 
media ban (see Joke 22). 
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Sticker One: “I voted for all the 
individuals in both the lists.” 
 
 
 
Sticker Two: “Shall I repeat again?! 
For all individuals in both the lists.” 
 
 
 
 
Sticker Three: “I repeat, vote for all 
the individuals in both the lists.” 
 
 
 
 
Sticker Four: “Hi [Allo in Farsi]?! 
Can you hear me? All the 
individuals in both the lists.” 
 
 
 
Sticker Five: “Do not ditch it 
[Napichoon in Farsi]! All the 
individuals in both the lists.” 
Figure 20: Khatamilore: Stickers 
 
Joke Nineteen/collected on February 2016:  
Zarif’s text message to Kerry:  
Hey Dude! If Trump really wants to sabre-rattle for you, just lick your lips [Lab Tar Kon 
in Farsi, meaning doing a friend or a loved one a favor pleasurably and so quickly 
without losing time], so I can ask Khatami to give out a video speech! 
 
Joke Twenty/collected on February 2016:  
Clinton’s campaign costs thus far: 44 million dollars 
The List of Hope’s campaign costs thus far: Just a video and couple of Dubsmash videos! 
 
Joke 21/collected on March 2016:  
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And the Oscar goes to Mr. Mohamad Khatami from Iran whose two-minute leading role 
in a film before the elections fundamentally changed all political equations in this 
country!   
 
Joke 22/collected on March 2016:  
A few moments ago, Tehran’s attorney general announced: ‘From now on, Mr. Khatami 
is subject to Repetition ban!’ 
 
Even today, two years after these elections, whenever a jokable political event with great 
significance happens domestically or internationally, Khatami’s “I repeat” phrase gets recycled 
in political joke cycles in Iran. A famous example is the 2017 U.S. election jokes in Farsi in 
which Iranians replaced Khatami’s role with Obama. When Obama officially endorsed Clinton, 
according to these jokes, it was Obama’s “Repetition turn.” Additionally, when she lost to 
Trump, these jokes blamed Obama’s neglect in giving out a “Repetition-full” speech and 
Americans’ ignorance of “applications called Telegram and Dubsmash” in “the low-tech” 
American culture!27 (all the words in quotation marks are taken from jokes). In addition, during 
the Iran’s twelfth presidential elections in May of 2017, Khatamilore, especially his “Repetition” 
slogan, inspired and fed a large number of political jokes in which reformists humorously 
“repeated” the importance of the elections and called on each other to support the reformist 
movement one more time as they did in the 2016 February elections. 
Like pre-election disqualifications jokes, Khatami electionlore shows how my informants 
analyse and reflect on politics in their everyday lives. Not only do they mirror the political 
climate and public mood of the society around the elections, but the elections jokes are also the 
collective and humorous political manifestation of Iranians, focusing on the elections and their 
relations to other significant historical and political events like BARJAM and the Revolution. 
Indeed, they are the expressions of what I term “vernacular politics”: the ways in which 
                                                            
27 All the words in quotation marks are taken from jokes. 
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individuals live out politics on a daily basis while interpreting complicated political events that 
directly or indirectly affect their everyday lives. 
In the vernacular politics of jokes, it is in joke tellers, makers, and distributors’ hands to 
decide what events get more highlighted, which politicians become heroes or villains, which 
faces are remembered, and whose words are revived. In other words, the vernacular politics 
articulated and promoted in the language of humor are not just a simplified, vernacularized 
version of the so-called official politics; it is, indeed, a painstakingly selected, carefully 
modified, and intentionally subverted version whose multiple layers reveal different unspoken 
details about politics.  
Re-narrating the February elections and their stories through vernacular politics, joke 
tellers recreated the existing political battle between reformists and conservatives by contrasting 
heroes like Zarif, Rouhani and Hassan Khomeini with villains like Jannati and Haddad-Adal. 
Firstly, they juxtaposed the Revolution and its ideals with the results of the Guardian Council’s 
qualification process to magnify their conflicts in the pre-election disqualification jokes. 
Secondly, they unbanned a banned politician and put him in the center of this battle field in the 
Khatami electionlore as a donor who came to the aid of the reformists with his speech. And, 
finally, in the post-election jokes, the villains got punished, as people disqualified the Guardian-
Council-qualified candidates. I will explore the latter in the following section.  
 
“The conservatives left the group!”: Constructing Newslore with a Revenge Laughter in 
the Post-Elections Jokes 
 
“What were your favorite jokes?” I asked this question from all my informants. This 
time, Hadis answered: 
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I got floods of jokes during the vote-counting period. I really enjoyed reading and sharing 
these jokes. It gave me a deep sense of confidence that it was me who voted and won! 
Jokes after jokes I read, I witnessed the opposing group who always underestimates us 
falling down step by step until all of them got kicked out! […] These jokes about the 
conservatives’ downfall really and deeply cheered my heart! And I heard many, many 
jokes of this sort, jokes about conservatives’ heavy humiliating defeat! [emphasis in her 
tone] 
 
Maral’s reply was: 
 
I really enjoyed reading these jokes [jokes during the vote-counting time]! Especially the 
ones with pictures [jokes appeared as funny captions for photos], they were very 
interesting! Hilarious! You know I really wondered at some point where they found these 
pictures as if they had saved all them for these special moments. I had not seen many of 
them before. […] sometimes, I got a joke first and then the [corresponding] news. Off the 
top of my head are Hashemzaee’s jokes [Hashemzaee was a conservative candidate for 
Tehran’s parliament]. I remember when they were counting votes, and he was still among 
winners but the last one, I got a joke saying: ‘Poor Hashemzaee, he has been always in 
the end of list since school times [In Iranian schools, students’ names are usually listed 
alphabetically, and “H” is the second last letter in the Farsi alphabet]. Look, he is still the 
last one in the parliament list.’ Then, when they finished counting votes, I got another one 
to the effect that ‘Poor Hamshemzaee, his family name always steals away his luck! It 
seems that no space is left in the parliament list for the H letter!’ So then, I realized he 
didn’t make it!  
 
The largest and, as Fifi calls it, “the most passionate [Por Shour in Farsi]” group of jokes during 
the February elections were the post-election jokes which were all over Telegram, reporting the 
election outcomes second by second when votes of each voting district got counted and officially 
announced by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. According to my informants, it is not an 
overstatement to say that not a single newsworthy story during that time remained uncommented 
or unjoked, especially because Tehrani reformists achieved a decisive victory in the parliament 
and, with one exception, won all the seats in the Assembly of Experts.  
As Maral and Hadis pointed out, one could follow the outcomes of the elections just by 
reading the live-streamed jokes in Telegram. They only needed to search for the hashtag 
“counting” (#شرﺎﻤﺷ in Farsi) in any social media to make these jokes appear. The following 
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jokes are sorted chronologically, in the order I received on my Telegram groups at different 
stages of counting votes: 
Stage One: At the beginning of counting, Haddad-Adel was the only conservative 
candidate who made it into the final list of parliament representatives while all the remaining 
were the List of Hope’s candidates. His place was seventh so far. The jokes I received at this 
stage are as follows: 
Joke 23/ collected on February 2016:  
Now, Haddad has come to Agha [Sir in English, vernacularly and humorously used to 
refer to the Leader28], put his head on his laps, crying and saying: ‘I do not want to go to 
the parliament alone! No way!’ Agha is kindly patting him on his head and saying: ‘Do 
not worry sweetie! You will find new friends!’ 
  
Joke 24/collected on February 2016:  
A typical day in Iran’s tenth parliament: the speaker says: ‘Okay, any objections from 
Mr. Haddad?’ 
[The audience’s laughter] ‘So, the law is passed!’ the speaker continued. 
 
 Stage Two: A few hours later, Haddad’s place was dropped down to 22nd out of thirty. 
Joke 25/collected on February 2016:  
Haddad at Khatami’s feet [In Farsi, ‘to 
be at someone’s feet’ means ‘to beg 
them for help with abasement’]: 
Sayed, I beg you to help me! Please 
come and repeat they vote for me! I 
am losing my reputation! 
 
 
Figure 21: Joke 25: Post-electionlore 
                                                            
28 Behzad, my thirty-year-old male informant, once mentioned to me that Agha is a title used by Basijis 
when they want to address the Leader. Since this title is normally reserved for religious figures like Shia 
Imams, the vernacular use of this word among Iranians is interpreted as a mockery of Basijis’s blind love 
for the Leader. 
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Joke 26/collected on February 2016:  
On the left, Aref, the leading 
candidate in the Tehran parliament 
election, is talking to Haddad: Look! 
You are getting removed!  
Haddad: For God’s Sake, do not 
refresh the damn page anymore! 
 
 
Figure 22: Joke 26: Post-electionlore 
 
On the other end, on the Assembly of Experts final list, only two of the Leader’s 
confidantes, Jannati and Mesbah-Yazdi, had, so far, made it to the winners’ list in the last two 
places. 
Joke 27/collected on February 2016:  
Jannati: I’ve never had such stress in any century as I have in the 21st! 
 
Joke 28/collected on February 2016:  
Jannati’s text message to his son [the then minister of Culture]: My sweetheart, you know 
daddy loves you and daddy ‘doret begrade’ [literally meaning ‘may I stroll around you’ is 
an expression in Farsi used by parents to show their affection to their children]. Do you 
know anybody in the Ministry of Interior Affairs? 
 
Joke 29/collected on February 2016:  
The longest jump in the history of Olympics are co-awarded to Haddad and Jannati 
whose names just appeared in the middle of reformists! 
 
Along with people from within the country, Iranians in diaspora also passionately followed the 
election news and contributed to the creation and distributions of these vote-counting jokes. On 
his Facebook page, a friend of mine posted a video of a concert in Montreal, Canada, in which 
the celebrated Iranian singer Ebi was singing a famous verse from his works, “without opening 
the gift” [Hedyaro baz nakarde], and waited for the answer from the audience. Instead of saying 
“she/he sent it back” [pas ferestad], they played with the rhyme and chanted all together “the 
elimination of Mesbah” [Hazfe Mesbah] (see Ebi 2016). Since the 1990s, when Ebi performed 
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this song for the first time, this particular verse has appeared many times in Iranian jokes as the 
second part sounds mysterious and unclear enough to be the target of playful mishearing and 
creative interpretations. Playing with language, these derivative jokes, are like riddles whose 
answers and subsequently appropriate incongruities are embedded linguistically in the rhythmic, 
but not necessarily meaningful, words of the second verse29 (see Appendix C-The Ebi Joke). As 
a result, when Ebi sang this verse in Montreal around the vote-counting time, the audience 
creatively used an already-existing form to make a spontaneous joke influenced by the top 
election news. Soon after the concert, this joke went viral in Telegram: 
Joke Thirty/collected on February 2016:  
Without opening the gift [Hedyaro baz nakarde] 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
The elimination of Mesbah! [Hazfe Mesbah!] 
 
Stage Three: It seemed to people that in these elections, the vote-counting process took longer 
than usual. Given conservatives’ step-by-step fall, the more votes that were counted, the closer 
voters got to a conservative-free parliament and Assembly. 
Joke 31/collected on February 2016:  
Jannati: If I had known that it was going to be like this, I would have disqualified the 
Nation as well! 
 
*** The word ‘Nation’ or ‘Mellat’ in Farsi is a common word used officially by 
politicians to address people in order to provoke their sense of nationalism during 
significant political events such as elections. The choice of Mellat in this joke instead of 
the less-official word ‘Mardom’ (meaning people in English) amplifies its humorous 
language.  
 
                                                            
29 This joke is parallel with the modern folkloric genre, mondegreen. Mondegreen is created when one 
mishears a verse or a phrase, substitutes the misheard words with new ones, and gives it a new and 
sometime different meaning. 
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Joke 32/collected on February 2016:  
Khamenei: Please stop counting the 
votes! Don’t push it longer!  
 
Figure 23: Joke 32: Post-electionlore 
 
Joke 33/collected on February 2016:  
A few minutes ago, Ayatollah Makarem [a conservative Shia clergy who is best known 
and also targeted in jokes for his Haram fatwas] just issued a fatwa, declaring ‘the 
continuation of counting votes’ as forbidden [Haram in Farsi and Arabic]!  
 
In their criticism, some of these jokes flashed back to previous elections, especially the disputed 
2009 election. In line with Green Movement protesters’ claims regarding vote-rigging, joke 
tellers compared the vote-counting periods of the 2009 and 2016 elections and criticized the 
2009 state, Ahmadinejad’s, whose Minister of Interior Affairs announced the official election 
outcomes in less than a day (see Joke 34 and 35). Additionally, they indirectly questioned the 
regime’s unjust punishment of the Green Movement’s Leaders, who were labelled as “leaders of 
sedition” and were sentenced to strict house arrest since 2009 without having an official trial (see 
Joke 35). 
Joke 34/collected on March 2016:  
It is funny they cannot count five million votes for Tehran’s Assembly in three days; how 
come they counted thirty million votes of the whole country in just five hours in 2009? 
 
Joke 3/collected on March 2016:  
These elections [2016] are among those exceptions in which a night’s sleep does not 
surprisingly change their outcomes!  
*** In 2009, to voters’ extreme shock, in early morning after the election day, 
Ahmadinejad was officially announced the next president of Iran.  
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Joke 36/collected on March 2016:  
I was thinking if Jannati would not acquire enough votes to remain in the Assembly, we 
should pour into streets and protest like 2009. We would pretend that we are his 
supporters, so they will put him in house arrest! 
 
 Final Stage: The final outcomes of both elections were officially announced by the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs. Haddad-Adel lost to the List of Hope by placing the 31st. On the other end, 
despite having Leader’s support, Mesbah-Yazdi, along with other prominent ultraconservatives, 
namely Mohammad Yazdi who was the then-chairman of the Assembly of Experts, did not make 
it to the next Assembly. Jannati was the only conservative who slid onto the winners’ list as the 
last elected candidate.  
Joke 37/collected on March 2016:  
Noah, the great prophet with superhuman power, could not kick Jannati out from his Ark. 
Now, did you really think you could get rid of him in the Assembly of Experts? Such a 
naïve thought! 
 
Joke 38/collected on March 2016:  
I was passing by the Baharestan Square [where Iran’s parliament is located] when I saw 
the banner which says: ‘with new management!’ 
 
Joke 39/collected on March 2016:  
Now, the Guardian Council has driven crazy and just announced: ‘From next election on, 
first you, the nation, vote, and then we disqualify!’ 
 
With the elimination of Mohammad Yazdi, Hashemi Rafsanjani placed on top of the elected 
candidates would probably become the next chairman of the Assembly of Experts. Once again, 
in the final scene of these jokes, heroes faced villains in order to punish them (see Jokes 39 and 
41).  
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Joke 40/collected on March 2016:  
Hashemi Rafsanjani on the left 
talking to Mohammad Yazdi on the 
right: “Say Ya Ali and stand up!”  
***Ya Ali is the expression which 
Shia Muslims say when they want 
to stand up or commence doing 
something in order to get aid from 
their first Imam 
Figure 24: Joke Forty: Post-electionlore 
Joke 41/collected on March 2016:  
Hassan Khomeini on the right 
offering a place to Jannati on the 
left: 
“Please sit in the end of the line!” 
 
Figure 25: Joke 41: Post-electionlore 
 
Influenced by the online venue of their growth, many of these digital post-election jokes 
benefited from technological terminologies and special features in the Telegram platform in 
forming their incongruities (see Joke 42-43).  
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Joke 42/collected on March 
2016:  
The Nation Removed Haddad-
Adal. 
The Nation Removed 
Koochakzadeh. 
The Nation Removed Mesbah-
Yazdi. 
The Nation Removed 
Mohammad Yazdi. 
The Nation Removed Rajab 
Rahmani, 
The Nation Removed Ahmad 
Jannati 
   
Ahamad Jannti joined the group 
via invite link. 
 
Figure 26: Joke 42: Post-electionlore 
 
Joke 43/collected on March 2016:  
Haddad-Adel left the group. 
 
Joke 44/collected on March 2016:  
I am so happy to see even if Fars News [State-run news agency30] does everything with 
the Tehran’s parliamentary winners’ list, sort them by size, age, alphabetical order, 
weight, height, any kind of order, there is no way Haddad can get it! 
 
Not simply covering the elections news, vote-counting jokes also acted as a commentary which 
analyzed, corrected, and criticized the news of the state-owned and backed mainstream media 
(Joke 44). Additionally, they reminded their listeners of the violations of freedom of speech and 
the press, and political freedom in Iran (Joke 45 and 46).  
Joke 45/collected on February 2016:  
Did you realize that oddly enough, after the election day and even the next morning after 
the announcement of the outcomes, journalists and social media people [ashabe resane in 
Farsi] woke up in their beds, not in the Evin prison?!? 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 Although this news agency officially describes itself as “independent,” my informants and many other 
reformist Iranians feel it echoes the government’s voice. 
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Joke 46/collected on March 2016: 
Now, it is the time [for the government] to send parasite noises to its own News Network 
[Shabakeye khabar in Farsi]. 
  
*** The News Network is one of Iran’s national TV’s news agency in Farsi. Since 2009, 
during politically sensitive periods such as elections, access to independent broadcasters, 
primarily headquartered outside of Iran, is usually poor and disturbed by the 
government’s parasite noise from within the country. This joke shows how the 
announcement of reformists’ victory sounds like a bitter news to the national TV 
indirectly governed and directly supervised by the Leader.  
   
Hana describes the critiques embedded in these jokes as “people’s honest and unstifled idea of 
politics” and says: “There is no open space for political discourses in Iran. All we have is biased, 
and state-controlled and directed political discussions. All of us are aware that these political 
jokes are the safest and the easiest way of communicating our political thoughts in Iran without 
ending up in Evin [emphases in her tone].”  
Like other sub-cycles of the February electionlore, the vote-counting jokes provided 
voters with a relatively safe language and secure tool to make manifest vernacular politics and 
express their criticism of the Guardian Council (Jokes 39 and 40), the previous election (Jokes 
34-36), and government-dependent news agencies (Jokes 44-46). They also enabled them to 
construct “newslore”, which constitutes a large component of their vernacular politics. Defined 
by Frank, “newslore” is “folklore that comments on, and is therefore indecipherable without 
knowledge of, current events” (2011, 7). He argues that newslore is “expressive,” “cathartic,” 
and “subversive” because “it violates the rules of deference and discretion when it comes to 
authority figures, bodily functions, and social conflict” (ibid., 11).  
According to this definition, all the February electionlore studied here is voters’ newslore 
which subverted the hegemony of the elections’ power dynamics in favor of reformists. In this 
way, they mobilized my informants and the pro-reformists’ supporters by evoking their sense of 
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solidarity and empowered them by engendering a feeling of superiority. Narges explains these 
feelings as follows: 
I think the election jokes with this variety, made and spread by reformists mostly in 
Tehran’s society, elicited a sense of hamdeli [‘compassionate’ is the closest translation. 
The word-by-word translation is ‘united in hearts’] among people. When people receive 
these jokes online, they would say: ‘yes, it is my idea too! I agree!’, and because they 
were all like-minded [hamfekr in Farsi], they shared the jokes and spread [their] political 
messages. Therefore, I can say according to the huge number of pro-reformist jokes 
which were viral during the elections, many [pro-reformist] people realized they had 
millions of allies out there who like them wanted reformists to win. […] yes, I think these 
jokes showed them that they are large in numbers and can win the elections, so they came 
out and voted. […] Even in the polling station where I casted my vote, I witnessed once a 
person brought out their cellphone to write the List of Hope from Telegram, others 
expressed their familiarity and agreement by approaching them and finding an excuse to 
have a chat. 
 
The most explicit examples of such subversive empowering discourses in jokes are the ones 
which listed all prominent defeated conservative candidates and announced their downfall with a 
single sentence, “Disqualified by people!”. This short but powerful punchline not only 
challenges the game of power by replacing the Guardian Council with voters, it also shows 
people’s empowerment and how they used their ballots to take revenge for the unfairness of the 
elections.  
Even though electionlore is primarily generated and shared on online venues, most 
notably Telegram, it is not limited to the virtual world. Indeed, a significant amount of 
electionlore, especially verbal jokes, were performed in face-to-face communications in private 
or public places such as taxis. In the following section, I specifically explore the key role of 
Tehran’s taxis in the elections in relation to creation, performance, and circulation of 
electionlore. 
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“The last taxi you get on the election day determines which lists you will vote for!”:  Un-
whispering election jokes in Taxis in Tehran 
 
 “One day around the elections, I was in a taxi coming back home from work” said Hadis 
in our Skype interview. “I love taxi stories. Give me all the details!” I shouted. She laughed and 
continued: 
Ok, let me remember: There were two passengers sitting in the back, two men but I 
cannot exactly picture their faces now [because] I was in the front, and all I saw was 
through the mirror. On our half way toward [the destination], one of the guys from the 
back who was fairly young broke the silence and asked the driver: ‘Gentleman, have you 
decided to vote? If yes, do you mind if I ask for whom?’ He kept a wide smile on his 
face, and you know he was trying to make the atmosphere more intimate. Oddly, the 
driver remained silent! [Hadis laughed] Then the guy handed him the List of Hope, and 
[one other copy] to the passenger sitting next to him. Then he leaned a bit forward and 
stretched out his hand to give me one too, but I did not take it. You know I was too 
exhausted to get into another political lecture; I had enough that day, plus I knew I was 
going to vote for the same list, so I refused it and said: ‘Thank you, I am not interested’. 
He was polite enough not to insist more. Shortly after, he opened a discussion, I suppose 
indirectly addressing me. I think he thought I was not going to vote because he said ‘I 
know the country is ruined, so on and so forth [folan o folan o folan in Farsi] [and] it is 
getting worse and worse every year, but let’s vote to prevent more damages. […] He 
breathlessly talked for couple of minutes; mentioning BARJAM, Khatami’s support of 
the coalition, Rouhani’s struggles with the parliament, so on and so forth [Folan va 
bahman in Farsi]. Then the driver jumped into his lecture and then the other passenger 
joined them too. And the whole time I was just listening. […] I remember when I got off 
the car, their debate got just heated! I was kind of tempted to participate, but it was too 
late!  
 
Hadis’s account was among millions of people’s daily encounters in taxis in Tehran. In Iran, 
public taxis, usually in yellow, green, white, and orange, are shared between, at most, four 
passengers in 405 Peugeot, Kia Pride, and Iran Khodro Peykan cars and more than 6 people in 
green minivans who all go in the same direction. Since Tehran is a big busy city, its main streets 
and even highways are often overcrowded especially in rush hours. During these hours (7 a.m. to 
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.), public transportation, such as taxis, are used frequently to their 
fullest capacities. For example, in Tehran taxis, strangers have to sit side by side for hours for an 
often long period of time; depending on driver’s mood, they chat with each other to pass their 
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time. A very typical topic of taxi conversations is first and foremost politics and second, as its 
inseparable twin, economics. It is not surprising that during the elections or other important 
political events, these discussions proceed with more passion and persistence from both 
passengers and drivers. Drivers, usually male, act like panel chairs who lead the discussions and 
decide when passengers should stop talking.  
In the February elections, political chats in taxis reached their climax, especially before 
and on the election day, because of the four already-discussed reasons: the significance of the 
two elections, BARJAM, the mass disqualifications, and Khatami’s call for support of the List of 
Hope. The old questions of “whether we should vote or not” and “if yes, for whom” arose again 
and became the main thread of taxi political chats. My informants told me, as in online venues, it 
was primarily pro-reformist, or, in other words, pro-Khatami and pro-Rouhani voters who started 
and led the political discussions in taxis, obviously in support of the List of Hope. When I asked 
why it was the case, Nikou, my 27-year-old female informant answered that “while [the 
opposing group] have always benefited from the state tribune to deafen people with their loud 
coarse [nakharashide in Farsi] voice, we use these social places [like taxis] creatively to spread 
our voice.”  
Another significant factor that kept conservatives and pro-Leader voters silent in public 
or semi-public places like taxis during the elections was their fear of confrontation. I remember, 
for a year of my stay in the University of Tehran residence, I was randomly assigned a room with 
a hard core conservative student who as I figured out later, after my graduation, was the head of 
Student Basij Association in our university, known as the most powerful and active force in 
promoting the Leader’s ideologies across academic institutions. Knowing my absolute 
opposition to and perhaps resentment against her political orientations, I do not remember a 
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single instance in which she accidently leaked out anything even generally related to politics, let 
alone discussed important matters like elections with me. Indeed, she not only avoided political 
conversations, but also successfully managed to hide her political beliefs that, for about a year, I 
was wrong in my thoughts that she was just a regular Basiji, fond of the Leader with an 
occasional and rare interest in politics.  
This roommate always kept a framed photo of Khamenei, placed on top of her shelf, 
facing down whenever I was in the room, and her non-academic books were always locked 
inside her drawer, out of my sight. Additionally, one day during the 2013 political election when 
her friends came over to help her organize speeches and make posters, she asked them to whisper 
and not to leave out their posters on the desk uncovered. Another of our roommates who, like 
me, guessed that our conservative friend was somehow affiliated with Basij once told me that she 
thought our roommate was afraid to talk to us about her political activities because she feared the 
fact that she and her people were not welcome among us, a majority in number but a minority in 
power. 
During the February elections, pro-Green Movement voters took advantage of 
conservatives’ silence or perhaps fears in semi-public spaces in Tehran such as taxis, and soon 
turned them into alternate spaces for campaigning and criticizing politics. Like social media, 
taxis provided passengers with a relatively open and, to some extent, safe venue for their 
political activism. As my informants told me, the shortness of taxi trips, the anonymity among 
passengers, and their contractual intimacy that expired at the end of each trip, all came together 
to foster an environment which is neither as skeptical and unreachable as state-dominated public 
spaces nor as trusted and open as Telegram for pro-reformist voters. In other words, taxis 
became liminal spaces between the digital world and the state-controlled public in these elections 
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where people temporarily built trust to orally create and circulate electionlore in their face-to-
face communications.  
Maral told me about one of her personal encounters in a taxi whose driver told her a joke 
about the defeated conservative candidate, Haddad-Adel. As she elaborated her taxi story, at the 
time when the serious political debate was in progress, neither listeners nor speakers, distracted 
or de-emphasized the argument by telling a joke. However, once their points were made, 
humorous language was used to both lighten the heavy and serious atmosphere and to reinforce 
their political statements. While it is not only impossible, but also unnecessary, to draw dividing 
lines between digital Telegram and oral taxi electionlore to show which one came first or which 
borrowed from which, it should be noted that these two forms of electionlore, either analog or 
digital, constitute “hybridized folklore” (Blank 2013, 20). Like other folkloric expressive forms, 
the February electionlore did not only remain in a single birthplace; it was both digitally and 
orally created, shared, and converged as online jokes entered taxis and vice versa.  
Not only as a venue for exchanging jokes with Telegram, taxis and their contributions to 
these elections provoked a large series of verbal jokes about themselves which were widely 
spread in social media. The main subjects appearing in these taxi-themed jokes were namely 
heated political taxi debates around the elections period, highly politicized passengers and 
drivers (see Jokes 47-49), and the key role of this space in shaping and influencing voters’ 
minds, especially on the elections day (see Jokes 50-53). As main targets, drivers were ridiculed 
for their confidence in commenting on politics regardless of its complexity (see Jokes 47, 48, 52, 
and 54) and their authority in leading political taxi debates (see Joke 49). In this way, some of 
these jokes slightly and implicitly touched upon the recently growing and concerning issue of the 
unemployment of educated young Iranians some of whom, despite of having graduate degrees, 
 127
ended up driving taxis as their main jobs (see Joke 55). Additionally, these jokes along with 
other electionlore, especially the pre-election disqualification joke sub-cycle, reflect the 
vernacularized political groupings among ordinary Iranians: Pro-reformist versus pro-
conservatives (see Joke 53). Therefore, they empowered pro-reformist voters by assuring them 
they are the majority in numbers, even in taxis.  
While jokes frequently speak for themselves, the taxi-themed one that emerged in these 
elections is in Davies’s terms “social facts” whose existence in a large set “needs to be explained 
in terms of other social facts” (2011, 8). In addition to Iran’s political climate, Iranians’ political 
divisions, and their avid interest in politics, these jokes reveal the significant role of a social 
space where strangers build temporary trust with each other to discuss important political events 
such as elections. 
Joke 47/collected on February 2016:  
This morning, I asked a taxi driver: ‘what do you think of these elections?’  
He smirked: ‘He-he, for 1000 Tomans [less than one Canadian dollar], I’ll tell you my 
ideas just about traffics. If you want my interpretations of the elections, you should 
charter the taxi!’ 
 
Joke 48/collected on February 2016:  
Today in a taxi, the driver said: ‘sorry my passengers, today I am not planning to 
participate much in your political debate. I am saving for a house visiting where we are 
supposed to have a heavy political discussion!’ 
  
Joke 49/collected on February 2016:  
I was in a taxi talking passionately about the elections that all of a sudden the driver 
stopped and tapped on my shoulder: ‘Dude! Feel completely free! Just take my seat and 
you drive!’ 
 
Joke 50/collected on February 2016:  
The last taxi you take on the election day determines which lists you will vote for! Please 
make a smart choice! 
 
Joke 51/collected on March 2016:  
All 435,000 people who voted for Haddad were those who chose a wrong taxi on the 
election day! 
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Joke 52/collected on February 2016:  
Tonight [the election night] taxi drivers are busy following the election news, so 
tomorrow morning, they can give their passengers first-hand political analyses! 
 
Joke 53/collected on February 2016:  
Today, on taxi stations in Tehran, taxi drivers were shouting: conservative-Poonak 
Square only one passenger, reformist-Vali-Asr Square three! Obviously, they were not in 
mood for hearing any opposition! 
***I got this joke exactly on the election day. 
 
Joke 54/collected on March 2016:  
When you take a taxi, all money you pay to the driver is just a reimbursement for 
political research he conducted during the elections, plus the fees for the discussions they 
offer you. In fact, transportation is totally free! 
 
Joke 55/collected on March 2016:  
My friend is studying political science at master’s level at university. His father has 
promised him if his GPA gets higher than 18 [out of 20], he will buy him a taxi! 
 
According to what my informants describe, Iranian election jokes told and spread in taxis differ 
from the so-called “whispered anecdotes” or “Flüsterwitze” (Draitser 1979; Lipman 1991, 18) in 
Nazi Germany or some parts of the former Soviet bloc. As its name explains, whispered jokes 
are the ones that “people were reluctant to tell strangers” and even “informants usually spoke in 
low tones after glancing around to see if there was anyone else listening” (Dundes 1971b, 51).  
Therefore, it is not surprising that un-whispering whispered jokes in such countries brought 
severe punishments for tellers and even listeners (see Beckmann 1969 for examples of these 
punishments). Drawing on German scholarship on joking during World War II, Davies defines 
whispered jokes as dangerous “jokes about the forbidden which could not be expressed in other 
ways” (2010, 26). Likewise, Oring calls joking under repressive regimes “a risky business” 
which is not “merely socially hazardous but physically dangerous” (2004, 210). 
Even though the February electionlore targeted primarily conservatives close to the 
Leader or political entities under his command, these political jokes were not whispered in Iran, 
and, as my informants assured me, their tellers were not even slightly punished or threatened by 
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the authorities. I suggest there are several reasons why. Firstly, these jokes very rarely 
questioned or directly criticized the Leader himself. Describing this intentional avoidance, 
Behzad, my thirty-year-old male informant, used a famous Farsi expression: “We know that we 
should not play with the lion’s tale!” Therefore, most of my informants’ criticism in jokes was 
directed at the entities under the Leader’s control such as Iran’s national media, the judiciary, 
and the Guardian Council or politicians from his inner circle, notably Jannati, Mesbah-Yazdi and 
Haddad-Adel.  
Secondly, this kind of electionlore did not circulate underground, nor was it encrypted or 
regarded as secretive; oral taxi jokes were told among total strangers. Telegram, as the main 
online venue for the creation and the dissemination of this digital electionlore, was not only a 
campaigning tool only in the hands of my informants, ordinary Iranians and supporters of 
Leader-disfavoured reformist politicians such as Khatami, but it was also the unfiltered free 
social media which was not only approved by the president but was also used by the Leader 
during the elections. Haddad-Adel’s tweet, mentioned in the previous chapter, also bears 
testimony to the un-whispered nature of these jokes. Acknowledging the numerous jokes about 
him, this defeated conservative, who is also a relative of the Leader, used a filtered social 
network in Iran, Twitter, to thank joke-tellers for not attacking his personality and his family in 
their digital jokes.  
Finally, as earlier discussed, the February electionlore is a hybridized genre commuting 
between two domains. Its oral performances and disseminations in semi-public places like taxis, 
as well as its exchange in the digital world similarly proves that regardless of its undesirable 
messages and the consequences for conservatives, it was widely known and orally and digitally 
performed in different social spaces in Iran. In this regard, the taxi-themed jokes that appeared in 
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Telegram (Jokes 47-55) also reinforce the claim that the February electionlore was un-whispered 
in semi-public social places when people passionately discussed the elections with each other.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The Main Disagreement 
 
There is an open-ended question in humor studies as to whether humor is capable of “real” 
political change in a society. Is it, using Davies’s metaphor, only a “thermometer” and not 
“thermostat” (Davies 1990) because as he argues, it merely reflects the political climate without 
having effective long-term consequences. Taking different approaches toward this question, 
humor scholars are generally divided into two groups: the first group constitutes a large number 
of scholars who insist that political humor has only micro-level effects, such as achieving moral 
victories (see Kishtainy 1985; Benton 1988; Cochran 1989; Davies 2001, 2002, 2007, 2010, 
2011; Oring 2004; Tsakona and Popa 2011; Laineste 2013). In their views, political jokes are 
regarded as just “indications of the truth” (Davies 2010) which are “not a form of active 
resistance” (Benton 1988, 54), and their “critique was in many cases harmless and playful” 
(Shifman, Coleman, and Ward 2007, 466). Holding to this lens, they conclude that political 
humor is “not a sword, but it is an attractive decoration on the scabbard” (Davies 2007, 302) 
because it “does not make political resistance more effective, but it does make the message more 
attractive” (Laineste 2013, 489).  
In opposition to this perspective, another group of scholars see political jokes as 
inseparable from and key player in political activism believing that, as George Orwell writes: 
Every joke is a tiny revolution, […] Whatever destroys dignity, and brings down the 
mighty from the seats, preferably with a bump, is funny. […] A joke is a temporary 
rebellion against virtue, and its aim is not to degrade the human being but to remind him 
that is already degraded ([1945] 1969, 184).  
 
The early studies of these scholars were primarily concentrated on Nazi Germany, Franco’s 
Spain, and the Soviet Union in which political jokes were regarded as “a weapon” used against 
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enemies (Speier 1969, 182; Larsen 1980), “the oral equivalent of Spanish guerrilla warfare” (Pi-
Sunyer 1977, 187), and “a nail in Hitler and Stalin’s coffins” (Mikes 1985, vii). These views 
were seconded by a group of young scholars, mostly specializing in digital humor. In their recent 
studies of political humor in Serbia (Sørensen 2008), Norway and Sweden (Sørensen 2016), 
Azerbaijan (Pearce and Hajizada 2014), Zimbabwe (Musangi 2012), Egypt (Helmy and Frerichs 
2013), and Mexico (Schmidt 2014), they not only broaden the scope of American- and Soviet-
Union- centered scholarship in humor studies, but also provide contemporary contextualized case 
studies in which jokes appear not just as decoration, rather playing effective and active roles in 
bringing political changes such as mobilization and dissent. Asking the same question here, I 
locate my study of Iranian electionlore in these two bodies of scholarly literature and indicate 
how it contributes to, converges with, and diverges from the existing theories.  
 
The Dilemma: A Passive Resistance or An Active Revolution? 
 
In his book, Seriously Funny: Mexican Political Jokes as Social Resistance, political 
scientist Samuel Schmidt examines the critical but not seemingly serious roles of political jokes 
in contemporary Mexico. Identifying different roles, he emphasizes that political humor is a 
“subterranean confrontation between politics and the society” (2014, 8) because it “is an act of 
transgression that undermines the rituals, symbols, and values of politicians, and it is an 
instrument to get even with the politicians.” (ibid., 233) He also argues that “the importance of 
the joke depends on the political system. If the system is open and democratic, the impact of the 
joke is low, but if the system is closed, with restricted liberties, the joke can play a delegitimizing 
role” (ibid., 236). 
 133
Among the numerous examples Schmidt provides, the 2006 Mexican election jokes were 
a powerful example of online humor which recovered the historical memory of a people by 
reviving and disseminating old jokes about corrupted political parties (Schmidt 2014, 222). 
Additionally, the undeniable role social media played in this election led to breaking censorships 
and changing traditional humorous expressions by enriching its language with sound and picture 
(ibid., 246). Studying jokes that emerged in different presidents’ times, he concludes that “not 
only [the Mexican] society yanked31 monopoly of power, but with jokes, it has stripped 
politicians of the sweetness of being beloved and even idolized” (ibid., 238). 
With the same approach, in her book, Humour in Political Activism: Creative Nonviolent 
Resistance, Majken Jul Sørensen explores the ways through which political activists in Serbia 
and Sweden combine humor with serious actions to challenge and attack the dominant power in 
their discursive guerrilla war (2008, 173; 2016, 17). She believes that “although political humour 
operates within a play frame and generates laughter and amusement, this should not be confused 
with not being serious” (2016, 6). 
While Schmidt’s study of Mexican election jokes and Sørensen’s research on political 
humorous activism stand on the Orwellian side, Limor Shifman, Stephen Coleman, and Stephen 
Ward’s study of the 2005 UK election jokes swings more toward the first group of scholars who 
believe in the passive role of political humor. In their exploration of humorous texts from three 
genres of games, cartoons, and online and offline posters in different campaigns of the UK 
election, they reach to the conclusion that “politics is a cynical game and nothing more” and 
these various forms of humor “rarely dealt with key election issues and tended to focus on the 
                                                            
31 This sentence is taken from the English translation of the original Spanish. Any inaccuracy is the 
translator’s.  
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‘horserace’ attributes of the campaign” (2007, 483). Therefore, they insist that “far from their 
igniting Orwell’s ‘tiny revolution’, or toppling ‘the mighty from their seats’, online humor 
served to soften people up for ‘politics as usual’” (ibid.). 
Likewise, in his comparative study of jokes and their targets, Davies analogises political 
jokes to “aspirin” which people take to “suspend their political pain”. He argues: 
Given that the jokes had no discernible effect in or on the Soviet empire, despite being 
concentrated on a single target and being so important to the jokers that they would in 
times of terror defy persecution in order to tell them and in times of decadence make 
them an important part of social life, we can be certain that jokes have no effects in 
democratic societies with freedom of speech (2011, 248). 
 
There is a missing point in the conclusions of both groups; neither Orwellian scholars nor Davies 
and his like-minded colleagues carefully notice the societal and political complexity of the 
birthplaces of humor. Additionally, even though both groups come to different conclusions, their 
contemplations start with the same hypothesis for the function of humor; they both view humor 
as a form of resistance against the dominant power.  
While the Orwellian scholars interpret every attempt, including humorous activism, in 
light of a revolution and a drastic change, those in the second group close their eyes to the biased 
divisions they imposed upon other countries. For these scholars in the second group, notably 
Davies and Oring, there is a neat dividing line between two groups of countries whose people 
use humor in their political activities: these countries are either democratic or repressive. If 
democratic, people are guaranteed an abundance of different forms of freedom including 
freedom of political humor and mockery. As a result, in such countries, humor in many forms is 
not forbidden or “whispered” (Draitser 1979; Lipman 1991, 18); therefore, it is condemned to be 
“ineffective” and “decorative” (Davies 2007, 302). According to this view, humor’s 
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“effectiveness” is in reverse relation to freedom of speech; the more democratic the countries 
are, the less effective is their humor.  
From this binary perspective, if the political system of a country, usually non-western, 
does not match the Western definition of democracy, it must be under a kind of totalitarian 
dictatorship with varying degrees of oppression. In this general assumption, people of these 
countries must live under the dominance of a dictator who stifles all forms of criticism, even 
humor. Consequently, joke-telling in this long list of “repressive” countries (see Oring 2004, 210 
for this list) is analysed as a “risky business” and frequently labelled as “dangerous”. With this 
implicit supposition, scholars tend to explore humor in relation to the monopoly of power and the 
stolen freedom of people. The theory of “resistance jokes” (Obrdlik 1942; Powell and Paton 
1988; Bryant 2006) has risen from this point. 
In such totalitarian societies, resistance jokes are twinned with the concept of “resilience” 
which enables the suppressed people of countries to do “quiet protest” (Davies 2007) or “blame” 
the existing power (Davies 1997). These modes of protest, according to the first group, are 
considered “merely symbolic and joke-telling [does] not have any real-world consequences” 
(Oring 2004, 229); whereas, to pro-Orwell scholars, it equips people with serious, “non-violent” 
and “active resistance” (Schmidt 2014; Sørensen 2016).  
Resistance jokes were firstly studied in different parts of Soviet Union (Adams 2005; 
Krikmann 2006; Davies 2007; Laineste 2009); the dictatorial state of Franco in Spain (Brandes 
1977; Pi-Sunyer 1977); the Egyptian military regime of Abdel Nasser (Shehata 1992); Nazi 
Germany (Speier 1998; Herzog 2011); and Czechoslovakia (Bryant 2006) and Norway (Stokker 
1997) during Nazi occupations. Since then, most studies written on the political humor of non-
Western countries, such as contemporary Egypt (Helmy and Frerichs 2013), Serbia (Sørensen 
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2016), Mexico (Schmidt 2014), and Azerbaijan (Pearce and Hajizada 2014), evolve around the 
theory of resistance humor, regarding it either as an active or passive form. This pattern is 
extended even to the Eastern-European scholarship concerning humor in post-socialist countries 
which once belonged to the Soviet bloc. This is exemplified in the recent work of humor scholars 
Astapova and Laineste into contemporary online and oral humor, respectively in Belarus (2015) 
and Estonia (2008; 2009), wherein they still analyzed political jokes in their relations to 
“dictatorship,” “fear,” and “resistance.”  
What if, however, a non-western country, neither democratic, socialist, or 100% 
totalitarian, is not in need of a revolution nor is in a state of resistance? Is it possible that people 
seek shelter in jokes beyond a “liberation” (Limon 1997, 74) from their desperations? With the 
departure from the resistance theory, my study of Iranian political humor suggests another 
possibility for the function of humor in societies whose political system stands in the gray area 
between democracy and dictatorship. “Humor as reform” is the approach I propose to take for 
understanding political jokes born out of such countries.  
 
Iranian Jokes in Suspense: Neither Revolution nor Resistance 
 
Post-Revolution Iran has a complex hybridized political system of authoritative theocracy 
and liberal democracy. At least in theory, according to its constitution, unquestionable monopoly 
of power should not exist in a both Islamic and republican country, where religion is armed with 
politics to bring people freedom and security. All these paradoxical factors gathered in this 
system not only divide politicians into different camps, but also make people politically line up 
in support of either theocracy or democracy. As discussed in the previous chapters, this 
dichotomy has been mirrored in political jokes.  
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Oring argues that “humor depends upon the perception of an appropriate incongruity; that 
is, the perception of an appropriate relationship between categories that would ordinarily be 
regarded as incongruous” (2003, 1). Being both republican and Islamic makes the Iranian joke 
tellers’ jobs easy by handing them two ready-made incongruities. Using mechanisms of making 
these incongruities “appropriate” in the frame of a joke (Oring 2003, 13-26), my informants, as 
the pro-reformist and pro-president joke tellers/distributors of the afore-discussed February 
electionlore, target pro-Leader politicians and juxtapose them with their reformist heroes to 
magnify the bipolarity in the system. Similarly, the reverse situation may be true for pro-Leader 
joke tellers who cheer in favor of theocracy and Islamicized civil rights restrained and redefined 
by religion. Thus, it is a simplistic reading if we say Iranian jokes (in this case let us consider 
only pro-reformists) serve merely as a means of protest and resistance against the Islamic Iran by 
indicating its illegitimacy, fragility, and weeknesses. Indeed, they do more than just reflect a 
nation’s discontent and resilience; they serve as a means of reform and are expressions of 
support and unification for the republic Iran.  
Furthermore, post-Green-Movement Iran is a post-revolutionary society with a thirty-year 
distance from the climax of the 1979 Revolution and an eight-year distance from its awakening 
uprising in 2009. Correspondingly, political jokes that emerged in this society are not in-time-of-
conflict jokes since they reflect the opinion of the nation not in desire or perhaps need of another 
revolution, but in demand for reform within the deep layers of their existing system. As my 
informants indicate, post-Green Movement Iran is a country on an uneven path toward 
democracy and reform, not a society close to eruption for overthrowing the regime. This notion 
of reform is embodied in the heart of these jokes, bolder than concepts of resistance, and this 
makes these jokes different from humor under repressive regimes.  
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Additionally, unlike anti-Nazi or anti-Soviet humor, post-Green movement Iranian jokes 
have not risen in the height of extensive repression. On the contrary, they emerged when my 
reformist informants found a patron at one of the highest level of politics, a president -  the head 
of the Executive Branch of the government - who stood by them against blocking and silencing. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the February jokes, as the most recent example of post-Green 
Movement humor, evolved more around action-demanding concepts such as unification, 
mobilization, and revenge as a means of reformation instead of attacking the whole “ideology of 
the system” as it appeared in Soviet and post-Soviet jokes (Astapova 2015) and even the Tahrir-
Square jokes in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Helmy and Frerichs 2013).  
 According to what my informants told me, it can be concluded that my study of their 
political jokes neither belongs to the Orwellian group nor promotes Davies’ and his like-minded 
colleagues’ views. Indeed, what it offers is a new starting point in thinking about and analysing 
political humor. Rather than seeking resistance and identifying its types in our enquiries, I 
suggest we change the initial question and embark on our exploration from a different 
perspective. Instead of asking “what kind of resistance,” I propose, we ask “whether resistance” 
and try to find other forms of response to the dominant power. Iranian political jokes show 
people do not always wish to be on the other side of the politics as the resilient or revolutionary 
force; rather, they sometimes ally with and assist some parts to defeat or reform other parts. In 
this way, if we assume politics as a scale with two trays, and the dominant power in one tray, it 
should not be necessarily resistance or revolution on the opposite side to balance out the pressure 
and repression. The weights in this scale are mixed as power, official politics, and vernacular 
politics all come into play together.  
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Seeing jokes as a means of reform rather than resistance is an attempt to solve the 
inherent problem with the views of both groups. In fact, this approach stands in between both 
groups’ viewpoints by offering an intermediary standpoint. On one hand, it invites the Orwellian 
scholars to seek other forms of change brought by humor in a society. Reform is one such 
example; in a non-democratic society, revolution is not the only way to resolve issues with the 
dictator. The system itself might provide people with opportunities to improve the situation from 
within. With “their disguise” in their language (Schultz 1995, 62), jokes facilitate this reform and 
bring about a change, as minor as awakening people’s ideas and as major as shaking up the 
elections.  
On the other hand, replacing resistance with reform unbounds the pro-Davies scholars 
from their essentialising persistence in dividing countries into democratic and repressive ones, 
and associating repression alone with resistance. Consequently, in this new approach, the direct 
relations between repression and humor’s effectiveness become pointless, and humor’s roles, 
otherwise limited to “quiet protest” and “a narrative of blame,” become extended. In this way, 
my proposed approach also opens up a new possibility in this group of scholars’ rigid 
conclusions about democratic countries. If not only repression gives birth to powerful political 
jokes, other responses to the dominant power have the potential to produce numerous and 
effective jokes under any circumstances, either humor is free or suffocated. As a result, jokes 
which are born out of freedom and not conflict are capable of making real changes in their 
societies.  
However, while my proposed theory insists on the visible and non-decorative role of 
humor, I do not aim to romanticize its effect and exaggerate its power in non-democratic 
countries like Iran with several instances of violation of political freedom, freedom of speech, 
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and human rights. Doubtlessly, humor’s reform is limited as the criticism embedded and 
expressed in jokes’ vernacular politics is cautious. My informants told me over and over that in 
Iran, they pursue their political activities, even including making and sharing political jokes, 
under the constant fear of the authorities. The recent mass arrest of Telegram channels’ 
administrators who were politically active during the 2016 February elections (mentioned in 
Chapter Four) was among several reasons which they named as the cause of this fear. Therefore, 
as discussed in Chapter Five, to get political jokes to live life to the fullest, my informants must 
self-censor and watch their steps, so as to not cross the red line which is targeting unquestionably 
unjokable targets: the Revolution’s leaders. Through the construction and manifestation of 
vernacular politics and newslore in these jokes, they not only express their counterhegemonic 
political ideas in a humorous way but also protect their safety in its “cryptic” (Schutz 1995) 
language as if they are professional tightrope walkers who artistically and courageously hold 
their balance on the thin rope of their freedom.   
 
The ‘Seriously Funny’ February Electionlore: Sword and Shield 
 
In this thesis, I have examined the stories and the reports of twenty-five articulate and 
involved Iranians with regards to their consumption and distribution of political jokes in the past 
several years. I have analysed online venues, mostly Telegram channels, and semi-public places 
like taxis in which my informants created, (were) told, and participated in the distribution of 
these jokes. Through this I have thought of the metaphor sword and shield which was first 
introduced to humor studies by neuroscientist Mohamed M. Helmy and his colleague Sabine 
Frerichs in their research on political humor used among revolutionaries in Tahrir Square of 
 141
Cairo. They use “sword and shield” to explain the undeniable role of humor in the 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution. They argue: 
As a sword, […] [humor] made a thrust at Mubarak that he could not parry as he only 
knew how, with senseless violence, without him appearing powerless and silly. As a 
shield, […] it brought the Square together in an experience that was at worst tolerable, at 
best inspiring (2013, 476). 
 
With a slight twist, this metaphor is applicable to the post-Green-Movement Iranian jokes, 
especially the February electionlore, because being both sword and shield mirror these jokes’ 
dual nature: attacking and defending. In the election battlefield, as a weapon, they villainized the 
conservatives while, as a protective shield, they support my reformist informants and give their 
beloved politicians heroic faces. By doing so, they reinforce the pro-reformist voters’ group 
cohesion while dragging the conservative enemy down. The combination of three meta-theories 
about laughter, “superiority” (Hobbes 1962; Berlyne 1968; Morreall 1987), “relief” (Freud 1960; 
Meyer 2000), and “incongruity” (Beattie 1776; Oring 2003) explains these effects. 
The relief theory explores humor as a tool to relieve stress and alleviate anxiety by 
discharging the nervous energy through laughter (Freud 1960, 146-149). In this cathartic 
explanation of humor, laughter is viewed as “an aggressive weapon and a safety-valve at the 
same time” (Mikes 1971, 109). Relying on this theory, Charles E. Schutz calls the creator of 
humor the “aggressor against a political personage or social institution” who has “translated his 
anger or resentment into a satirical attack in which his target is made the butt of humor for an 
audience. The target becomes a victim and the aggressor’s anger is expended peacefully” (1997, 
77).  
According to the superiority theory, laughter is interpreted as an explicit message of 
superiority from the humor’s creators to their victims (Carell 2008, 306), thereby reinforcing the 
group’s unity against the target (Wilkins and Eisenbraun 2009). Drawing on this interpretation, 
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Gruner sees humor as a “game” which involves two opposite groups of winners, joke tellers and 
those who laugh at the joke, and losers who are victims (1997). Rather than focusing on people’s 
motives and engendered emotions, the congruity theory concentrates on the perception and the 
message of humor (Billig 2005) and analyses it as the unexpected “appropriated” (Oring 2003, 
13-26) encounter between two incongruent components (Beattie 1776).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, according to my informants, vernacular politics 
constructed and manifested in jokes challenges the formal politics and criticizes different key 
players in the game of power. In all three analysed joke sub-cycles of the February electionlore, 
the confrontation between reformist heroes and conservative villains in the vernacular political 
battlefield of jokes not only magnifies the growing political divisions in Iran but also highlights 
the existing duality between democracy and theocracy in the Iranian political system by 
juxtaposing two seemingly incongruent components. According to relief theory, the pre-election 
disqualification jokes specifically served as an aggressive weapon as well as a safety-valve. They 
alleviated the tension and anxiety among my reformist informants, which was caused by the 
mass disqualification of the reformist candidates, while attacking the Guardian Council and 
blaming hardliners for the unfair elections.  
As the large component of jokes’ vernacular politics, newslore subverted the hegemony 
of the elections’ power dynamics in favor of reformists. While Khatamilore mobilized my 
informants and other the pro-reformists’ supporters by evoking their sense of solidarity, the post-
election vote-counting jokes empowered them by engendering the feeling of superiority. In this 
way, the February electionlore not merely served as a spirit lifter but also, along with other 
campaigning tools, mobilized and unified my informants to make a political alliance which, in 
the end, led to their victory.  
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Additionally, analysis of the February electionlore suggests a broader definition of humor 
not limited to “spontaneous,” “anonymous,” and “non-strategic” (Davies 2001, 395 and 409) 
collective creations of witty minds. With the advent of new technologies and the growing 
popularity of applications such as Telegram and Dubsmash, humor is not only constructed 
through oral communications between tellers and listeners, and, likewise, the stimulated laughter 
is not restricted to the face-to-face action of laughing. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, 
my informants used different forms of stickers, Dubsmash videos, and digitally-altered photos in 
constructing their online electionlore, and, similarly, expressed laughter in forms of smiles and 
animated pictures. These customized stickers and photo-shopped or digitally altered photos were 
not spontaneously and unintentionally created and circulated all over the digital world at the 
height of these political competitions. Furthermore, as my informants emphasize, the essential 
role of Dusbsmash Khatami videos in these elections provides a good example of an identified, 
pre-planned, and strategic form of humor which came into play in favor of the List of Hope.  
Moreover, in my informants’ online political activism in the language of humor, the 
boundaries between the serious and the funny were blurred during the February elections. In the 
digital campaigns, both my informants and their opponents used humor in its different forms 
along and in line with serious language. As Maral, my 27-year-old female informant, explains, 
non-humorous political notes, speeches, and agendas were usually accompanied by and assisted 
with unquantifiable humorous electionlore. Hadis, my thirty-year-old female informant, 
describes this online movement as “a wave both rational and humorous” and argues: 
It was a beautiful wave which took many people along and brought them together! What 
I love most about it was it had both rational and fun parts all together. It was both serious 
and humorous. No part outweighed the other. There were jokes as well as serious 
political notes. […] All I want to say is they were not just jokes, they had serious 
rationales behind them. Also, beside this rationality, it was a wave of emotions. It gives 
you a feeling of hamdeli [‘compassionate’ as the closest translation. The word-by-word 
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translation is ‘united in hearts’]. All that was going on in the digital sphere echoes these 
messages to me that we are united and we are numerous [emphasis in her tone]. 
 
In addition to this intertwinement, the February electionlore is a hybridized folklore which 
converges in both digital and analog realms as online jokes entered semi-public places like taxis 
and vice versa. This hybridity made the role of February electionlore in the Iranian society more 
effective and tangible as if it sharpened the sword and rounded the shield. 
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Appendix A-Maps 
 
 
Map One: Provincial Divisions of Iran 
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Map Two: Ethnoreligious Distribution Map of Iran 
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Appendix B-Stickers 
Local Stickers 
 
The stickers below are, respectively, in the Mazani dialect (Sticker One-Three), the Kermani- 
accented Farsi (Sticker Four-Six), and the Shirazi-accented Farsi (Sticker Seven-Nine), including 
local words and expressions. Farsi and Mazani are not 100% mutually intelligible. Forough, my 
29 year- old Mazani informant, translated these stickers for me. 
Sticker One: I want you! [It is a local 
expression of love.] 
 
 
 
Sticker Two: What happened?!!! 
 
 
 
 
Sticker Three: Hi! How are you doing? 
 
Sticker Four: [a Kermani expression which 
literally means “May all your pains and 
suffering be mine” and is locally used as an 
expression of affection]  
 
 
Sticker Five: [a Kermani expression which 
literally means “Don’t grow acne” and is 
locally used to imply “don’t stress”] 
 
 
Sticker Six: Thank you in the Kermani 
accent.  
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Sticker Seven: Bravo! [in the Shirazi accent] 
 
 
 
 
Sticker Eight: [A Shirazi expression which 
literally means “What do they mean bro?” 
and is locally used for expressing confusion.] 
 
Sicker Nine: [A Shirazi expression which 
literally mean “now, wait!” and is locally 
used to imply “don’t rush” and “take it 
easy”] 
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NO2UK Stickers 
 
Sticker One: 
Queen Elizabeth: May 
you, young fellow, 
grow older [Pir shi 
javoon in Farsi, mostly 
used by elders to thank 
youth]! Come and vote 
for the Queen’s list! 
 
Sticker Two:  
Queen Elizabeth: Kido! 
Don’t you ever dare to 
vote to anti-British 
candidates! 
 
Sticker Three:  
Winston Churchill: I 
really miss interfering 
in Iran!  
 
Sticker Four: 
Jack Straw: No!! For 
God’s sake, don’t vote 
to the Revolution 
supporters! 
 
 
 
Sticker Five: 
David Cameron: You 
vote for whom I say! It 
is obvious from your 
eyes! [az cheshmat 
maloome in Farsi, 
implying “you cannot 
hide it!”]   
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Khamenei Stickers 
 
All the italic words are those which are written in the red ink in the Farsi original. 
Sticker One: 
Khamenei: 
When the 
enemy speaks 
highly of you to 
make divisions 
between you, 
express your 
hatred instantly. 
 
 
Sticker Two: 
In the enemy’s 
political 
language, 
hardliner is the 
one who is 
most adherent 
to the 
Revolution. 
 
***For 
hardliners, 
Khamenei’s use 
of enemy has 
specific 
connotations. In 
the context of 
the 2016 
elections, they 
interpreted it as 
BBC Persian 
and 
consequently, 
UK.  
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Appendix C-The Ebi Joke 
 
Ebi on the stage: “Without opening the gift”, [waiting for the audience to answer him back with 
the second verse] 
The Audience [some of the words do not have any meanings]: “Brain and surgeon”, “sent in the 
evening”, “the beginning of Islam”, “the start season”, “KaperSky”, “Iftar season”, “sent a 
horse”, “sent it back?1?”, “Feskeresko”, … 
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Appendix D: Informants 
Almost all the names listed in this table are pseudonyms that I use upon my interviewees’ 
requests to protect their identities. All the interviews are conducted by me in Farsi either in- 
person or via Skype.   
 Interviewee’s 
Name/ 
Pseudonyms  
Year of 
Birth 
Gender Education  Date of the 
Interview(s) 
Type/Place of 
the 
Interview(s) 
1 Ahmad 1985 Male Master April 30, 
2015 
In person 
(informal)/ 
Tehran 
2 Arman 1985 Male Master June 20, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
3 Asghar 1984 Male PhD June 17, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
4 Bahar 1986 Female PhD 
Student 
#1: July 2, 
2015 
#2: August 
9, 2016 
Both 
interviews in 
person/ 
Tehran 
5 Baran 1986 Female Master  June 21, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
6 Behzad 1986 Male PhD 
Student  
#1: June 22, 
2015 
#2: August 
14, 2016 
Both 
interviews in-
person, 
Tehran 
7 Eli 1986 Female Master  June 17, 
2015 
In person, 
Tehran 
8 Fariborz 1984 Male Master June 26, 
2015 
In person/ 
Kerman 
9 Forough 1987 Female Bachelor  June 11, 
2015 
In person, 
Bandar Gaz 
10 Fifi 1986 Female Master  #1: June 26, 
2015 
#1: In person/ 
Kerman 
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#2,3: March 
second and 
third, 2016  
#2: Skype 
11 Hadis 1986 Female Master  March 11, 
2016 
Skype 
12 Hana 1983 Female Master #1: June 15, 
2015 
#2: August 
10, 2016 
Both in-
person/Tehran
13 Khale 
Moshtari 
1946 Female High 
School 
Diploma 
June 13, 
2015 
In person/ 
Bandar Gaz 
14 Mahdi 1978 Male High 
School 
Diploma 
June 12, 
2015 
In person/ 
Bandar Gaz 
15 Mandana 1985 Female PhD 
Student 
June 23, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
16 Maral 1989 Female Master  March 5, 
2016 
Skype  
17 Mari 1994 Female Master June 27, 
2015 
In person/ 
Kerman 
18 Mehran 1988 Male Bachelor June 11, 
2015 
In person/ 
Bandar Gaz 
19 Narges 1986 Female PhD 
Student 
#1: June 18, 
2015 
#2: March 6, 
2016 
#1: In person/ 
Tehran 
#2: Skype 
20 Nikou 1989 Female Master  #1: June 23, 
2015 
#2: August 
7, 2016 
Both 
interviews in 
person/ 
Tehran 
21 Rezvan 1984 Female Bachelor June 20, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
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22 Sajad 1987 Male Master June 16, 
2015 
In person/ 
Tehran 
23 Sharon 1986 Female PhD 
Student 
July 17, 
2015 
Skype 
24 Shohreh 1995 Female Master June 27, 
2015 
In person/ 
Kerman 
25 Ziba 1991 Female Master June 25, 
2015 
In person/ 
Kerman 
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